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en 


THE 

SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  AND  EELIGION  OF 

COMTE 


FUBr.ISHKD    BV 

JAMES   MACI.EHOSE    AND   SONS.    GLASGOW, 
Ptililtshrrs  to  the  antbfrsitu. 

MACMII.LAN    AND  CO.,    LONDON    AND    NEW    YORK. 

Lo^idon,  ■     ■     -  Shnpkin,  Hamilton  and  Co. 

Cambridge,  ■     -  Macmillan  and  Bmves. 

Edinburgh,  -     ■  Douglas  and  Foulis. 

MDCCCXCIII. 


THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  AND 
RELIGION  OF  COMTE 


BY 


EDWARD  CAIRD,  LL.D.,  D.C.L. 

PROFESSOR  OF  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY  IN  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  OLASQOW 
LATE  FELLOW  AND  TUTOR  OF  MERTON  COLLEGE,  OXFORIl 


SECOND  EDITION 


GLASGOW 

JAMES   MACLEHOSE  AND   SONS 

publishers  to  the  gJnibcvsitg 

1893 


149343 


WITH   AFFECTION    AND   ESTEEM, 
MY   FRIEND   AND   COLLEAGUE 

JOHN   NICHOL. 


CONTENTS. 


Preface, 


CHAPTER  I. 

a 

g  GENERAL  ACCOUNT  OF  COMTE's  PHILOSOPHY. 

__i        f!mntp\<i  fii.ndamp.ntal  principles — Their  heariiui_on_}m   viQiV   of 

2  history — Decay  of  theology  and  of  the  social  system  founded 

^  on  it — Metaphysic>t,   its  strength  for  destruction  and  weakness 

t3  for  construction — //  prcjiares  the  v:ay  for  positive  science,  on 

O  'which  the  social  system  of  the  future  must  he  based — Necessity 

W  for  a  new  religion  based  on  scie7ice — Humanity  the  true  object 

of  worship — The  social  system  corresponding  to  the  religion  of 

Humanity — Man's   intellectual   and  moral  poivers   evolved  in 

conflict   with   nature — The   nature   of  the   social   organization 

and  the  three  forms  of  society,  the  Family,  the  State,  and  the 

Church — The  Priesthood  of  Humanity  and  its  office.  1-46 


CHAPTER  n. 

THE    NEGATIVE    SIDE    OF    COMTE's    PHILOSOPHY HIS 

OPPOSITION    TO   METAPHYSIC    AND    THEOLOGY. 

Growth  of  a  nevj  view  of  the  social  organism  opposed  at  once  to 
Individualism  and  Socialism — Comte  and  the  (j£xma7i  Idealists 


-iii  CONTENTS. 

—Meaning  of  his  attack  on  Metaphysics— His  real  agreement 
with  modern  metaphysicians— He  adopts  Locke's  principles  as 
to  knowledge,  yet  is  opposed  to  the  Individualism  of  Locke's 
French  disciples— He  attacks  Realism  as  a  Nominalist  and 
yomn\{lii\\\\  lilil  i\~1^mUnt,  iritinT  if  rriTi'i^iri  qtiidcd  h  "  higher 
principle  than  either — His  mistaken  attitude  towards  the 
'^Ut\ia(  l^los6p7iy^Relutio7i...u;^^-Pkiim0pIi^.Jo.  Science— It 
makes  men  conscious  of  their  guiding  principles — Comte's  un- 
consciousness of  the  categories  that  g^iide  his  thought — Con- 
sequent defects  in  his  view  of  the  development  of  Religion,  of 
Philosophy,  and  of  Science— Mr.  Spencer's  criticism  and 
Littr€s  answer — Ambiguity  in  the  opposition  between  the  uni- 
versal and  the  particular 47-93 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE  POSITIVE  OR  CONSTRUCTIVE  SIDE  OF  COMTE's  PHILO- 
SOPHY— HIS  SUBSTITUTES  FOR  METAPHYSIC  AND 
THEOLOGY. 

His  recognition  of  the  need  of  substitutes  for  Theology  and 
Metaphysic — His  assertion  that  his  philosopku-is  relative  and 
subjective — Double  meaning  of  the  relativity  (f  knowledge,  as 
involving  the  assertion  or  the  denial  of  real  or  absolute  know- 
ledge— Collision  of  Comte's  earlier  and  later  views  on  this 
point — Comte's  stibjective  synthesis  not  subjective  in  the  sense 
of  Individualism,  nor  yet  in  the  sense  that  a  conscious  subject 
is  implied  in  all  objects — His  compromise  between  these  opposite 
theories — His  doctrine  that  man  sees  the  viojildAxi  ordine  ad 
hominem  but  not  in  ordme,-ad,_universum — Impossibility  of 
separating  nature  from  man  or  of  criticising  the  whole  system 
to  v)hich  man  belongs — Defects  of  Comte's  religion  according 
to  his  own  idea  of  religion — Schisms  in  the  school  of  Comte. 

94-148 


CONTENTS.  ix 

CHAPTER  IV. 

comte's  view  of  the  relation  of  the  intellect  to 

THE     heart ITS     EFFECT     ON     His      CONCEPTION     OK 

HISTORY    AND    OF    THE    SOCIAL    IDEAL. 

The  necessity  for  unity  in  man's  intellectual  and  moral  lift — 
Nature  of  the  conflict  heticeen  the  intelligence  and  the  heart — 
It  is  really  a  conflict  of  intelligence  with  itself — Criticism  of 
Comte's  doctrine  that  the  intelligence  must  he  subjected  to  the 
heart — Its  efect  upon  his  conception  of  history,  especially  of 
the  history  of  Christianity — The  two  elements  in  Christianity, 
their  conflict  and  reconciliation  in  its  development — The  nega- 
tive tendencies  of  mediceval  Catholicism  and  the  positive  tend- 
encies of  the  modern  era — Comte's  imperfect  conception  of  the 
Reformation  and  the  Revolution— His  restoration  of  the 
mediceval  ideal — His  general  position  as  a  Philosopher. 

149-210 


PREFACE. 


This  volume  consists  of  a  series  of  articles  wliicli 
have  already  appeared  in  the  Contemporary  Review, 
and  which  the  proprietors  of  that  Eeview  have 
kindly  permitted  me  to  republish.  A  few  para- 
graphs have  been  re-written,  and  a  few  verljal 
changes  introduced,  to  remove  obscurity  or  in- 
accuracy, but  the  general  substance  of  the  articles 
remains  unaltered. 

In  the  following  exposition  and  criticism  of 
Comte's  philosophy  I  have  considered  it  mainly, 
though  not  exclusively,  in  its  ethical  and  religious 
aspects.  I  have  not  attempted  to  deal  with  the 
detailed  discussion  of  the  nature  and  methods  of 
the  sciences  in  Comte's  FhilosojjJiie  Positive,  except 
in  so  far  as  is  necessary  for  the  understanding 
of  the  Politique  Positive,  in  which  the  social  and 
religious  aims  of  his  philosophy  are  for  the  first 
time  explicitly  stated.  Not,  indeed,  that  there 
is  any  very  marked  division  between  his  earlier 
and  his  later  treatises.  The  changes  observal^le 
in  the  latter  do  not  show,  as  has  sometimes 
been    represented,    a    sudden    revolution    of    opinion  : 


xii  PREFACE. 

they  are  only  the  last  result  of  tendencies  which 
had  been  gaining  ground  in  Comte's  mind  as  his 
work  advanced,  and  gradually  carrying  him  away 
from  his  original  principles,  or  at  least  greatly 
modifying  their  first  significance,  I  have  preferred, 
however,  to  confine  myself,  in  the  main,  to  the 
social  philosophy  of  Comte  and  the  restoration  of 
religion  connected  therewith,  partly  because  I  have 
not  sufficient  scientific  knowledge  to  estimate  the 
value  of  his  critical  review  of  mathematics  and 
physics,  chemistry  and  biology ;  and  partly  because, 
so  far  as  I  know,  there  has  been  very  little  serious 
criticism  of  that  part  of  his  work  which  he  regarded 
(I  think  justly)  as  the  most  important  and  original. 
In  his  earlier  treatise,  or  at  least  in  the  greater 
part  of  it,  Comte  was  working  upon  lines  which 
are  common  to  him  with  all  the  representatives 
of  what  in  the  last  century  was  termed  "  Enlight- 
enment," and  now  most  often  goes  by  the  names 
of  "  Positivism "  or  "  Agnosticism."  But  the  dis- 
tinctive _jDeculiaiil^L_iiLJlkLiiil^^  does  not 
,  stopat  that  negation  of  metaphysics  and  theology 
which  is  characteristic  of  this~~school,  but '  that  his 
PositivLsm  reproduces^  both,  though  in  a  new  form. 
It  fs7 indeed,  just  this  new  eleliient  in  Comte  which 
gives  a  truly  "  positive  "  meaning  to  his  well-known 
law  of  development,  which  in  its  first  form  might 
more  truly  be  described  as  "  negative."  For  in 
that  form  all  that  it  distinctly  tells  us  about  the 
development  of  the_Jmman  mind  is  that  man  once 
believed  in  theological  oi^  metaphysical  fictions,  and 
that  lie    has    now_£eased,    or is    gradually    ceasing, 


PREFACE.  xiii 

to  believe  in  them.  In  his  later  writings,  however, 
Comte  has  come  to  see  that  l>otli  Theology  and 
Metaphysics  are  based  upon  perennial  wants  of  man's 
spiritual  nature,  wants  which,  as  man,  he  cannot 
but  feel,  and  for  which  a  real  and  not  merely  a 
fictitious  satisfaction  can  be  provided.  He  teaclies 
us,  therefore,  to  regard  the  progress  of  man  as  a 
true  development,  in  which  the  passing  away  of 
the  first  forms  of  his  higher  life  is  incidental  to 
the  lurther~jnanifestation__o^^  spirit  which  was 
once  expressed  in  them.  Hence  the  last  or  "  posi- 
tive "  stage  of  thought  is  conceived  to  be  a  negation 
and  abolition  of  the  past,  in  which  all  that  gave  ^^-/C- 
the  past  its  value  is  reaflirmed  and  maintained. 
It  is  a  hJCThpr  "pnsitivp/'  which  IS  reached  through 
the  neo-ation  of  the  lower,  but  it  is  itself  a  great 
deal"  more  "than  thatnegation. 

^owTthe  ultimate  interest  of  Comte's  philosophy 
lies  in  the  success  or  failure  of  this  attempt  of 
his  to  find  a  new  satisfaction  for  those  higher  wants 
of  humanity,  which  Theology  and  Metaphysic,  or,  ^ 
as  I  should  prefer  to  say,  Eeligion  and  Philosophy,  , 
have  so  long  been  supposed  to  satisfy.  It  is  not 
difficult  to  describe,  at  least  in  general  terms,  what 
these  wants  are.  Philosophy  professes  to  seek  and 
to  find  the  principle  of  unity  which  underlies  all 
the  manifold  particular  truths  of  the  separate  sciences, 
and  in  reference  to  which  they  can  be  brought 
together  and  organized  as  a  system  of  knowledge. 
And  Eeligion,  while  it  also  is  concerned  with  an 
absolute  principle  of  reality,  diflers  from  Philosophy 
mainly  in   this,  that   it   is   not    merely   or   primarily 


xiv  PREFACE. 

theoretical.  For  Iveligion,  what  is  required  is  such 
a  conviction  as  to  the  ultimate  basis  of  our  exist- 
ence as  shall  enable  us  to  find  therein  at  once  an 
adequate  object  of  affection  and  a  sufficient  aim  for 
all  our  practical  endeavours.  Now  a  scientific  Ag- 
nosticism, such  as  is  common  at  the  present  day, 
means  either  that  there  are  no  such  wants  in  man, 
or  that,  if  they  exist,  no  provision  is  made  for 
their  satisfaction.  Such  an  Agnosticism  could  scarcely 
find  a  better  expression  for  itself  than  the  Comtean 
.^  law  of  intellectual  development ;  for,  as  that  law  is 
commonly  understood,  it  implies  that  the  whole  pro- 
gress of  man  has  been  just  his  gradual  awakening 
to  the  necessity  of  renouncing  all  effort  to  penetrate 
to  the  reality  which  is  hidden  behind  the  veil  of 
phenomena.  On  this  view,  it  is  vain  for  man  to  ask 
any  longer  the  question  of  Philosophy,  or  to  attempt 
to  find  a  support  for  his  life  in  the  faiths  and 
hopes  of  religion.  Man  is  but  a  link  or  a  series 
of  links  in  the  endless  chain  of  phenomenal  causes ; 
his  utmost  knowledge  cannot  reach  beyond  the  re- 
lations of  particular  things  to  each  other  and  to 
his  own  particular  existence ;  and  whatever  he  may 
desire,  to  these  relations  he  must  be  content  prac- 
tically to  limit  himself.  Tccutii  hahita  et  noris  quam 
sit  tihi  curta  supdlex. 

Now  the  peculiarity  of  Comte's  position  is  that 
he  admits  the  principle  on  which  this  Agnostic  view 
is  based,  and  yet  at  the  same  time  rejects  the 
\  conclusions  which  are  usually  and  naturally  drawn 
from  it.  He  accepts  the  situation  as  he  under- 
stands it.      He  admits  and  contends  that  Philosophy 


PREFACE.  XV 

is  defeated  in  its  attempt  to  reacli  an  al).solute 
principle — a  principle  of  unity,  whitli  is  at  once 
the  real  or  objective  centre  of  the  universe,  and  the 
subjective  centre  for  our  knowledge  of  it.  He 
admits  and  contends  that  there  is  a  great  gulf 
fixed  between  the  absolute  reality  of  things  and 
our  consciousness  of  them.  Nevertheless,  he  holds 
that,  in  a  sense,  we  may  still  aspire  to  that  en- 
cyclopaedic or  universal  view  of  things  which 
Philosophy  pretended  to  give  ;  for,  though  we  cannot 
reach  an  objective  principle  of  unity  in  things,  we 
can  still  gather  knowledge  to  a  subjective  centre, 
by  regarding  all  things  in  relation  to  our  own 
needs  and  uses.  This,  however,  does  not  mean 
that  we  are  to  view  everything  in  relation  to  our 
own  individual  pleasures  and  pains.  For  the  indi- 
vidual is  essentially  related  to  his  race ;  or  rather, ' 
to  use  Comte's  own  expression,  the  "  individual 
man  is  a  mere  abstraction,  and  there  is  nothing 
real  but  Humanity."  Hence,  in  knowledge  and  in 
feeling  we  are  carried  beyond  ourselves ;  and  as  in 
our  moral  life  we  can  rise  from  egoism  to  altruism, 
so  in  our  intellectual  life  we  can  learn  to  regard 
the  world  from  the  point  of  view,  not  of  the 
individual,  but  of  the  race.  And  the  same  change 
brings  with  it  the  restoration  of  religion.  The 
"  objective "  or  absolute  God,  the  God  who  made 
all  things  work  together  for  good  to  His  creatures, 
has  disappeared  with  the  fictions  of  childhood. 
'But  His  place  has  been  taken  by  Humanity,  con- 
ceived as  a  great  providential  existence,  which 
sustains    and    controls     the     life    of    the     individual 


xvi  PREFACE. 

man,  and  in  wliich  he  finds  a  sufficient  object  for 
all  his  devotion.  Looking  to  this  Great  Being, 
man  need  not  feel  the  want  of  any  other  God. 
He  has  before  his  eyes  One  who  can  help  him 
and  whom  he  can  love  and  serve.  Or  if  he 
should  still  feel  something  wanting,  as  an  object 
of  worship,  in  a  Being  who  is  not  the  Absolute 
l>eing,  he  is  at  liberty  to  indulge  in  the  poetic 
illusion  which  makes  Nature,  as  well  as  Humanity, 
the  friend  of  man.  If  he  does  so,  however,  he 
must  remember  that  he  is  yielding  to  an  illusion, 
which  is  not  supported  by  anything  we  know  of 
Nature ;  for  Nature,  apart  from  the  action  of  man 
upon  it,  shows  itself  as  a  mere  fatality,  which  is 
.  altogether  indifferent  to  his  weal  or  woe. 

Even  this  short  sketch  of  Comte's  system — for 
the  detailed  exposition  of  which  the  reader  is  re- 
ferred to  the  following  chapters — may  suffice  to 
show  where  the  vital  spot,  the  Achilles'  heel,  of 
Comte's  philosophy  lies.  It  lies  in  the  idea  of  a 
'^^  "  subjective  synthesis "  or  relative  centre  of  know- 
ledge. This  idea  for  Comtists  is  the  articulus 
stantis  vel  cadentis  philosophiac.  If  this  central 
principle  can  be  securely  defended,  it  matters  little 
to  the  orthodox  Positivist  how  many  of  the  subor- 
dinate elements  of  Comte's  thought  may  have  to  be 
abandoned  or  modified.  If  it  has  to  be  surrendered, 
however  numerous  and  valuable  may  be  the  separate 
truths  and  suggestions  which  are  discoverable  in 
every  part  of  Comte's  works,  his  philosophy  as  a 
whole  must  be  given  up.  From  what  I  have  read 
of  the  works  of  Comte's  most  zealous  and  discerning 


/ 


PREFACE.  xvii 

followers,  I  am  disposed  to  think  that  tliey  would 
be  ready  to  accept  this  issue.  Os'ow  Conitu's  position  ' 
has  generally  been  attacked,  if  one  might  so  express 
it,  from  the  rear,  i.e.,  by  those  whose  views  accord 
most  with  his  earlier  doctrine  expressed  in  the 
Philosophic  Positive,  and  who  regard  liini  as  aban- 
doning the  true  Positivism  when  he  admits  any 
philosophical  or  religious  synthesis  whatever,  whetlier 
subjective  or  objective,  whether  relative  or  absolute^ 
It  is  in  this  way  that  Comte  was  assailed  by 
Littr(^,  the  most  eminent  of  his  French  disciples ; 
and  it  is  in  this  way  also  that  he  was  criticized 
by  Mill  and  Lewes,  who,  without  being  strictly 
his  disciples,  accepted  most  of  the  leading  ideas  of 
his  earlier  work.  '  If  there  is  any  novelty  in  the"1 
criticism  contained  in  the  following  pages,  it  is  that  V 
it  starts  from  the  opposite  point  of  view,  and  seeks 
to  show  that  the  true  synthesis  of  philosophy  must"~"" 
be  objective  as  well  as  sul)jective,  and  that  there 
can  be  no  religion  of  Humanity,  which  is  not  also 
a  religion  of  God,  And  this  means  that  it  is 
logically  impossible  to  go  beyond  the  merely 
individualistic  point  of  view  with  which  Comte 
started,  except  on  the  assumption  that  the  intelli- 
gence of  man  is,  or  involves,  a  universal  principle 
of  knowledge.  The  same  arguments,  in  fact,  which 
break  down  the  division  between  man  and  man, 
break  down  also  the  division  between  man  and 
nature  ;  for,  if  all  mankind  be  considered  as 
organically  united,  it  becomes  impossible  not  to 
recognize  in  nature  an  essential  relation  to  man, 
which  makes  it   in  some   sense  a  part   of  the   same 


XVlll 


PREFACE. 


organism.  The  history  of  the  development  of 
Comte's  thought  is  itself,  as  I  endeavour  in  the 
sequel  to  show,  an  evidence  of  this  principle ;  for 
it  is  the  history  of  a  development  which  ends  by 
all     but     retracting     the     negations     with    which     it 

Jjegins.  And  when,  in  his  Synthase  Subjective, 
Cointe  sanctions  the  poetic  treatment  of  Space  and 
the  Earth,  as  divine  friends  of  man  and  members 
of  a  kind  of  Trinity  in  which  Humanity  is  the 
third  person,  he  comes  very  near  to  a  complete 
return  upon  himself.  It  has,  indeed,  been  contended 
by  Dr.  Bridges  *  that  this  is  but  the  ordinary 
license  of  poetry,  such,  for  instance,  as  we  find  in 
Shelley's  Earth-hymn  in  the  "  Prometheus  Unbound." 
"  Supposing  any  one  had  taken  Shelley  seriously 
to  task  for  maintaining  that  the  Earth  is  alive, 
should  we  not  think  him  curiously  dull  and 
pedantic  ?  "  True,  it  may  be  answered :  but, 
supposing  any  one  had  maintained  that  the  earth 
is  not  in  any  sense  the  expression  of  that  spiritual 
principle  which  expresses  itself  in  a  higher  way 
in  living  beings,  and  above  all  in  man,  and  that, 
therefore,  there  is  nothing  hut  fiction  in  the 
ascription  of  life  to  it,  should  we  not  be  entitled 
to  say  that  he  had  lost  hold  of  the  sense  in  which 
poetry  is  truth  ?  Should  we  not  consider  that 
he  had  degraded  poetry  from  a  sensuous  and  there- 
fore partly  fictitious  presentment  of  ideal  truth,  into 
a  mere  plaything  of  fancy  which  bodies  forth  things 
that    are    not    as    if    they    were  ?     In    Comte's    case 

f^^the  interest  of  the  poetic  fiction  consists  in  this, 
*  "  Unity  of  Comte's  Life  and  Doctrine,"  p.  60. 


PREFACE.  xix 

that  it  was  the  huaginative  anticipation  of  a  truth 
towards  which  he  was  moving,  l)iit  which  hi' 
had  not  distinctly  recognized.  His  imagination 
had  already  emancipated  him  from  the  limits  of 
those  earlier  opinions  of  his,  which  still  held  good 
for  his  understanding.  If  he  had  taken  one  step 
farther,  the  wheel  would  have  "  come  full  circle " ; 
and  he  would  have  restored  lioth  Theology  and 
Philosophy  to  the  place  from  which  he  expelled 
them,  j  He  would  have  "burnt  what  he  had  adored, 
and  adored   what  he  had   burnt." 

I  cannot  say  so  much  in  criticism  of  Comte's 
views  without  adding — what  every  new  reading  of 
his  works  and  especially  of  the  Politique  Fosithc 
makes  me  feel  more  strongly — that  the  value  of 
his  teaching  is  by  no  means  to  be  estimated  by 
its  mere  logical  result.  Whatever  may  be  said 
of  his  philosophy  as  a  whole,  he  possessed  that 
unmistakable  instinct  for  truth  which  renders 
even  the  errors  and  inconsistencies  of  men  of 
genius  more  instructive  than  the  most  unexception- 
able reasonings  of  many  judicious  persons,  who 
follow  the  beaten  tracks  of  thought  and,  tlierefore, 
"  need  no  repentance." 


EDWARD  (JAIRD. 


University  ov  Glasgow, 
March,   1885. 


THE   SOCIAL   PHILOSOPHY   AND 
RELIGION   OF   COMTE. 

CHAPTEE  I. 

GENERAL  ACCOUNT  OF  COMTE'S  PHlLOSOrHV. 

Comte^s  fundamental  principles — Their  hearing  on  his  vieiv  of 
history — Decg,y  of  theology  and  of  the  social  system  founded 
on  it — Metaphysics,  its  strength  for  destruction  aiid  weakness 
for  construction — It  prepares  the  vmy  for  positive  science,  on 
which  the  social  system  of  the  future  must  be  based — Necessity 
for  a  new  religion  based  on  science — Humanity  the  true  object 
of  worship — The  social  system  corresponding  to  the  religion  of 
Humanity — Maris  intellectual  and  moral  poioers  evolved  in 
conflict  with  nature — The  nature  of  the  social  organization 
and  the  three  forms  of  society,  the  Family,  the  State,  and  the 
Church — The  Priesthood  of  Humanity  and  its  office. 

It  is  impossible  to  understand  the  errors  of  a  great 
writer  unless  we  do  justice  to  the  truth  which  under- 
lies them.  In  judging  of  Comte's  philosophy,  and 
especially  of  his  social  philosophy,  this  law  of 
criticism  has  often  been  neglected,  even  by  those 
who,  from  their  general   philosophical   point  of  view, 


2  THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

might  seem  best  qualified  to  appreciate  him.  Dis- 
agreeing as  I  do  with  many  of  his  conclusions,  I 
cannot  hope  to  be  entirely  successful  in  doing  him 
justice.  But  the  attempt  to  do  so  may  have  its  use, 
if  only  in  bringing  to  light  the  relationship  of  philo- 
sophies which  are  commonly  regarded  as  having  no 
connection  with  each  other.  The  spirit  of  tlie  time 
is  greater  than  any  of  its  expressions,  and  it  moulds 
them  all,  under  whatever  outward  diversity  of  form, 
to  a  common  result.  If  there  is  anything  which 
the  history  of  philosophy  teaches  with  clearness,  it 
is  that  contemjjoraneous  movements  of  the  human 
spirit,  even  those  which  appear  to  be  most  inde- 
pendent or  antagonistic,  are  but  partial  expressions 
of  a  truth  which  is  not  fully  revealed  in  any  one 
of  them,  and  which  can  be  adequately  appreciated 
only  by  a  later  generation.  The  present  is  said  to 
be  par  excellence  the  age  of  historical  criticism  ;  but 
the  historical  imagination  is  worth  little  if  it  does 
not  enable  us  to  discover  identity  of  nature  under 
the  most  varied  disguises,  and,  instead  of  being  con- 
fined to  the  formulae  of  any  one  philosophy,  to  remould 
and  renew  our  own  ideas  by  entering  into  the  minds 
of  others.  In  order  to  prepare  the  way  for  a  just 
appreciation  of  the  teaching  of  Comte,  I  shall,  in 
this  chapter,  give  a  short  sketch  of  his  philosophy, 
and  more  particularly  of  his  social  philosophy,  as 
far  as  possible  from  his  own  point  of  view,  reserving 


RELATION  TO  ROUSSEAU. 


for  subsequent  chapters  what  I  liave  to    say    i 
way  of  criticism. 

There  are  two  inaiu  thouijhts  which  rule  the 


■  -.::o 


the 


of  Comte,  and  are  the  sources  of  luusL  of  the  j)eculi-  cJ,',Tto!' 
;iviti('s  of  his   system.       Tlie   one  is   "  tlie    hiw   of  the 
three    stages "|    the    other    is    tlic     suljordination    of 
science_to_uiaa?s  social  well-being,  or,  as  he  expresses  ~~^ 
it,  of  the   intellect  tt)  the  heart.      The  first  of  these  f  ^ 
thoughts     eniliodii's    his    ciiicrinu    of    l<uo\v]c(l'_;v  ;     the  J 
\second  is  the  principle  by  which  he  seeks  to  system-   \ 
atize  knowledge,  and    to   estimate   the   relative  value . ' 
of    its    parts.      The    relation    of   these    two  points    in 
the   mind    of   Comte    will    be   best    understood    if  we 
recall   his  historical  position   and   the  early  course  of 
his    mental    development.       As    with    most    educated 
Frenchmen    of   his    time,    Comte's    first    thoughts   on 
social    politics    were    suggested    by    the    llevolution  ; 
and  his  youthful  connection   with   St.   Simon    showed 
that  he  shared  in  that  reaction  against  the   individ- 
ualistic philosophy  of  the  Eighteenth  Century,  which 
gave    rise    to    so    many    socialistic    and    communistic 
theories.      In  the  school  of  St.  Simon,  Comte  learned 
the    falsehood   of  the   gospel    of  Eousseau — that   last    ^ 
quintessence    of  the   philosophy   which   found   reality 
only  in  the  individual,  and  which,  therefore,  idealized 
the  natural  man  as  he  is  apart   from,  and   prior   to, 
all  society,   and   regarded   all   social  inlluence  as  de- 
teriorating from  his  original  purity.     The  hollowness 


i^V 


4  THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

of  that  theory  had   l)cen   written    in    letters   of  blood 
on    the   page   of  recent   history,   and  tliat   too   plaiidy 
to  be  ignored  by  the  most  hopeful  theorist  on  social 
sulijects,     Nor  could  anyone  who  had  read  it  there, 
fail  to  perceive  also  the  less  striking   failure   of   the 
same  doctrines  in  tlieir  economical  form.      The  libera- 
tion of  the  individual  liad  nut  brought  to  man  political 
salvation,  l)ut  had  rather  revealed  his  essential  weak- 
\   ,     ness   when  emancipated  from  the  restraints  of  social 
order.      "  Laissez    faire "    had    not,   as    was    expected, 
introduced  an  economic  millennium  ;  but  had  rather 
given   rise   to    a   struggle    of  interests,   which,   if  not 
moderated    by    any    higher    principle,   might    end    in 
the  dissolution  of  society.      Hence  the  mere  irrational 
movement   of   reaction    drove    the    mass    of   men    to 
bind    again    upon    themselves    the    fetters    which    the 
Eevolution    had   broken,  and   taught   those  who,  like 
De   Maistre,   represented   the   ideas   and    interests   of 
the  past,   the   speculative   strength   of  their   position. 
De   Maistre    saw    clearly   that   mere  individualism   is 
anarchy,   and    that    the    moral   education    of    man    is 
possible  only  through  some  binding  social  force.      Xor 
was  it  difficult  for  a  skilful  special  pleader  like  him 
to    confound    this    truth    with    the   doctrine    that    the 
only  safety  for  civilization  lay  in  a  renewed  submis- 
sion to  the  medineval  order  of  Church  and  State.      On 
the   other   hand,   men    who   were    too    nuich    imbued 
with    the    modern    spirit    to    be    moved    l)y    this   re- 


RELATION  TO  THE  SOCIALISTS.  .-, 

actionary  k)f,dc,  were  led  to  detach  the  socialistic 
idea  from  the  special  form  it  had  taken  in  past 
history,  and  to  seek  for  some  new  form  of  political 
organization,  in  which  individual  freedom  should  be 
again  subordinated  to  social  order.  Such  men  were 
St.  Simon  and  Fourier — not,  in  any  sense,  great  or 
comprehensive  thinkers,  but  writers  who  were  effec- 
tive and  influential  for  the  moment  simply  because 
they  represented  the  abstraction  which  was  then 
rising  into  favour,  and  which  liad  at  least  this  to 
recommend  it,  that  it  was  the  opposite  abstraction 
to  that  of  the  IJevolutionists.  Comte  was  too  roliust 
and  manysided  to  remain  long  under  the  inHuence 
either  of  the  concrete  or  of  the  abstract  reactionaries 
■ — either  of  those  who  sought  to  return  to  the  form, 
or  of  those  who  sought  to  return  to  the  spirit,  f)f 
the  past.  But  his  temporary  subjection  to  St. 
Simon,  and  his  ultimate  revolt  against  him,  hel])  us 
in   some    measure   to    understand   that   double   move-  ^^;;- 

men'E  of  thought  out  of  which  his  system  sprung. 
His  subjectionT  indicated  that  he  had  seen  the  in- 
sufficiency and  unreality,  the  abstract  and  unhistorical 
character,  of  the  gospel  of  mere  rebellion.  His 
emancipation  from  St.  Simon  indicated  his  discovery 
that  the  simple  repression  of  reliellion,  the  mere 
closing  up  of  the  ranks  of  society  under  a  social 
despotism,  was  an  utterly  inadequate  solution  of  the 
difficulty.      The    problem    before    him,    therefore,    was 


6  THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

to  do  justice  to  the  element  of  truth  in  each  of 
these  movements — to  the  social  imj^ulse  on  the  one 
hand  and  to  the  critical  movement  of  intelligence  on 
the  other, — and  to  reconcile  them  in  a  higher  unity. 
Socialism  had  taught  him  that  social  enthusiasm  might 
be  separated  from  the  religious  and  political  institu- 
tions on  which  it  had  rested  in  the  past  ;  and  the 
progress  of  science  had  taught  him  that  intelligence 
has  a  constructive  as  well  as  a  critical  influence. 
The  solution,  therefore,  was  simply  to  take  the 
former,  as  determining  the  end  and  goal  of  all  prac- 
tical effort  ;  and  the  latter,  as  pointing  out  the 
proper  means  for  its  attainment.  The  enthusiasm 
of  humanity  guided  by  science,  science  directed  so 
as  to  secure  the  highest  happiness  of  humanity,  were 
thus  the  two  ideas  by  which  the  course  of  his 
thoughts  was  determined, 
hl'g'^on'hrs'  -'■'^  ^^®  ^^^^  place  these  ideas  gave  to  Comte  what 
history.  secmcd  to  him  a  perfect  key  to  the  history  of  the 
past.  Man  he  conceives  of  as  a  being  who  at  first 
is  divided  between  weak  social  tendencies  which 
l)ind  him  to  his  fellows,  and  strong  selfish,  or,  as 
he  calls  them,  personal  instincts,  which  make  liim 
their  rival  and  their  enemy  ;  yet  without  the  triumph 
of  the  former  over  the  latter  there  can  be  no  security 
for  his  welfare  or  even  for  his  existence.  This 
triumph  of  social  sympathy  is  the  first  necessity 
of  civilization  ;    and   in   an   early  age  any  theory  of 


THE  NEED  FOR  A   THEOLOGY.  7 

life  must  l>e  welcome  which  promises  to  secure  it. 
The  first  social  leaders  of  mankind,  even  if  such  an 
idea  could  have  presented  itself  to  them,  could  not 
wait  with  patience  till  experience  had  revealed  to 
them  the  true  nature  of  man  and  the  world  he 
lives  in.  Their  ignorance  and  their  benevolent  haste 
to  organize  society,  and  to  bind  men  together  in 
the  bonds  of  a  definite  faith,  made  them  eagerly 
grasp  at  the  first  explanation  of  the  universe  which 
imagination  suggested  ;  and  that  first  explanation 
was  of  course  anthropomorphic.  "  As  they  watched 
nature,  as  their  eyes  wandered  over  the  surface  of 
the  profound  oceau,  instead  of  the  bed  hidden  under 
the  waters,  they  saw  nothing  but  the  refiection  of 
their  own  faces."*  Hence  the  first  moral  order  and 
social  discipline  established  among  men  was  based 
upon  a  theological  explanation  of  the  universe.  Nor 
did  the  insecurity  of  the  foundation  seem  for  a  long 
time  to  interfere  with  the  firmness  of  the  super- 
structure. The  union  of  men  was  like  the  union 
of  an  army — a  union  of  men  bound  together  for 
life  and  death,  though  the  bond  that  united  thfim 
was  but  a  fairy  tale.  Yet,  in  the  long  run,  it  was 
impossible  that  criticism  should  not  make  itself  heard. 
Advancing  experience,  as  it  disclosed  that  the  world 
is  no  plaything  of  arbitrary  wills  but  an  order  of 
fixed  law,  gradually  limited  the  free  play  of  imagin- 
*Tur<i;ot. 


8  THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

ation,  and  removed  the  gods  to  a  greater  and 
greater  distance.  When,  therefore,  jihenomena  were 
seen  to  group  themselves  in  large  genera,  with 
permanent  attributes  and  relations,  Polytheism  rose 
out  of  Petichism  ;  and  when  the  ideas  of  the  unity 
of  nature  and  of  the  general  persistency  of  its 
laws  began  to  prevail,  theology  was  inevitably 
reduced  to  the  conception  of  one,  overruling  will 
which,  directly  or  by  its  ministers,  controlled  the 
whole  movement  of  things.  Up  to  this  point  the 
theological  form  of  thought  persisted  :  in  one  point 
of  view  it  might  even  be  said  that,  up  to  this  point, 

-*  it  was  strengthening  its  hold  upon  men.  For, 
every  successive  concentration  of  the  divine  power 
made  the  idea  of  it  a  firmer  and  more  comprehensive 
bond  of  social  order,  until  at  length  the  levelling 
and  organizing  genius  of  Eome  laid  the  foundation 
of  the  universal  empire,  and  Christian  Monotheism 
broke  down  all  the  walls  of  division  between  races 
and  nations. 
thet?ogy?i'^      But     this     apparent    advance    of    the    theological 

j  spirit  was  illusive,  for  it  was  really  due  to  an 
intellectual  movement,  which  must,  in  the  long  run, 
prove  fatal  to  that  spirit.  The  concentration  of 
Fetichism  into  Polytheism,  and  of  Polytheism  into 
Monotheism,  was  really  the  gradual  withdrawal  of 
theology  from  the  exj^lanation  of  the  universe,  till, 
finally,  it  was  driven  to  its  last  stronghold,  its  most 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  THEOLOGY.  J) 

general  and  abstract  form.  Ilonce.  the  liour  of 
its  greatest  social  triumph  was  that  whieli  preceded 
its  decisive  fall.  The  same  growing  jjcrceplion  of 
the  order  of  the  world  inuhn*  general  laws,  whidi 
had  forced  the  theologian  first  to  substitute  a 
limited  for  an  indetinite  number  of  divine  wills, 
and  then  to  substitute  one  will  for  this  limited 
number,  necessarily  and  inevitably  awakened  a  doubt 
whether  there  is  in  nature  any  indication  of  will 
at  all.  Monotheism  had  represented  the  world  as 
a  general  order  of  iixed  laws,  only  interrupted  by 
exceptional  miracles  ;  but  increasing  knowledge  made 
miracles  more  and  more  incredible,  till  at  last  the 
theologians  were  reduced  to  the  assertion  that 
their  God  had  once  performed  them,  but  that  he 
performed  them  no  longer.  AVhen  this  point  was 
reached,  it  was  not  difficult  to  see  that  the  whole 
anthropomorphic  explanation  of  things  was  on  the 
eve  of  disappearing.  A  God,  who  was  nearer  man 
in  the  past  than  he  is  in  the  present,  could  not 
be  the  God  of  the  future. 

But  even  before  this  period,  the  growing  weakness  And ..( the 

social  Older 

of  the  theoretical  basis  of  belief  had  bc^ain   to  affect  connected 

'  with  it. 

the  practical  life  of  men.  The  social  order  was  built 
upon  theology,  and  therefore  the  advance  of  the 
critical  spirit  was  continually  loosening  its  founda- 
tions. Hence  the  fierce  hostility  of  the  representatives 
of    that    order    to    the    freedom    of    the    intelligence. 


10        THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

That  hostility,  however,  is  to  be  attributed  not  so 
much  to  their  indignation  at  unbelief  in  itself,  as  to 
their  alarm  at  the  dissolution  of  social  order  which 
was  its  practical  result.  Nor  was  it  altogether  inex- 
cusable, so  long  as  the  assailants  of  the  old  faith 
were  unable  to  propound  any  theoretical  principles 
which  could  be  made  the  basis  of  reconstruction. 
Now  the  metaphysical  principles  to  which  such 
assailants  appealed  were  really  negations  pretending 
to  be  affirmations,  and  their  purely  negative  char- 
acter must  reveal  itself  as  soon  as  their  victory 
was  achieved.  Men  in  whom  the  practical  and 
organizing  impulse  was  strong,  who  felt  the  necessity 
for  a  moral  order,  could  not  but  see  that  such  ropes 
of  sand  were  no  real  substitute  for  the  old  frame- 
work of  social  and  political  life,  and  they  were 
therefore  tempted  to  shut  their  eyes  to  the  intel- 
lectual claims  of  a  truth  which  could  be  fertile  only 
n/  in  destruction.  Thus  arose  that  fatal  division  be- 
tween the  heart  and  the  intellect  which  has  lasted 
down  to  the  present  day,  and  which  must  last  till 
the  intellect  shows  itself  capable  of  producing  a 
new  system  that  can  sustain  the  social  order  more 
securely,  and  satisfy  the  affections  and  spiritual 
aspirations  of  men  more  completely,  than  the  fic- 
tions of  theology, 
nfetii.hysi-  '^^^^  truth  of  this  view  will  be  more  clearly  seen 
of  thlught.   if  we  examine  the  nature  of  that  intermediate  system 


VICTOR  V  OF  ME  TA  Pll  J  \SIC.  \  \ 

of  critical  thought  which  was  tlio  great  weapon  of 
attack  upon  theology.  This  system  was,  in  iacl, 
only  the  last  abstraction  of  the  theological  antliru- 
pomorphism  itself.  As  in  one  department  of  human 
thought  after  another  the  knowledge  of  the  uniform 
and  unchangeable  order  of  things  prevailed  over  the 
conception  of  accident  ami  arbitrary  change,  the  idea 
of  will  became  attenuated,  until  it  ultimately  dis- 
appeared altogether_ from  the^  explanation  of  natu re. 
Bui  it  left  behind  a  kind  of  spectre  of  abstraction. 
Instead  of  being  dominated  by  go^d^T'l^^ieiiomena 
were  supposed_to__be_(3 qui i rm,f-.pfri'>y  essences  and 
powers,  which,  however,  were  merely  eene^i-al  nanu's 
for  these  very  phenomena.  How  abstractions  came 
to  be  thus  substantiated  as  real  entities,  separate 
from  the  phenomena  from  which  they  were  derived, 
might  be  diificult  to  understand,  if  we  did  not 
remember  that  they  were  but  the  residua  of  what 
had  once  been  individualized  pictures  of  imagination. 
The  essences  of  the  Schoolmen  were  but  the  dry 
bones  of  the  living  creatures  of  poetry  which  the 
understanding  had  slain.  "  The  human  mind,"  as 
Mill  puts  it,  "  did  not  set  out  from  the  notion  of  a 
name,  but  from  that  of  a  divinity.  The  realization 
of  abstractions  was  not  the  embodiment  of  a  word, 
but  the  disembodiment  of  a  Fetich."  Keally,  there- 
fore, these  essences  and  powers  were  nothing  more 
than  the  disembodied  ghosts,  the  negative  reHexions, 


12         THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

of  the  gods  whose  places  they  took.  They  had  no 
positive  content  of  their  own.  As  mere  negatives 
-  they  had  no  value  except  in  relation  to  the  corre- 
sponding affirmatives,  although  in  the  first  instance 
imagination  was  strong  enough  to  give  them  the 
semhlance  of  positive  principles  occupying  the  place 
of  the  beliefs  they  expelled.  And  it  was  just  this 
temporary  illusion  which  made  them  such  power- 
ful weapons  of  destruction.  For  the  revolutionary 
passion  can  never  be  sustained  by  negations  which 
it  recognizes  as  such.  It  is  impossible  to  march 
with  enthusiasm  to  the  attack  upon  the  institutions 
of  the  past,  without  the  conviction  that  there  is 
something  more  to  be  gained  than  the  destruction 
of  those  institutions. 
men*t  of"  '^'^^^  metaphysical  philosophy,  as  the  necessary  fore- 

runner of  the  philosophy  of  experience,  gradually 
extended  its  destructive  powder  over  all  branches  of 
human  knowledge.  At  first  it  laid  its  hand  on  the 
sciences  that  deal  with  inorganic  nature,  and  of  these, 
first  of  all  on  those  that  deal  with  the  phenomena 
furthest  from  man,  and  least  subject  to  his  control. 
For  man  discovers  that  the  phenomena  of  the  heavens 
are  not  ruled  by  arbitrary  will,  long  before  he  dis- 
cerns the  absence  of  caprice  from  the  general  course 
of  nature.  In  like  manner,  he  is  sensible  that  inor- 
ganic things  have  fixed  and  unchangeable  relations, 
while  as  yet  the  spontaneity  of  animal  life  seems  to 


Metapliysic. 


THE  IDEA  OF  NA  TURE.  \  ;j 

be  as  unlimited  as  that  whicli  lir  attributes  to  his 
own  will.  And  cnily  last  of  all  iloes  it  dawn  upon 
him  that  his  own  life  also  is  limited  and  controlled 
by  something,  which  is  neither  his  own  will  imr  the 
will  of  a  being  like  himself  whom  he  can  propitiate 
or  persuade — something  which  is  both  within  and 
without  him,  to  which  he  nuist  conform  himself, 
seeing  it  will  not  conform  to  him.  The  last  sub- 
stantiated abstraction,  therefore,  which  is  ])ut  in  the 
place  of  the  divine  powers,  is  Nature.  And  Nature 
is  only  a  name  for  the  general  course  of  things, 
though  it  is  regarded  by  metaphysics  as  existing  ' 
apart  from  and  controlling  them.  But  as  Nature 
succeeds  to  the  place  of  a  C^od  whom  men  were 
conceived  to  be  bound  to  obey,  but  able  arbitrarily 
to  disobey,  so  it  is  represented  as  the  source  of  a 
law  distinct  from  the  actual  course  of  human  life, 
and  to  which  it  does  not  necessarily  conform.  The 
law  of  nature,  in  this  view,  is  a  law  written  on 
man's  heart,  but  not  necessarily  realized  in  his  actions. 
In  truth,  however,  it  is  but  the  negation  of  that 
.order  of  social  life  which  was  based  upon  the  theo- 
logical idea,  though  its  negative  character  is  neces- 
sarily hidden  from  those  who  believe  in  it. 

This   becomes  evident    whenever   we   examine    the  itspowcrfor 

.  destruction. 

main  articles  contained  m  this  supposed  law  of  nature. 
For  these  are  simply  negations  of  different  parts  of 
that    social   order   which    was    based    upon    theology. 


14.         THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

The  first  of  these  articles  is  the  right  of  private 
judgment — that  is,  the  right  of  every  individual  to 
emancipate  himself  from  all  spiritual  authority,  and 
to  judge  of  everything  for  himself.  This  principle 
is  merely  "a  sanction  of  the  state  of  anarchy,  which 
intervenes  between  the  decay  of  the  old  discipline 
and  the  formation  of  new  spiritual  ties."  In  other 
words,  it  is  not  a  new  principle  of  order,  but  the 
abstract  expression  of  the  ungoverned  state  of  mere 
individual  opinion,  "  for  no  association  whatever,  even 
of  tlie  smallest  number  of  persons  and  for  the  most 
temporary  objects,  can  subsist  without  some  degree 
of  intellectual  and  moral  agreement  between  its 
members."  In  the  next  place,  among  the  articles 
of  the  law  of  nature,  stands  the  doctrine  of  eciuality, 
which  has  a  meaning  only  as  the  negation  of  the 
old  hierarchy,  the  old  social  and  political  order,  but 
which,  taken  absolutely,  is  the  negation  of  all  order 
wjiatever.  For  if  society  is  anything  more  than  a 
collection  of  unrelated  atoms,  if  it  is  an  organic 
unity,  it  must  have  different  organs  for  its  different 
functions  ;  and  it  is  as  impossible  that  these  organs 
should  all  be  equal,  as  that  they  should  all  be  the 
same.  This  doctrine,  therefore,  is  but  the  abstract 
proclamation  of  social  anarchy.  To  these  articles 
are  commonly  added  the  doctrines  of  national  inde- 
pendence, and  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  people. 
The   former   is    nothing   more    than    the   negation    of 


THE  FORMULAS  OF  ANARCHY.  15 

that  spiritual  supremacy  of  the  Church,  which  in 
the  Middle  Ages  mediated  between  the  nations  ol 
Europe  and  made  them  one  community  ;  hut,  taken 
absolutely,  it  would  imply  national  isolation  and  ' 
international  anarchy.  The  latter  is  the  transference 
to  the  governed  of  that  fiction  of  divine  right  which 
was  formerly  supposed  to  reside  in  the  governor, 
and  it  has  no  meaning  except  as  the  negation  of 
that  fiction.  For  the  people  cannot  rule  themselves ; 
and  even  to  make  them  choose  their  ruler,  that  is, 
__  to  make  the  inferior  and  less  wise  to  choose  the 
superior  and  wiser,  cannot  be  regarded  as  more 
than   a  provisional   expedient  for  anarchic   times. 

The   articles   of   the    law   of   nature,   then,   like    alpt» «>•«''• 

ness  for 

metaphysical     principles,    are    merely     principles     of  tJ'","*"'"'^' 
insurrection    and    revolt.       They    have    no     positive 
validity ;  for  they  are  just  the  ultimate  abstractions, 
or,    so    to    speak,    the    speculative    phantoms    of    the 
system   which   they    destroy.      As   it   is   said    that   a_ 
man  dies  when  he  has  seen  his  own  gliost,  ?n,  arcord- 

"  ing  to  Comte,  the  destroyer  of    theology   i-  ju-l  the 
ghost  of  itself,  raised  by  abstraction.     But  the  ghost 

*Tilso  vanishes  when  its  victim  is  fairly  buried, 
leaving  the  field  to  the  growing  strength  of  positive 
science. 

Positive   science,    then,    is    the    real    cause    of    all  Jf  p«-epnro» 

— =».^M^^-^::7  '  . - the  way  for  -^ 

intellectual  progress,  and  its  advance  constitute^  the  ^"*'"'"^" 

ni8U8  formativus  that  is  concealed  beneath  the  surface  i  / 


10         THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

struggle  of  theology  and  metaphysics.  For,  even  in 
the  earliest  theological  era,  there  was  a  certain 
element  of  positive  science,  that  is,  of  knowledge 
of  the  permanent  relations  of  things.  The  most 
arbitrary  will  is  not  all  arbitrary,  but  presupposes 
something  of  a  fixed  order  without  or  within ;  and 
therefore  the  anthropomorphic  analogies  by  which 
phenomena  were  interpreted,  still  left  some  space 
for  the  idea  of  law.  And  this  space  was  continually 
being  widened,  at  the  expense  of  the  arbitrary  and 
the  accidental.  While  metaphysics  seemed  simply 
to  be  substituting  one  transcendent  explanation  for 
anothcv,  it  was  really  disguising  the  abandonment 
of  all  transcendent  explanations  whatever,  and  the 
introduction  of  positive  explanations  in  their  place. 
The  doubts  expressed  in  the  metaphysical  criticism 
were  really  due  to  a  growing  sense  of  law,  which, 
when  it  became  clear  and  self-conscious,  produced 
the  positive  philosophy.  Hence  there  was,  for  a 
long  time,  an  intimate  alliance  between  the  scientific 
and  the  metaphysical  spirit,  though  the  former  was 
merely  "  critical,"  and  the  latter  "  organic."  And 
this  alliance  was  the  more  easily  maintained,  because, 
in  the  first  instance,  neither  the  negative  character 
of  the  former  nor  the  positive  character  of  the  latter 
was  distinctly  discerned.  Metaphysic  was  not  seen 
to  be  merely  "  critical,"  because  its  abstractions  were 
taken    to    be    real    entities.      And   science   could   not 


METAPHYSIC  ALLIED   WITH  SCIENCE.        17 

be  seen  to  be  "organic,"  that  is,  to  contain  (ho 
principle  of  a  new  organization  of  society,  till  it  rose 
from  the  contemplation  of  the  inorganic  work!  to 
the  study  of  life,  and  especially  of  human  life. 
History,  however,  shows  tliat  science  has  always 
reaped  the  fruits  of  every  victory  won  over  theology 
by  metaphysic,  and  on  the  other  hand  that  metaphysic 
has  never  succeeded  in  maintaining  any  position 
against  theology,  which  has  not  soon  been  occupied 
by  science.  The  great  metaphysical  movement  of 
the  Greeks  left  for  its  sole  permanent  result  the 
sciences  of  Geometry  and  Astronomy ;  while  their 
premature  speculations  on  Psychology  and  Sociology 
were  suppressed  or  forgotten  by  the  mediicval  church, 
which  directed  all  the  intelligence  of  the  world  to 
the  practical  work  of  civilizing  and  organizing  men 
by  means  of  the  monotheistic  idea.  When  thought 
was  again  awakened,  the  abstract  metaphysic  of  the 
Schoolmen  was  only  the  forerunner  of  the  renewed 
study  of  natural  science,  especially  of  Physics  and 
Chemistry,  which  at  first_jippeared  under  the  forms 
of  Astrology  and  Alchemy ;  and  the  victory  of  Nom- 
inalism  over  Eealism,  in  which  the  scholastic  philo- 
sophy ended,  was  the  indication  of  another  triumph 
of  the  scientific  spirit.  For  Nominalism  is  simply 
the  negation  of  that  tendency  to  personify  abstrac- 
tions, which  is  the  essence  of  metaphysic.  Finally, 
as    a    consequence    of    that    development    of   science 


18         THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

which  cuhiiinatecl  in  Newton^_jneta£hxsic__ceased_to 
apply  its_method  to  the  external  world,  and  confined 
itself  to  the  sphere  of  Biology  and  Sociology,  from 
which  it  is  now  beiiig___gmdiial]x^4lJv§IJ.-  ^^  ^^^ 
last  of  these  applications,  its  power  for  criticism 
and  destruction,  and  its  weakness  for  reconstruction 
and  reorganization,  were  proved  by  the  decisive  experi- 
ment of  the  French  Revolution,  in  which  the  ideas 
of  the  rights  of  man  and  the  law  of  nature  were 
tried  and  found  wanting.  Since  that  time  political 
life  has  fluctuated  between  the  theological  and  the 
metaphysical  principlet;,  and  therefore  between  the 
opposite  dangers  of  reaction  and  revolution,  finding 
*"  no  security  for  order  but  in  the  former,  and  no 
security  for  progress  but  in  the  latter.  But  the 
advance  of  Sociology  into  the  jDositive  stage,  which 
has  been  inaugurated  by  Comte,  has,  in  his  view, 
shown  that  the  opposite  interests  of  order  and  progress 
may  be  equally  secured,  if  only  we  base  both  upon 
a  knowledge  of  the  laws  by  which  the  existence 
and  activity  of  man  are  ruled,  and  not  on  the 
fictions  of  the  imagination,  or  on  the  still  emptier 
fictions  of  the  understanding. 
On  science        The  aim  of  the  future,  then,  is  one  with  the  aim 

the  social  '  ' 

thffXr/e    of  the  past.      That  social  passion  which  in  all  great 

based.         constructive  periods  of  human  history,  and  especially 

in  the  Middle  Ages,  took  hold  of  theological   beliefs 

and  made  them  a  means   to   organize   and   discipline 


A   IV IS  I-:  AGXOSTICISM.  19 

mankind,   is    still    to    be    tlie   .uuidiiiLi;    motive    of    all 
speculation    and    action.      lUit   the  svsteiii   nf  tliou-jjil        /'-^\  ' 


which  it  uses  for  this  end  must  inevitahly  be  cliaiii^'ed. 
Eenouncing  the  theological  and  metaphysical  interpre- 
tations of  things,  which  have  been  jtroveil  to  be  either 
inconsistent  with  facts  or  at  least  incapable  of  being 
verified  by  facts,  we  must  now  base  our  effort  to 
improve  man's  estate  upon  the  laws  of  the  resem- 
blance, the  coexistence,  and  the  succession  of  plieno- 
mena  as  these  are  determined  by  science.  And  nn 
the  other  hand,  as  we  recognize  that  all  the  sciences 
tend  to  lose  themselves  in  the  multiplicity  of  a 
universe,  where  every  path  leads  to  the  infinite,  we 
must  seek  also  to  organize  and  discipline  the  hitherto 
dispersive  efforts  of  science,  so  that  they  may  be 
directed  entirely  to  the  relief  and  furtherance  of 
man's  estate.  In  this  way  scientific  knowledge  and 
social  benevolence  will  act  and  react,  at  once  limiting 
and  supporting  each  other,  and  amid  all  the  darkness 
of  a  universe  which  alisiihiirjii  is  unknowable,  and 
even  rdativdy  to  liiiiisclf,  is  only  partially  knowable, 
man  can  yet  give  a  kind  of  unity  and  completeness 
to  his  transitory  existence.  For  all  he  needs  to  know 
'is  that  which  experience  has  constantly  been  teaching, 
the  uniformity  and  constancy  of  the  laws  of  pheno- 
mena. By  means  of  this  knowledge,  so  far  as  he 
can  obtain  it,  and  without  any  need  to  penetrate 
into  the  transcendent  causes  of  things,  he  can    fore- 


LV 


20 


THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 


Necessity 
for  a  new 
religion. 


Religious 
basis  of 
life. 


sec  many  phenomena,  like  those  of  the  heavens, 
over  which  he  has  no  control  whatever,  and  also 
many  phenomena,  like  those  of  his  own  nature  and 
his  immediate  environment,  which  he  can,  to  a  certain 
degree,  change  and  modify.  And  thus  he  can  learn, 
with  continually  growing  certainty,  what  are  the 
means  he  must  use  to  bring  within  his  reach  the 
highest  good  which  the  system  of  things  allows  him 
to  attain,  detaching  his  thoughts  and  interests  more 
and  more  from  the  unfathomed  abyss  beyond,  which 
he  now  knows  to  be  by  him  unfathomable. 

Is  it,  then,  possible  for  men  to  sketch  out  the 
programme  of  an  existence  limited  to  this  "  bank 
and  shoal  of  time,"  to  conceive  it  as  a  complete  system 
in  itself,  and  re'-organiscr  sans  Dieu  ni  roi,  'par  Ic  culte 
sysMmatique  de  VhumaniU?  Can  they,  surrendering 
the  belief  in  "  a  Divinity  that  shapes  their  ends,  rough 
hew  them  how  they  will,"  "constitute  a  real  provi- 
dence for  themselves,  in  all  departments,  moral,  intel- 
lectual, and  material "  ?  Comte  answers  that  they 
can ;  and  in  the  "  Politique  Positive "  he  tries  to 
exhibit  the  main  outlines  of  that  social  system  of 
the  future  by  which  this  end  is  to  be  attained. 

His  starting  point  is — strange  as  at  first  it  may 
seem — the  idea  of  religion.  "  Since  religion  embraces 
all  our  existence,  its  history  must  be  an  epitome  of 
the  whole  history  of  our  development."  Beneath 
and   beyond   all   the   details    of  our   ideas  of  things. 


RELIGION  Gl VES  L W'l EV  70  L ZEE.  •_>  1 

there  is  a  certain  "esprit  d'ensemble,"  a  general  d in- 
ception of  the  world  without  and  the  world  within, 
in  which  these  details  gather  to  a  head.  If  ijjis 
conception  or  picture  be  coherent  witli  itself,  and 
if  at  the  same  time  it  he  such  as  to  present  an 
object  on  which  our  affections  can  rest,  and  an  end 
in  the  pursuit  of  which  all  our  powers  and  capacities 
may  be  exercised,  then  our  life  will  have  that  unity 
and  consistency  with  itself  which  is  necessary  for  the 
highest  efficiency  and  happiness.  Such  a  harmony 
of  existence,  in  which  all  its  elements  are  titly  co- 
ordinated, is  what,  in  Comte's  view,  constitutes  a 
religion.  And,  since  man  is  both  an  individual  and  y 
a  social  being,  this  harmony  is  seen  to  in\'()lvc  two 
things.  It  involves  a  subordination  of  all  the 
elements  of  man's  individual  nature  to  some  ruling 
tendency,  and  it  involves  a  certain  adaptation  of 
men  to,  and  a  combination  of  tliem  with,  each  other. 
Further,  this  harmony  of  humanity  with  itself  must 
also  be  a  harmony  of  man  with  the  world  in  which 
he  exists.^^— In  other  words,  the  individual  can  attain 
his  highest  perfection   and   happiness  only  in   so  far  ^ 

as  he  is,  at  once  and  by  virtue  of  the  same  principle, 
in    harmony    with    the    world,    with    his    fellow-men,  ^ 
and  with  himself. 

Now,  this   harmony   cannot    be    produced    by    the  Kiemenu 

•^  i  ./  iiccesHsry 

sway  of  personal  or  egoistic  motives  ;    for   these  are  rJi^jo,,. 
in  fatal  disagreement  with  each  other,  and    they  set 


22        THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

each  man  in  antagonism  to  all  other  men,  and  even 
to  the  natural  conditions  of  his  own  existence.  The 
regulation  and  harmonizing  of  the  nature  of  the 
individual  man,  therefore,  implies  his  attachment  or 
self-surrender  to  an  oly'ect  which  is  without  him,  and 
to  which  he  is  necessarily  related — to  some  object  in 
tliat  world  of  persons  and  things  wliich  hems  him 
in  on  every  side,  and  which  must  needs  be  his 
*'  enemy  so  long  as  he  is  ruled  by  egoism.  Further, 
if  the  principle  of  religion  is  thus  to  be  found  with- 
out and  not  within  the  individual  man,  it  must  be 
found  in  some  object  to  which  he  submits  as  a 
superior  power,  and  on  which,  at  the  same  time, 
his  affections  can  rest.  -*  Submission  and  love  are 
both  necessary  to  religion,  for  if  we  have  merely 
the  former,  the  utmost  we  can  feel  is  resignation 
to  a  fatality ;  and  this,  though  it  involves  a  certain 
limitation  of  the  selfish  tendencies,  can  never  over- 
come them,  or  substitute  a  new  motive  for  them. 
To  retain  the  energy  of  egoism  and  combine  it  with 
resignation  to  a  power  greater  than  ours,  we  must 
love  that  power  to  which  we  submit.  Finally,  this 
submission  and  self-surrender  must  be  consistent 
with  a  certain  relative  sense  of  independence,  for 
no  feeling  is  really  powerful  which  does  not  result 
in  action.  Hence,  to  submission  and  love,  we  must 
add  the  belief  that  we  can  make  ourselves  useful 
to   that   Being   to   whom  we   submit   and    whom    we 


THREE  ELEMENTS  OE  RELIGION.  23 

love.  Only  thus,  when  veneration  for  that  which 
is  above  us,  is  combined  with  love  for  that  which 
is  the  constant  source  of  good  to  us,  and  with  bene- 
volence towards  that  which  needs  our  help,*  can 
we  rise  above  the  unreal  and  imperfect  unity  of 
selfishness  into  the  perfect  unity  of  religion.  Or, 
to  put  it  more  shortly,  in  Comte's  own  language, 
"  the  principal  religious  difficulty  is  to  secure  that 
the  external  shall  regulate  the  internal  without  afiect-  .  , 
ing  its  spontaneity  " ;  to  secure,  that  is,  that  the  free 
subjective  principles  of  love  and  benevolence  shall 
attach  to  the  power  to  which  we  believe  our  existence 
to  be  subordinated.  For  if  our  faith  be  not  one 
with  our  love,  or  if  our  love  be  not  a  principle  of 
activity,  we  cannot  be,  in  the  full  sense  of  the  word, 
religious. 

Now  the  difficulty  of  attaining  such  a  harmony  or  scieutifu- 

•1  o  •/  basis  for 

unity  of  existence  cannot  but  be  obvious  to  those  ■••^I'sfj*'"- 
who  live  in  a  period  when  "  the  intelligence  is  in 
insurrection  against  the  heart ; "  when  what  men 
desire  and  love  is  not  by  any  means  one  with  what, 
on  the  authority  of  science,  they  believe.  If,  how- 
ever, we  follow  the  course  of  advancing  knowledge, 
we  shall  see  that  this  state  of  things  is  merely  tem- 
porary, and  that  completed  positive  science  gives  us 
back  air  that  in  the  course  of  its  development  it 
seemed  to  take  away.  Science,  indeed,  from  its 
*  Cf.  Goethe's  "  Three  Eeverences." 


24         THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

verv  (lawn,  when  it  discovers  that  there  is  a  fixed 
order  and  law  in  the  movement  of  the  heavenly 
bodies,  gives  support  to  one  element  of  religion,  the 
sense  that  we  are  in  the  hands  of  a  superior  power. 
It  reveals  to  man  an  ultimate  necessity  which  bounds 
and  determines  his  life — a  necessity  which,  from  the 
nature  of  the  case,  he  cannot  modify.  And  as  the 
idea  of  law  is  gradually  extended  to  physical,  chemical, 
and  vital  phenomena,  this  necessity  is  seen  to  limit 
and  control  him  on  every  side.  Phenomena,  there- 
fore, can  no  longer  be  regarded  as  the  expressions 
of  the  wills  of  fictitious  beings  endowed  with  the 
qualities  most  admired  in  humanity,  and  therefore 
capable  of  being  loved.  And  the  natural  effect  of 
this  is  to  reduce  religion  into  a  mere  resignation  to 
an  irresistible  fate,  which  is  incapable  of  awaking 
or  responding  to  human  affection.  With  the  rise 
of  sociology,  however,  science  changes  its  aspect,  and 
begins  to  restore  to  us  more  than  all  that  was  con- 
tained in  the  dreams  of  mythology  which  it  has 
destroyed.  For  this  culminating  science  teaches  us 
to  regard  the  whole  race  of  man  as  an  organic  and 
self-developing  unity,  in  which_we,  as  individuals, 
are  parts  or  members.  Between  our  own  life  and 
the  merely  external  necessity  of  nature  we  see  a 
spiritual  power  which  modifies  it  and  adapts  it  to 
\/  our  wants.  Between  the  individual  and  the  world 
stands  humanity,  and  the  "  main  pressure  of  external 


SOCIOLOGY  AND  RIJ.IGIOX.  2.') 

fatality  does  not  full  upon  the  rdrnier  directly,  but 
only  through  the  interposition  of  the  latter."  In 
passing  through  this  medium,  hrute  necessity  is 
changed  more  and  more  into  a  saving  providence. 
To  be  convinced  of  this  we  need  only  to  observe 
that,  after  we  go  beyond  the  fixed  order  of  the 
celestial  system,  which  is  the  ultimate  necessity  of 
our  lives,  and  which  lies  entirely  beyond  the  reach 
of  our  interference,  we  come  upon  various  orders  of 
phenomena — physical,  chemical,  and  vital — which  are 
capable  of  modification,  and  are  continuously  sub- 
jected to  it  by  man,  and  even  by  plants  and  animals. 
So  soon  as  life  begins,  order  becomes  the  basis  of 
progress :  for  the  living  l)eing  not  only  adapts  itself 
to  the  medium  in  which  it  lives,  but  continually 
reacts  upon  that  medium,  in  order  to  render  it  more 
suitable  for  its  wants  ;  and  in  the  case  of  man, 
inasmuch  as  his  existence  has  a  connection  and  a 
continuity  that  binds  the  whole  race  together  through 
the  long  succession  of  ages,  this  reaction  is  cumu- 
lative. The  life  of  the  individual  in  any  age  is 
what  it  is,  by  reason  of  the  whole  progressive  move- 
ment of  humanity ;  and  the  later  the  time  of  his 
appearance  tlie  more  he  owes  to  his  race.  "  The 
living  are  always  more  and  more  dominated  by  the 
dead."  On  this  great  benefactor,  therefore,  his 
thoughts  can  rest,  as  a  power  which  moderates  and 
controls    his    wliole    life,    and    which    controls    it    not 


2G        THE  SOCIAL  PJIILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

merely  us  a  fate  to  which  he  must  resign  himself, 
but  as  a  providence  to  which  his  love  and  gratitude 
are  due.  Xor  will  such  feelings  be  less  powerful 
because  this  Providence  is  one  which  he  can  serve, 
and  which  needs  his  service.  Hence  he  is  led  to 
contemplate  his  life  in  all  that  makes  it  worth  living, 
as  the  gift  of  a  "  Grand  Etre,"  to  whom  during  his 
short  term  of  earthly  years  it  is  his  highest  virtue  to 
devote  himself,  and  with  whom  it  is  his  final  reward 
to  become  incorporated.  For  his  "  ohjective "  or 
actual  existence  in  time  has  no  valuable  result,  unless 
it  add  to  the  "  suhjcdive "  existence  of  humanity,  to 
the  influences  and  memories  which  mould  for  good 
the  lot  of  subsequent  generations.  His  religion,  in 
short,  is  to  consider  himself  as  a  useful  link  in  the 
chain  between  the  past  and  future  of  the  race,  a 
soldier  of  humanity  in  the  continual  struggle  whereby 
it  adapts  itself  to  its  sphere  of  action,  and  its  sphere 
of  action  to  itself,  so  as  to  realize  an  ever  richer 
and  more  harmonious  social  existence, 
iiumanity         Jt,  \^  truc  Indccd  that  Humanity  has  no  absolute 

tlie  only  •' 

power,  that  it  is  hemmed  in  by  a  fatality  which  it 
can  only  partially  modify.  "  This  immense  and 
eternal  Being  has  not  created  the  materials  which 
its  wise  activity  employs,  nor  the  laws  which  deter- 
mine the  results  of  its  action."  But  it  is  as  vain 
to  attempt  to  raise  our  hearts  beyond  this  immediate 
benefactor,  as  to  carry    the   mind   beyond  the    circle 


true  God. 


RELIGION  OF  HUM  A  MT\ '.  27 

\ 

of  experience  within  wliicli  it  is  necessarily  enclosed. 
Nay,  it  is  not  only  vain,  but  hurtful.  "  The  pro- 
visional r(^'ginie  which  ends  in  our  day  has  only  too 
clearly  manifested  the  gravity  of  this  danger,  for 
during  it  the  words  of  gratitude  addressed  to  a 
fictitious  Being  have  constituted  so  many  acts  of 
ingratitude  to  Humanity,  the  sole  author  of  the 
benefits  for  which  thanks  were  given."  If  the 
adoration  of  fictitious  powers  was  morally  indispens- 
able,  so  long  as  the  true  '  Grand  Etre '  that  rules 
our  lives  could  not  clearly  manifest  himself,  now  at 
least  it  would  tend  to  turn  us  away  from  the  sole 
worship  that  can  improve  us.  Those  who  would 
prolong  it  at  the  present  day  are  forgetting  its 
legitimate  purpose,  which  was  simply  "to  direct  pro- 
visionally the  evolution  of  our  best  feelings,  uiulcr  \ 
the  regency  of  God  during  the  long  minority  of  ' 
Humanity."  Of  this  worship,  the  Christian  doctrine 
of  the  incarnation  might  be  regarded  as  an  anticipa- 
tion, and  still  more  perhaps  the  mediaeval  worship 
of  the  Virgin  ;  for  women,  as  the  sex  characterized 
by  sympathy,  are  the  fit  representatives  of  Humanity. 
They  mediate  between  Humanity  and  man,  as  Hu- 
manity mediates  between  man  and  the  world. 

But  the  worship  of  Humanity  is  only  the  general  The  social 
principle  from   which   the   new   life  of  "  Sociocracy  "  \^l^  °° 
must  spring,  it  is  not  "  Sociocracy  "  itself.     We  have  '^*^  '*^°"' 
therefore    to    inquire    what    is   the    order    of  life   that 


28         THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

corresponds  to  this  new  religion.  How  does  it 
modify  our  ideas  of  the  relation  of  men  to  each 
other  and  to  the  world  ?  And  what  light  does  it 
cast  upon  tlie  various  forms  of  social  existence,  upon 
the  Family,  the  .State,  and  the  Church  ?  I  can  only 
give  a  brief  resume  of  Comte's  answers  to  these 
questions, 
conflict  ^11     civilization     or    improvement     depends     ulti- 

nature.  matcly  ou  mau's  control  over  material  resources, 
over  the  powers  and  products  of  nature.  And,  on 
the  other  liaiul,  it  is  the  reactive  influence  upon 
himself  of  the  effort  by  which  he  appropriates  and 
adapts  these  resources  to  his  purposes,  which  first 
civilizes  and  educates  him.  Man  can  only  conquer 
nature  by  obeying  her  laws,  and  to  obey  these  laws 
he  must  know  them.  Hence  it  is  the  necessities  of 
the  practical  life  which  excite  the  first  efforts  after 
scientific  knowledge,  and  it  is  under  the  pressure  of 
the  same  necessities  that  man  first  learns  to  sur- 
render self-will  to  the  discipline  of  regular  labour, 
and  of  co-operation  with  his  fellows.  We  might 
indeed  imagine  a  different  kind  of  education  for 
the  human  race.  If,  like  some  of  the  richer 
classes,  all  mankind  were  placed  in  circumstances  in 
which,  without  effort  or  struggle,  they  could  at  once 
satisfy  all  their  natural  wants  and  desires,  we  might 
imagine  that  social  sympathies  and  intellectual  tastes 
would  soon  prevail  over  all  the  personal  or  egoistic 


MAN  AND  NATURE.  29 

tendencies.  For  though  the  hitter  were  at  first  far 
the  strongest,  they  would  gradually  die  out  for  lack 
of  occasions  for  exercise.  Losing  thus  the  powerful 
stimulus  of  self-interest,  which  now  drives  men  to  in- 
vestigate the  laws  of  nature,  the  intellectual  activity 
of  such  beings  would  take  an  {esthetic  direction,  and 
would  be  devoted  mainly  to  the  task  of  providing 
forms  of  expression  for  the  social  symjiathies.  These 
social  sympathies  would  be  greatly  intensified,  for  they 
would  occupy  the  whole  of  life.  But  they  would 
in  the  first  instance  be  confined  in  the  circle  of 
the  family ;  for  the  social  life  of  States  gains  its 
principal  interest  from  the  everwidening  co-operation 
which  is  required  in  the  struggle  for  existence 
against  external  difficulties.  The  natural  creed  of 
men  would  be  an  iesthetic  Fetichism  ;  and  this,  in 
the  course  of  time,  when  men  had  learned  to  dis- 
tinguish between  action  and  life,  would  be  changed 
into  Positivism  without  needing  to  pass  through  the 
long  intermediate  stages  of  theology  and  metaphysics ; 
while,  in  the  practical  life,  the  affection  of  the  family 
would  broaden  to  the  love  of  humanity,  omitting 
the  middle  term  of  nationality.  Finally,  as  the 
heart  and  the  intelligence  would  continually  gain  a 
more  marked  ascendency  over  the  practical  activity, 
it  would  be  natural  that  the  spiritual  power  should 
rule  the  temporal,  and  that  women  should  have  the 
supremacy  over  men. 


30        THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 
Uses  of  Tliis   ideal   picture,   however,  only  serves   to   illus- 

this  con-  *- 

*''"'*•  trate    by  contrast    the    real   course    of   things,    which 

continually  advances  towards  the  same  goal,  but  by 
a  far  longer  and  more  stormy  path,  a  path  not  of 
untroubled  and  peaceful  growth,  but  of  conflict, 
division,  and  pain.  We  shall  find,  however,  as  a 
kind  of  recompense  for  this  hard  process  of  media- 
tion, that  the  final  reconciliation  of  humanity  with 
the  world  and  with  itself  is  far  more  perfect  and 
conclusive ;  as  it  is  a  reconciliation  which  disciplines 
while  it  satisfies,  all  the  different  elements  of  his 
nature.  For  a  "  sociality,"  reared  on  the  basis  of 
a  fully  developed  yet  conquered  "  j)ersonality,"  is  a 
far  higher  ideal  than  such  an  imagined  paradise,  in 
which  the  struggle  for  existence,  with  all  the  in- 
tellectual and  physical  exertion  which  it  involves, 
would  be  made  unnecessary, 
ind^i^dp^  Our  personal  tendencies  are  strongest  at  first,  and 
moral'  iu  tliclr  dircct  action  they  might  lead,  and  do 
indeed  often  lead,  to  a  sacrifice  of  society  to  the 
individual,  and  to  the  development  in  him  of  an 
extravagant  pride  and  self-will,  by  which  both  heart 
and  reason  are  corrupted.  But  man  soon  finds  that 
he  must  'stoop  to  conquer';  that  he  must  submit  his 
action  to  the  laws  of  nature,  if  he  would  make  nature 
the  servant  of  his  purposes ;  that  he  must  himself  be 
instrumental  to  the  well-being  of  others,  ere  he  can 
make  them  instruments  of  his  own  well-beins.     And 


nature. 


NECESSITY  MAKES  US  FREE.  31 

in  this  submission  of  caprice  and  passion  to  reason 
and  law,  and  of  his  own  life  to  social  ends,  he 
gradually  developes  his  intellectual  powers  and  social 
sympathies,  till  they  gain  a  supremacy  over  those 
egoistic  tendencies  to  which  in  tlie  first  instance 
they  were  subordinated.  The  highest  ideal  of  man's 
life  is  to  systematize  this  spontaneous  process,  and 
to  turn  into  a  conscious  aim  that  moral  and  in- 
tellectual discipline  of  his  nature,  which  in  the  past 
has  been  the  unforeseen  result  of  his  effort  after 
personal  ends.  "We  must,  however,  remember  that 
this  result  would  not  have  been  possible  unless  the 
beginnings  of  these  higher  tendencies  had  existed  in 
man  from  the  iirst.  No  empirical  i)i-ocess  could 
ever  have  developed  social  sympathies  in  him,  if  he 
had  been  by  nature  utterly  selfish,  any  more  than 
it  could  have  produced  reason  in  a  being  who  was 
devoid  of  even  the  germ  of  intelligence.  But  the 
whole  history  of  human  progress  is  just  an  account 
of  the  process  whereby  feeble  social  affections,  using 
as  a  fulcrum  the  outward  necessities  of  man's  life, 
gradually  secure  to  themselves  the  direction  of  all 
his  activity.  "The  principal  triumph  of  humanity 
consists  in  drawing  its  best  means  of  perfecting 
itself  from  that  very  fatality  which  seems  at  first 
to  condemn  us  to  the  most  brutal  egoism."  For 
"so  soon  as  the  personal  instincts  have  placed  us 
in  a  situation  proper  to  satisfy  our  social  tendencies, 


32        THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

these,  in  virtue  of  tlieir  irresistible  charm,  commonly 
guide  us  to  a  course  of  conduct  which  they  could 
not  have  had  at  first  the  force  to  dictate." 
and'socilT''  These  principles  find  their  illustration  in  certain 
progress.  gpQj;jQj^-ji(,r^i  truths.  In  uiost  conditions  in  which 
human  beings  are  placed,  the  individual  is  capable 
of  producing  more  than  is  immediately  necessary  for 
his  wants ;  or,  in  other  words,  of  accumulating  wealth. 
Such  accumulations  make  social  existence  possible, 
and  coming,  by  gift  or  conquest,  into  the  hands  of 
the  heads  of  society,  become  the  means  of  realizing 
a  division  of  labour,  and  providing  the  different 
classes  of  labourers  with  sustenance  and  instruments 
of  production.  Division  of  labour,  again,  while  it 
secures  increased  efficiency,  makes  continually  greater 
demands  upon  science  for  guidance,  and  thus  stimu- 
lates the  development  of  the  intellectual  life.  Thus 
the  hard  external  conditions  under  which  man  has 
to  seek  the  satisfaction  of  his  wants  become  a 
beneficent  necessity,  which  forces  him  to  increase 
his  knowledge,  and  to  co-operate  with  an  ever- 
widening  circle  of  his  fellow-men.  This  co-operation, 
indeed,  is  not  always  conscious ;  and,  even  when  it 
is  conscious,  it  is  not  necessarily  accompanied  by 
social  sympathy,  as  is  shown  by  the  fierce  industrial 
struggles  of  capital  with  labour  at  the  present  day. 
Yet  it  is  inevitable  that  it  should  in  the  long  run 
produce  a  sense  of  the  solidarity  of  mankind.     "As 


THE  FORMS  OF  SOCIAL  LIFE.  33 

each  one  really  labours  for  the  others,  in  the  end 
he  must  acquire  the  consciousness  that  lie  does  so 
labour,"  and  the  consciousness  of  beini^'  a  part  in 
a  greater  whole  must  produce  a  willingness  to  serve 
it  and  live  for  it.  Thus,  a  movement  beginning  in 
the  reactive  inHuence  on  man's  activity  of  the 
physical  conditions  of  his  life,  extends  its  effects 
gradually  to  his  intelligence  and  his  heart,  so  that 
the  order  of  the  elements  of  his  nature  becomes,  as 
it  were,  inverted ;  the  first  becomes  last,  and  the 
last  first.  And,  instead  of  the  self-concentration  of 
the  savage,  we  have  the  development  of  a  social 
impulse,  which  begins  by  setting  the  family  before 
the  iBclividttal^  w4iicli_goes  on  to  set  the  state  before 
the  family,  and  which  must  end  in  setting  humanity  ^ 
before  all. 

The  way  in  which  this  movement  is  accomplished,  J'*"  *^''?'' 

•1  i-  '  forms  of 

and  the  form  of  social  life  in  which  it  must  result,  ^''"''*^- 
are  determined  by  principles  that  have  already  been 
suggested.  T'he  abstract  elements  of  human  life,  of 
which  we  are  to  take  account,  are  material,  intel- 
lectual, and  moral  force,  corresponding  respectively 
to  the  will,  the  intelligence,  and  the  heart.  And 
these  again  correspond  to  three  forms^gf— asseeiation 
among  men — -the  State,  the  Church,  and  the  Family; 
three  partial  societies,  in  the  union  of  vvhiclwlfone 
man  can  attain  the  complete  satisfaction  of  his 
complex  being.      It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  intimate. 


0 


34        THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

however,  that  this  general  correspondence  of  the 
abstract  and  the  concrete  is  not  meant  to  imply- 
that  any  one  of  these  forms  of  society  is  purely 
material,  purely  intellectual,  or  purely  based  upon 
affection.  The  great  whole  of  the  universal  society 
is  made  up  of  parts  which  are  like  it,  and  are 
themselves  wholes  ;  and  in  every  one  of  them 
we  can  make  a  division  of  material,  intellectual, 
^  and  moral  powers.  Still,  with  this  reservation,  we 
may  say  generally  that  the  bond  which  holds  the 
family  together  is  one  of  affection ;  that  the  bond 
of  the  state  is  one  of  action,  or  material  purpose ; 
and  that  the  bond  of  humanity  is  the  spiritual 
bond  of  intelligence.  And  we  may  add  further, 
that,  as  the  tone  and  temper  of  the  Family  is 
determined  by  the  women,  so  the  tone  and  temper 
of  the  State  is  determined  by  the  practical  classes, 
warlike  or  industrial ;  and  the  tone  and  temper  of 
the  Church  by  the  priesthood,  theological  or  scien- 
tific. It  is  one  main  design  of  Comte's  sociology  to 
organize  and  put  in  their  proper  relation  to  each 
other  the  three  great  social  powers,  which  have 
successively  established  their  claims  in  the  long 
history  of  human  development.  The  dawn  of  civil- 
ization saw  the  organization  of  the  family,  under  the 
guidance  of  Fetichism.  Polytheism  taught  men  to 
combine  in  a  civil  society,  under  the  guidance  of  a 
power    in    which    temporal    and    spiritual    authority 


PRINCIPLES  OF  SOCIAL  UNION.  35 

were  confused  together.  Finally,  IMonotheism  separ- 
ated the  secular  and  spiritual  powers,  and  established 
a  certain  provisional  equilibrium  between  them. 
Metaphysic  was  powerful  only  to  destroy ;  but  by 
sapping  the  foundations  of  the  theological  system 
it  prepared  the  way  for  Positivism,  by  which  Family, 
State,  and  Church  are  finally  to  be  distinguished  and 
harmonized,  or  fixed  in  their  proper  organic  relations 
to  each  other,  so  as  to  preclude  for  ever  their  warfare 
or  intrusion  upon  each  other's  provinces. 

In   determiuinfT   the   nature   and   relation  of  these  The 

~  urKaiu- 

three  forms  of  social  union,  Comte  lays  down  two  gogletj"^ 
principles.  The  first  is,  that  there  can  be  no  society 
without  a  government,  any  more  than  there  can  be 
a  government,  or  effective  power  among  men,  with- 
out a  society.  "  A  true  social  force  is  the  result 
of  a  more  or  less  extended  co-operation,  gathered  up 
into  an  individual  organ."  It  is  a  result  in  which 
many  are  concerned,  yet  which  finds  its  final  ex- 
pression through  the  will  of  one.  As  to  the  former 
point,  that  a  social  basis  of  force  is  necessary,  Comte 
says  that  "  there  is  nothing  individual,  except  physical 
force";  and  even  physical  force  is  very  limited  when 
it  is  merely  individual.  Every  other  kind  of  power, 
whether  intellectual  or  moral,  is  essentially  social, 
dependent  on  the  co-operation  of  many  minds  in 
the  present,  and  generally  also  on  a  slow  accumulation 
of  energy  in  the  past.      As  Goethe   said,  "  It  is  not 


3G        THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

the  solitary  man  that  can  accomplish  anything,  but 
only  he  who  unites  with  many  at  the  right  time." 
Nor,  on  the  other  hand,  can  we  have  social  force 
without  government.  The  concurrence  of  many  can 
never  be  really  effective,  until  it  finds  an  individual 
organ  to  gather  it  up,  and  concentrate  it  to  a  definite 
result.  Sometimes  the  individual  comes  first,  fixes 
his  mind  on  a  determinate  purpose,  and  then  gathers 
to  himself  the  various  partial  forces  which  are  ne- 
cessary to  achieve  it.  More  often  in  the  case  of 
great  social  movements,  there  is  a  spontaneous  con- 
vergence of  many  particular  tendencies,  till,  finally, 
the  individual  appears  who  gives  them  a  common 
centre,  and  binds  them  into  one  whole.  But  in  all 
cases  the  effective  co-operation,  the  real  social  force, 
is  not  present  till  it  has  thus  concentrated  and 
individualized  itself. 
Outward  The  second  principle  is  one  that  has  been  already 

subordina-  '-  '-  •' 

higher  to  illustrated.  It  is,  in  Comte's  view,  the  law  of  the 
world  that  the  higher  should  immediately  subordinate 
itself  to  the  lower.  Thus  the  organic  finds  its  life 
controlled  and  limited  by  the  inorganic  world,  and 
man  has  to  work  out  his  destiny  in  submission  to  all 
the  necessities,  physical,  chemical,  and  vital,  which  are 
presupposed  in  his  existence.  The  higher,  therefore, 
can  overcome  the  lower  only  by  obedience ;  if  it  is  to 
conquer,  it  must  at  least  "  stoop  to  conquer."  And 
this  law  holds  equally  good  in  the  case  of  the  social 


luwer. 


NATURAL  AND  SPIRITUAL  RULE.  37 

life  of  man.  As  it  is  the  satisfaction  of  material 
wants  that  is,  and  must  be,  the  first  motive  of  his  life, 
so  it  is  in  the  effort  to  maintain  his  outward  existence, 
and  to  employ  the  resources  of  nature  for  the  satis- 
faction of  his  desires,  that  his  powers  are  first  excited 
and  disciplined.  Hence  it  is  the  practical  activities 
— military  or  industrial  according  to  the  state  of 
civilization — which  must  bear  the  immediate  rule  in 
his  life ;  not  because  they  are  the  highest,  but  because 
they  are  the  indispensable  basis  of  everything  else. 
Moral  and  intellectual  influences  can  only  come  in 
afterwards,  in  the  second  place,  to  modify  the  ruthless 
energy  of  the  practical  life.  They  are  essentially  re- 
straining, correcting,  guiding,  and  not  in  the  first 
instance  stimulating  or  originative  forces.  It  is  only 
when  they  act  in  this  indirect  way  that  tliey  are  really 
efficient,  and  their  direct  action,  if  it  were  possible, 
would  defeat  itself.  Their  purity  cannot  be  secured 
except  by  their  withdrawal  from  the  sphere  of  action 
and  command ;  their  power  is  dependent  on  their 
self-abnegation  and  rejection  of  immediate  authority 
and  rank.  They  cease  to  influence  men  when  they 
try  to  dominate  them.  Nay,  even  if  their  purity  were 
secured,  and  they  could  reign  without  rivals,  we  have 
seen  that  they  would  produce  a  less  beneficent  result 
than  when  they  come  in  as  moderators.  A  purely 
"  altruistic  "  and  intellectual  being,  in  whom  personal 
motives  did  not  exist,  would  have  a  less  exalted  ideal 


14934.'? 


r^S        THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

of  life  set  before  him  than  one  in  whom  the  personal 
motives  exist  in  all  their  energy,  but  are  remoulded  in 
conformity  with  social  interests. 

The  Family.  On  tliis  basis  we  have  to  consider  the  order  of  the 
Family,  the  State,  and  the  Church.  The  family  is 
the  first  instrument  of  man's  social  education.  It 
takes  him  at  the  lowest  point,  to  raise  him  to  the 
highest.  Its  life  is  the  "  only  natural  mediation 
which  can  habitually  disengage  us  from  pure  per- 
sonality, to  raise  us  gradually  to  true  sociability." 
In  it  the  man,  according  to  the  above  principle,  must 
bear  rule,  though  it  be  the  woman,  who,  "jpar  I'affcctu- 
euse  reaction  du  conseil  sur  le  commandement"  ulti- 
mately determines  the  spirit  of  the  society.  A  shadow 
also  of  the  other  spiritual  power,  the  power  of 
intelligence,  often  appears  in  the  family,  especially 
in  early  patriarchal  societies,  in  the  customary 
authority  given  to  the  moderating  counsel  of  the 
elders  who  are  beyond  the  age  for  active  service. 

The  state.  The  State  is  the  peculiar  sphere  of  the  active  or 
secular  power,  which,  after  being  military,  has  now 
become  distinctly  industrial.  During  the  military 
stage,  the  harmony  of  the  different  classes  in  the 
State  was  less  difficult  to  preserve,  seeing  that  common 
danger  bound  together  the  soldier  classes,  and  con- 
firmed their  fidelity  to  their  leaders ;  while,  in  general, 
the  industrial  offices  were  committed  to  slaves  or 
serfs,  who  were  deprived  of  all  political  power.     The 


CHURCH  AND  STATE.  3D 

change  to  an  industrial  order  of  political  life  brings 
with  it  many  dangers  to  the  unity  of  the  State, 
especially  as  it  has  taken  place  at  a  time  when  the 
old  theological  basis  of  belief  is  undermined.  Hence 
the  already  difficult  task  of  organizing  society,  on 
the  basis  of  individual  freedom  and  without  the 
external  pressure  of  danger,  is  rendered  still  more 
difficult.  The  capitalists,  who  are  the  natural  leaders 
of  an  industrial  society,  have  often  been  wanting  in 
the  consciousness  of  their  social  function,  and  in  their 
conduct  towards  their  workmen,  and  towards  each 
other,  have  been  given  up  to  the  action  of  personal 
motives.  On  the  other  hand,  the  labourers,  or 
"  proletaires,"  inspired  with  a  new  sense  of  inde- 
pendence and  excited  by  revolutionary  doctrines  of 
individual  right,  have  lost  the  old  sense  of  loyalty ; 
and  their  minds  are  filled  with  Utopias  of  equality, 
which  really  involve  the  negation  of  the  division 
and  co-operation  of  labour — i.e.,  of  all  social  organiza- 
tion. The  aim  of  all  social  reform,  therefore,  must 
be  to  bring  back  that  willing  subordination  to  leaders 
inspired  by  the  sense  of  social  duty,  which  characterized 
the  military  regime  in  its  best  form.  Ijut  this,  in 
the  decay  of  theology,  and  the  consequent  loss  of 
influence  by  the  Catholic  Church,  requires  the  de- 
velopment of  a  new  social  doctrine  based  upon  science, 
and  the  rise  of  a  new  spiritual  power  to  teach  and 
apply  it   to   modern    society.      The    State   cannot   be 


40         THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

perfectly  organized  without  the  revival  of  the  Church, 
for  it  is  the  wider  spiritual  unity  of  humanity  that 
alone  can  give  renewed  strength  to  the  bonds  of 
material  order  in  the  State. 
The  Church.  The  great  achievement  of  the  Middle  Ages  was 
the  separation  of  the  spiritual  from  the  temporal 
power.  This  has  often  been  taken  as  a  historical 
accident,  but  really  it  was  the  necessary  expression 
of  the  true  relation  of  theory  and  practice,  which, 
in  their  demands  and  requirements,  are  essentially 
opposed,  and  which  therefore  cannot  be  fully  developed 
except  in  relative  independence  of  each  other.  Theory 
is  general,  and  cannot  attain  its  highest  point  unless 
it  is  universal.  Practice  is  particular,  and  its  greatest 
success  is  the  fruit  of  concentration  upon  special 
circumstances  and  objects.  Theory  therefore  becomes 
stunted,  and  loses  its  freedom  and  impartiality,  if 
it  is  brought  into  close  connection  with  the  narrower 
aims  of  the  outward  life.  Practice,  on  the  other 
hand,  loses  little  by  the  egoism  of  personal  will 
and  desire,  and,  indeed,  within  proper  limits  requires 
it.  To  gain  the  full  benefit  of  this  distinction,  we 
must  adopt  with  all  its  consequences  the  mediaeval 
division  of  clergy  and  laity,  Church  and  State.  On 
the  one  hand,  therefore,  we  must  reduce  the  State 
to  the  dimensions  of  a  city,  with  its  proper  com- 
plement of  rural  domain;  "for  experience  has  proved 
that     the     city,     when     completed,     and     sufficiently 


THE  SOCIAL  ORDER.  41 

supported  by  material  resources,  is  the  largest  polit- 
ical society  that  can  be  produced  and  maintained 
without  oppression  " ;  as  it  is  also  the  society  which 
secures  the  most  definite  and  specialized  reaction  of 
man's  social  activity  on  the  physical  medium  liy 
which  he  is  surrounded,  further,  within  the  city 
so  constituted,  we  must  have  as  intensive  a  division 
of  labour  as  possible,  the  government  being  con- 
centrated in  the  hands  of  those  capitalists  whose 
occupations  are  of  the  greatest  generality  (/.<•.,  the 
bankers) ;  the  other  capitalists  (merchants,  manu- 
facturers, and  agriculturists)  taking  their  rank  accord- 
ing to  the  same  principle  ;  and  the  proletaires  follow- 
ing, organized  in  fraternal  equality.  Finally,  the 
various  offices  are  to  be  handed  down  from  one 
generation  to  another  according  to  the  principle  of 
"  heredite  sociocratique,"  each  official  choosing  his 
successor,  subject  to  the  approval  of  his  superiors ; 
for  this,  and  not  the  anarchic  principle  of  the  choice 
of  superiors  by  inferiors,  is  the  true  modern  principle 
of  government,  which  succeeds  to  the  old  method 
•of  inheritance  by  birth.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
order  of  the  priesthood  is  to  be  in  everything  the 
exact  opposite  of  the  order  of  the  laity.  In  the 
first  place,  motives  of  personal  interest  are,  so  far 
as  possible,  to  be  excluded  from  their  lives.  There 
is  to  be  no  competition  of  trade  among  them,  but 
all    spiritual   work   is   to    be    paid    by   salaries   Irom 


42        THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

the  public,  and  these  salaries  are  to  be  fixed  at 
so  low  a  rate,  even  in  tlie  case  of  the  highest  members 
of  the  order,  that  there  shall  be  no  inducement  to 
enter  the  order  from  motives  of  cupidity.  In  the 
second  place,  although  a  certain  subordination  of 
rank  is  necessary,  in  order  to  secure  discipline 
and  combined  action — and  all  the  priesthood  will  be 
arranged  in  a  hierarchy  vmder  the  "grand  Pretre 
de  I'Humanite  " — yet  there  must  be  no  specializa- 
/  tion  of  function,  or  division  of  labour  among  them. 
In  Comte's  view  the  modern  anarchy  of  science 
is  due  to  the  fact,  that  scientific  men  are  mostly 
specialists ;  and  liis  priests  therefore  are  to  be 
trained  in  all  science,  from  mathematics,  through 
physics,  chemistry,  and  biology,  to  sociology  and 
morals — for  which  last  all  the  other  sciences  are 
to  be  regarded  as  preparatory.  In  this  way  the 
"  esprit  d'ensemble "  will  prevail  among  them,  and 
science  will  be  preserved  from  its  present  uncer- 
tain aberrations  into  regions  from  which  no  gain  can 
be  brought  back  for  the  furtherance  of  humanity. 
Nay,  Comte  appears  to  regard  even  the  separation 
'  of  Art  from  Science  as  a  step  toward  anarchy,  and 
demands  that  his  priesthood  should  be  the  artistic 
as  well  as  the  philosophic  teachers  of  men.  At  the 
same  time  they  must  avoid,  as  the  most  fatal  source 
of  corruption,  all  tendency  to  interfere  more  directly 
in    practical    affairs.      Their    business    is   to    "modify 


THE  WORK  OF  THE  PRIESTHOOD.  43 

the  wills,  without  ever  coinnianding  the  acts  of  iiieii," 
and  they  cannot  preserve  the  universality  which  is 
their  characteristic  without  a  complete  renunciation 
of  the  right  to  compel.  The  farthest  point  to  which 
they  may  go  in  this  direction,  is  to  exconiimniicate, 
or  affix  a  social  stigma  on  offenders;  which,  however, 
in  a  Positivist  society,  will  l)e  a  sufficiently  severe 
punishment. 

Such   a  priesthood   will    be    the   natural   represen-  The  priest- 

^  ^  hood  of 

tatives  of  the  unity  or  solidarity  of  mankind,  as  i'i"n'"»"J- 
opposed  to  the  particular  interests  of  individuals 
and  classes.  They  will  also  be  the  representatives 
of  the  continuity  of  the  life  of  humanity  in  the 
past  and  the  future,  as  opposed  to  the  excessive 
claims  of  the  present  hour.  It  will  be  their  duty 
to  make  men  conscious  that  their  occupations  are 
social  functions,  and  that  everything  that  is  valuable 
in  their  lives  has  been  gained  for  them  by  the  long- 
continued  labours  of  humanity,  whose  gratuitous  gifts 
it  is  their  highest  privilege  to  preserve,  and  hand 
down  increased  by  their  own  contributions  to  posterity. 
The  clergy  will  thus  be,  as  in  the  old  system,  the 
natural  allies  of  the  women ;  for  what  they  have 
to  do  is  simply  to  generalize  and  support,  Ijy  a 
complete  scientific  view  of  the  world  and  of  human 
life,  those  lessons  of  the  heart  which  are  first  learned 
by  man  in  the  narrower  circle  of  the  family.  By 
their    encyclopaedic    view    of   knowledge,    the    intclli- 


44        THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

gence,  which  under  the  dispersive  regime  of  science 
has  become  a  rebel  against  the  heart,  is  to  be 
brought  back  to  its  allegiance,  and  the  social  order 
of  the  State  and  of  Humanity  to  be  reconstituted 
on  the  type  of  the  family. 
Iii^work*of  I"  impressing  such  a  view  of  life  upon  mankind, 
thechure  .  ^^  Positivist  Church  will  avail  itself  of  all  the  aids 
of  art,  and  will  use  the  power  of  imagination  to  fill 
up  those  voids  and  imperfections  which  sober  science 
undoubtedly  leaves  in  our  knowledge  of  things.  For 
it  is  the  function  of  poetry  not  merely  to  give  body 
and  substance  to  the  necessarily  abstract  ideas  of 
science ;  it  may  even,  justifiably,  outrun  the  possi- 
bilities of  knowledge,  though  in  that  case  we  must 
not  forget  the  unverified  nature  of  the  illusions  to 
which  it  makes  us  yield.  In  the  first  of  these  uses 
Art  will  give  precision  and  force  to  the  worship  of 
Humanity,  or  of  its  representative — Woman.  It  will 
provide  language  for  those  exercises  of  prayer  and 
praise,  by  which  we  make  vivid  and  real  to  ourselves 
our  union  with  others,  and  dedicate  ourselves  to  a  life 
of  "  Altruism."  It  will  thus  intensify  and  deepen 
the  suhjcctive  life,  through  which  past  humanity  lives 
in  us,  and  enable  us  to  look  forward  with  joy  to 
our  only  personal  reward,  that  of  being  incorporated 
in  Humanity,  and  living  again  in  the  subjective  life 
of  others.  For  "  toute  Veducation  humaine  doit  pre- 
parer chacun  a  vivre  pour  autrui,  a  fin  de  vivre  dans 


POETRY  AND  TRUTH.  45 

autrui ;"  which  is  the  true  social  doctrine  of  immor- 
tality, as  opposed  to  the  anti-social  doctrine  of  an 
objective  immortality  for  ourselves.  The  other  use 
of  poetry,  in  which  it  transcends  the  strict  limits 
of  science,  is  to  revive  something  like  the  early 
fetichist  belief  that  everything  lives  and  is  moved 
by  human  desires  and  affections.  Thus,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  the  inorganic  world,  so  far  as  we  know 
it,  is  governed  by  a  fatality  which  is  indifferent  to 
the  well-being  of  man.  Nay,  in  its  first  action,  it 
seems  to  call  forth  those  tendencies  in  us  which 
most  need  to  be  repressed  and  subdued.  And  it 
is  only  by  the  providence  of  Humanity  that  this 
very  hostility  and  opposition  of  Nature  are  made 
instrumental  to  the  attainment  of  a  higher  good. 
Yet,  the  victory  being  won,  we  may  be  allowed,  at 
least  in  poetic  rapture,  to  forget  the  discord  between 
man  and  the  world  he  inhabits ;  or  to  regard  it  as 
existing  only  with  a  view  to  that  higher  good  which 
has  resulted  from  it.  For  "  Vexistcnce  humaine  ne 
sinformc  gidre  du  temjys  qui  exigca  sa  pre'paration 
S2)onta7iec."  When  we  consider  Nature  as  summed  up 
in  man,  we  learn  "  to  love  the  natural  order  as  the 
basis  of  the  artificial  order"  produced  by  humanity; 
and  thus  we  "renew,  under  a  better  form,  the  fetichist 
affections."  In  his  last  work,  Comte  carries  this 
extension  of  poetic  license  to  its  farthest  point,  and 
bids   us   add   to   our  adoration  of  Humanity,  as    the 


46        THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

"  Grand  Etre,"  an  adoration  of  Space,  as  the  "  Grand 
Milieu,"  and  of  the  Earth,  as  the  "Grand  Fetiche"; 
and  he  would  have  us  think  of  these  two  as 
yearning  for  the  birth  and  development  of  Humanity. 
In  Comte's  system,  therefore,  as  in  a  more  familiar 
text,  "  the  earnest  expectation  of  the  creature  waiteth 
for  the  manifestation  of  the  sons  of  God";  and  that 
optimism,  which  is  rejected  at  the  beginning  as 
truth,  is  brought  in  at  the  end  as  poetry.  Only, 
v/  poetry  is  not,  as  with  the  Apostle,  the  anticipation 
or  foretaste  of  knowledge ;  it  is  the  substitute  pro- 
vided because  knowledge  is  absent  and  unattainable. 

For  our  purpose  it  is  not  necessary  to  go  beyond 
this  point.  The  minute  prescriptions  of  the  fourth 
volume  of  the  "  Politique  Positive "  add  little  or 
nothing  to  the  general  meaning  of  the  system.  The 
positivist  New  Jerusalem  is  as  definitely  determined 
and  measured  as  the  Holy  City  of  the  Apocalypse ; 
but  the  main  interest  of  such  details  is  for  the 
church  and  not  for  the  world. 


47 


CHAPTER  11. 

THE    NEGATIVE    SIDE    OF    COMTE'S    PIIILOSOrilY HIS 

OPPOSITION    TO   METAPHYSIC    AND    THEOLOGY. 

Growth  of  a  new  view  of  the  social  organism  opposed  at  once  to 
Individualism  and  Socialism — Comte  and  the  German  Idealists 
— Meaning  of  his  attack  on  Metaphysics — His  real  agreement 
with  modern  metaphysicians — He  adopts  Locke's  principles  as 
to  knowledge^  yet  is  opposed  to  the  Indiridualism  of  Locke  s 
French  disciples — He  attacks  Realism  as  a  Nominalist  and 
Nominalism  as  a  Realist,  and  is  really  guided  by  a  higher 
principle  than  either^His  mistaken  attitude  toioards  the 
Critical  Philosophy — Relation  of  Philosophy  to  Science — It 
makes  men  conscioits  of  their  guiding  principles — Comte's  w?i- 
consciousness  of  the  categories  that  guide  his  thought — Con- 
sequent defects  in  his  view  of  the  development  of  Religion,  of 
Philosophy,  and  of  Science — Mr.  Spencer^s  criticism  and 
nitre's  answer — Ambiguity  in  the  opposition  between  the  uni- 
versal and  the  particular. 

In  the  previous  chapter  I  have  given  a  sketch  of 
Comte's  system,  and  especially  of  that  part  of  it 
which  has  attracted  least  attention  in  this  country 
— the  social  philosophy  of  the  "  Politique  Positive." 
In  this  and  the  subsequent  chapters  I  propose  to  make 


48        THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

a  few  criticisms  on  the  system,  with  the  view  of 
exhil)itiiig  the  fundamental  tendencies  of  thought 
which  are  manifested  in  it,  and  of  contrasting  the 
manifestation  of  those  tendencies  in  Comte,  with 
their  manifestation  in  other  writers,  especially  in  the 
great  German  idealists  of  the  beginning  of  this 
century.  In  these  criticisms  I  shall  observe  the 
same  relative  limitation  as  in  the  previous  chapter, 
and  shall  give  most  attention  to  the  social  and 
religious  results  of  Comte's  philosophy.  As,  however, 
it  is  impossible  to  separate  these  from  the  philo- 
sophical principles  upon  which  they  are  based,  it 
will  be  necessary,  in  the  first  place,  to  examine 
the  ideas  of  Comte  as  to  the  development  of  human 
thought  in  general,  and  of  science  in  particular. 
Tendency  of      Couite,  like   cvcry  great  writer,  was   a  son  of  his 

Comtes  '  ./     o  ' 

nTw  vi*ewof  time ;  and  his  greatness  is  measured  by  the  degree 
organism,  in  wliicli  he  brouglit  to  articulate  expression  the 
ideas  which  were  unconsciously,  or  half  consciously, 
working  upon  the  minds  of  those  around  him.  The 
great  emancipating  movement  of  thought  in  the 
eighteenth  century,  which  found  its  clearest  expres- 
sion in  the  works  of  Hume  and  Voltaire,  and  which 
was  kindled  into  revolutionary  passion  by  Eousseau, 
awakened,  by  way  of  reaction,  an  equally  extreme 
movement,  both  in  theory  and  practice,  toward  the 
reassertion  of  authority  and  social  order.  But  in  the 
midst   of   this   flux   and   reflur  of   the  popular   con- 


THE  SOCIAL  ORGANISM.  49 

sciousness,  and  still  more  after  the  extreme  limits 
of  each  of  these  movements  became  clearly  marked, 
a  new  idea  was  gradually  taking  possession  of  all 
minds  that  could  rise  above  the  atmosphere  of  party. 
Emancipation,  pushed  to  the  extent  of  isolating  the 
individual  from  that  general  life  through  which  alone 
he  can  become  a  moral,  or  even  a  rational  bein!:;,  and 
rebellion,  pushed  to  the  extent  of  severing  the  present 
from  that  past  upon  which  it  is  necessarily  based, 
had  for  their  natural  counterparts  an  equally  exagger- 
ated panic  of  reaction,  and  an  equally  indiscriminate 
admiration  of  past  forms  of  thought  and  life.  Even 
in  Eousseau  the  idea  of  savage  isolation  is  crossed  by 
longing  reminiscences  of  the  patriarchal  state,  and 
of  the  republics  of  antiquity ;  and  the  romantic  spirit, 
with  its  revival  of  mediaeval  types  and  models,  soon 
began  to  S2)read  through  the  literature  of  Europe, 
and  to  affect  its  social  and  political  life.  Between 
these  opposing  tendencies  the  conception  of  society 
as  a  unity,  yet  not  a  mechanical  but  an  organic  unity, 
of  living  and  independent  members,  presented  itself 
as  the  reconciliation  of  socialism  and  individualism, 
or,  in  other  words,  of  the  opposing  interests  of  order 
and  freedom.  And  with  this  came  another  kindred 
idea — the  idea  of  development  or  organic  evolution — 
which  made  it  possible  to  admit  men's  obligations 
to  the  past  without  denying  the  claims  of  the  present 
and  the  future.     Condorcct,  Kant,  and  Edmund  Burke 


50        THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

are  three  writers  of  very  different  temper  and  ten- 
dency, but  in  all  of  them  we  find  this  consciousness 
of  the  organic  unity  and  evolution  of  the  life  of 
men  and  nations.  All  equally  oppose  the  crude 
theory  of  a  Social  Contract  and  recognize  that  the 
unity  of  the  State  or  of  Society  is  something  better 
"  than  a  partnership  agreement  in  a  trade  of  pepper 
and  coffee,  calico  or  tobacco,  or  some  other  such  low 
concern,  to  be  taken  up  for  a  little  temporary  interest, 
and  to  be  dissolved  by  the  fancy  of  the  parties  ; " 
that  it  is,  on  the  contrary,  "  a  partnership  in  all 
science,  a  partnership  in  all  art,  a  partnership  in 
every  virtue,  and  in  all  perfection."  All  equally 
recognize  that  the  social  state,  to  which  they  look 
forward  as  the  ideal  of  the  future,  cannot  be  merely 
an  historical  accident,  or  a  success  achieved  by  the 
skilful  contrivance  of  individuals  ;  but  that  it  must 
be  the  final  realization  of  a  principle,  which  has 
been  working  through  all  the  past  history  of  man, 
and  which  has  underlain  not  only  the  old  order  of 
European  civilization  but  also  the  movement  of  re- 
bellion against  it.*  Finally,  after  Kant's  suggestive, 
though  imperfect,  application  of  it  to  history,  the 
same    idea,    with    a    deeper    metaphysical    perception 

*  This  is  not  strictly  accurate,  for  Condorcet  seems  to  except 
from  his  list  of  the  elements  of  progress  the  whole  social  and 
ecclesiastical  system  which  existed  previous  to  the  Revolution, 
while  Burke  can  see  no  element  of  growth  or  improvement  in 
the  Revolution  itself. 


RELATION  TO  GERMAN  IDEALISM.  -,1 

of  its  meaning,  became  the  central  thouglit  in  the 
philosophies  of  Schelling  and  Hegel  as  early  as  the 
first  years  of  this  century. 

Comte,   ignorant   for    the    most    part   of  tlie  work  Analogous 
of    any  except   his   French    predecessors,    was   led   to  "nd'in'tho 
the    same    fundamental    conception    by    the    political  idcaUisu. 
experiences    of   France,    as    well    as    by   the    conflict 
of  the  opposite  schools   of    Eousseau   and    St,   Simon 
with  each  other  and  with  the  Catholic   De   Maistre. 
Yet,    despite    this    independence,   there    is    a    certain 
parallelism     between    Comte's    interpretation    of    the 
idea  of  development  and  that  of  the   German   ideal- 
ists.    That  the  first  "  Synthesis,"  or  system  of  doctrinel^ 
upon  which  man's  intellectual  and  moral  life  is  based, 
was    poetic    or    imaginative  ;    that    it    was    therefore 
disintegrated    and    destroyed    by   the    critical    under- 
standing ;    and   that   it   requires    to   be   restored   and 
reconstituted  on  a  rational  basis,  a  basis  which  shall 
satisfy    the    awakened    intelligence,    as    well    as    tlie 
heart    and    the    moral    sympathies — all    this    was    a  ^ 
commonDlace  of  German   pliilosopliy  long   before   thei 
advent    of    Positivism."       The     coudeuniation    which 
Comte   pronounced   upon   the  individualistic   and   re- 
volutionary theories  of  Eousseau   is  little  more  tlian 
an   echo   of   the  GermaS  attack   upon   the   "Aufkliir- 

*Cf.  especially  Fichte's  Characteristics  of  the  Present  Age. 
Many  of  Carlyle's  characteristic  expressions  and  ideas  seem  tu 
have  been  suggested  by  this  book. 


52        THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

uus."  Even  Comte's  denunciation  of  the  "  meta- 
physical"  exiiluiialion  of  the  world  by  transcendenT 
causes  or  "  entities "  which  are  not  capable  of 
empirical  verification,  and  his  assertion  that  man's 
knowledge  is  confined  to  the  relative  and  phenomena], 
finds  a  close  parallel  in  the  language  of  Kant.  And 
Kant's  idealistic  followers,  though  they  assert  the 
possibility  of  a  knowledge  that  goes  beyond  the 
phenomenal,  do  not  assert  it  in  the  sense  in  which 
Comte  denies  it ;  for  with  them  the  negation  of  an 
absolute  dualism  between  the  noumenal  and  pheno- 
menal is,  as  will  afterwards  be  shown,  only  the 
necessary  result  of  the  doctrine  of  the  relativity  of 
knowledge  itself.  In  all  ways,  therefore,  the  question 
between  Comte  and  those  whom  he  would  have  called 
metaphysicians  is  of  a  much  more  definite  and  specific 
kind  than  he  or  his  followers  have  generally  recog- 
nized. The  general  basis  of  thought- — which  belongs 
rather  to  the  time  than  to  any  individual — is  common 
to  him  with  ail  the  greater  philosophic  writers  of 
his  own,  and  even  of  the  preceding  generation.  And 
the  only  point  for  controversy  is  whether  he  gave 
the  most  consistent  and  satisfactory  development 
to  those  principles,  which  we  cannot  indeed  say 
that  he  derived  from  others,  but  which  he  was 
certainly  not  the  first  to  express.  The  question 
in  short  is,  in  the  first  place,  how  far  Comte  had 
a   clear   consciousness  of  the   source   and   bearincj    of 


HIS  NEC  A  TIONS.  53 

his  own  leading  ideas  ;  and,  in  the  second  place, 
how  far  he  has  been  successful  in  applying  them. 
I  venture  to  think  that  in  both  points  of  view  a 
careful  examination  of  his  works  shows  him  to  be 
defective.  He  fails  to  apprehend  with  clearness  the 
logic  by  which  his  own  thoughts  are  guided ;  he  fails 
to  follow  out  that  logic  to  its  legitimate  result ;  and 
his  system,  therefore,  with  all  its  comprehensiveness, 
ends  in  inconsistency  and  self-contradiction. 

In  the  first  place,  then,  C  omte's  starting-point  was  Meaning  of 

*■ — -  ^  "^  his  attack 

fixed  for  him  by  the  sensationalist  philosophy  of  the  o''  ™.'^^  . 

^  r  r    J  physic  and 

last  century.  He  begins  where  Hume  ends,  with  ^''""'"fy- 
the  denial  of  the  scientific  value  of  metaphysics  and 
tlieplogy.  This  denial  he  only  modifies  so  far  as 
to  maintain  that,  while  neither  theology  nor  meta- 
physics can  be  regarded  as  forms  of  real  knowledge, 
both  must  be  regarded  as  necessary  stages  in  the 
process  by  which  real  knowledge  is  attained.  They 
are,  in  short,  transitory  forms  of  thought,  which  now 
survive  only  as  stages  in  the  culture  of  childhood 
and  youth,  or  as  prejudices  in  the  minds  of  those 
who  have  not  yet  been  awakened  to  the  spirit  of 
their  time.  Notwithstanding  this  wholesale  rejec- 
tion of  metaphysic  and  theology,  however,  it  may 
easily  be  shown  that  _Comtei's  own  theory,  like  every 
intelligible  view  of  the  world,  involves  a  metaphysic. 
and  ends  in  a  theolugy  ;  and  lliat  he  only  succeeds 
in  concealiniT    this    from    himself,  because   he   is   un- 


54        THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

conscious  of  the  presuppositions  he  makes ;  because 
he  uses  the  word  "  metaphysic "  in  a  narrow  and 
mistaken  sense ;  and  because  he  conceives  it,  as  well 
as  theology,  to  be  l)ound  up  with  a  kind  of  "  trans- 
cendentalism," which  all  the  great  metaphysicians  of 
modern  times  agree  in  rejecting. 
His  real  Hostility    to    metaphysic,    if    by     metaphysic    be 

niodeni''  meant  the  explanation  of  the  facts  of  experience  by 
physicians,  eutitics  or  causes,  which  cannot  be  verified  in  ex- 
]^>erience  or  shown  to  stand  in  any  definite  relation 
to  it,  is  the  common  feature  of  all  modern  phil- 
osophy, idealist  or  sensationalist.  It  is  as  clearly 
manifested  in  Descartes  as  in  Bacon,  in  Kant  and 
Hegel  as  in  Locke  and  Hume.  If  Bacon  accuses 
the  scholastics  of  anticipating  nature  by  unverified 
/  hypotheses  or  presuppositions  not  derived  from  the 
study  of  nature,  Descartes  is  no  less  emphatic  in 
his  denunciation  of  a  philosophy  of  authority,  and 
in  his  demand  for  a  fundamental  reconstruction  of 
belief.  If  the  former  leases  all  truth  upon  experi- 
ence, does  not  the  latter  seek  the  evidence  of  his 
principles  in  the  most  intimate  of  experiences,  the 
consciousness  of  self  ?  Leibniz  is  as  ready  as 
Locke,  Kant  is  as  ready  as  Hume,  to  maintain 
that  philosophy  must  not  introduce.,  transcendent 
^  principles  into  its  explanations  of  experience.  As 
Luther  rejected  a  God  who  did  not  reveal  himself 
directly   to   the   heart    and    intelligence    of   his   wor- 


IVHA  T  IS  ME  TA  PH  YSIC  ?  55 

shipper,  but  only  through  the  mediation  of  a  priest 
and  in  an  external  tradition,  so  the  greatest  modern 
philosophers   of    all    schools    are    agreed   in  rejecting 
all   principles   which    do   not   find    their   evidence   in 
being   an    integral    part    of    the    experience    of  men. 
It   would   be   too   much    to    say    that   tliey    all   con- 
sistently    develop     this     principle     to    its    necessary 
consequence,   or    that    traces   of  scholastic   modes   of 
thought  are  not  to  be  found  even  in  those  of  them 
who  most   strongly    denounce   scholasticism ;    on    the 
contrary,    it    may    be   admitted    that    no    one   before 
Kant  saw  what  was  involved  in  the  renuncialiun  of 
the   transcendent   as   an   object  of  knowledge.      Even 
Kant  himself  did  not  see  all  its  consLMjuunces.      Still, 
the   assertion  of  the   principle   itself,   and    the   effort 
to   realize   it,   is   perhaps   the   most   general   and   in- 
variable characteristic  of  modern  philosophy.      Li  SQ 
far,  therefore,  as  vvhat_Comte.  means  by  metaphysics 
is   anything    like    the    scholastic  philosophy,    witli   its 
transcendent  or  authoritative  principles,  uo  objection 
need  be   taken   to   his    assertion    that  metaphysic   is 
an  exploded  mode  of  thought,  from  which  the  philo-. 
sopher  and    the   man    of   science   must   now    seek   to 
free   themselves.     But    then   it   must  be  added   that, 
in  this  sense,  none  of  the  greater  speculative  writers 
of  modern   times   is,   in    principle,   a   metaphysician ; 
and  that   the  metaphysic   which  they  cultivate  is  of 
a  totally  different  nature.     If,  indeed,  we  could  con- 


,  5G        THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

"  V,  ^     sider  Comte's  remarks  as  aimed  at   the  great  meta- 

A  .M.\  ^  phvsicinns  of  Jiis  ovn  fl;iv,  at  Kant  and  liis  succes- 
sors, the  description,  and  therefore  the  censure 
founded  upon  it,  would  be  almost  ludicrously  in- 
applicable. 

To  understand  the  bearing  of  Comte's  denial  of 
metaphysics,  however,  we  must  keep  in  view  his 
historical  antecedents.  This  negation  was,  as  I  have 
already  said,  part  of  his  heritage  from  the  sensa- 
tionalist philosophy  of  the  last  century,  which  had 
reached  its  most  consequent  and  definite  expression 
in  Hume.  It  was  a  conclusion,  the  first  step  to- 
wards which  was  taken  by  Locke  in  his  attack 
upon  the  Cartesian  doctrine  of  innate  ideas.  In 
Locke's  view,  innate  ideas  were  principles  appre- 
hended independently  of  all  experience — possessions 
of  the  individual  mind  which  it  finds  in  itself  at 
once,  and  apart  from  any  process  of  development, 
and  apart  from  any  intercourse  with  the  world.  And, 
to  disprove  their  existence,  it  was  enough  for  him 
to  point  to  the  fact  that,  prior  to  such  intercourse 
with  the  world,  the  mind  has  no  contents  at  all, 
and  can  scarcely  be  said  even  to  exist.  This  obvious 
truth,  however,  was  immediately  confused  by  him 
with  the  doctrine  that  reality — the  objective  world 
of  individual  things  as  such — is  immediately  given 
in  sense  apart  from  any  "  work  of  the  mind,"  and 
that    any   ideas   or   universals   added   by    thought   to 


LOCKE'S  NEW  WAY  OF  IDEAS.  57 

the  data  of  sense,  must,  ?)wo  facto,  be  fictions.  In 
making  this  assumption,  Locke  was  yiokling  to  a 
tendency  of  thought  which  had  ah-eady  shown  itself 
in  the  nominalism  of  Hobbes.  Locke,  indeed,  was 
not  a  nominalist,  he  was  what  is  called  a  concep- 
tualist;  but  in  the  Essay  on  the  Human  Under- 
standing no  distinct  ground  is  ever  stated  for  giving 
to  universals  more  than  that  subjective  value  which 
even  Hobbes  allows  to  them.  In  his  criticism  of 
the  ideas  of  substance  and  cause,  Lucktj  is  always 
seeldng  to  reduce  fact  and  reahty  to  the  isdlated 
sensations  through  which,  as  he  supposes,  indiNidual 
tningsuare  given  And  the  same  tendency  of  thought 
leads  him  also  to  regard  the  individual  mind  as  ap- 
prehensive only  of  its  own  ideas  and  sensations,  and 
excluded  from  all  direct  contact  with  the  world.  It 
soon,  however,  became  obvious  to  the  followers  of 
Locke,  that,  on  these  terms,  no  knowledge,  or  even 
semblance  of  knowledge,  is  possible ;  that  the  in- 
dividual mind,  if  it  were  thus  confined  to  its  own 
isolated  feelings,  could  never  dream  of  the  existence 
of  an  objective  world ;  and  that  to  make  possible 
the  reference  of  sensations  to  objects,  it  is  necessary 
that  they  should  be  connected  together  according 
to  general  principles.  In  other  words,  it  became 
obvious  that  the  universal,  or  some  substitute  for 
the  universal,  is  required  to  make  knowledge  and 
experience    possible.      And    to    meet    this    want    the 


58        THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

theory  of  association  was  devised,  and  the  atomic 
elements  of  the  intelligible  given  in  sense,  were 
supposed  to  be  linked  together  by  the  principles  of 
resemblance,  contiguity,  and  succession.  It  was  not 
perceived  that  in  these  principles  there  is  already 
implied  the  unity  of  the  self-conscious  intelligence, 
and,  indeed,  the  whole  body  of  categories  which  the 
theory  of  association  is  used  to  explain  or  explain 
away.  It  was  the  work  of  Kant  to  show  this ; 
to  show,  in  other  words,  that  the  attempt  to  empty 
knowledge  of  its  universal  element  must  be  suicidal; 
that  it  must  be  fatal  not  only  to  theology  and 
metaphysics,  but  to  all  knowledge,  even  of  the 
simplest  facts  of  experience.  But  Hume — and  it 
may  be  added  most  of  his  English  followers,  such 
as  Mill  and  Mr.  Spencer — halt  half-way  in  the 
development  of  their  sensationalism,  and  therefore 
think  it  possible  to  maintain  that,  while  the  ulti- 
mate reality  of  things  is  hid  from  us,  because  we 
cannot  transcend  our  own  ideas,  we  can  still  have 
knowledge  of  phenomena,  because  these  ideas  are 
combined  in  the  minds  of  all  men  according  to  the 
same  principles  of  association.  It  is  from  this  point 
of  view  that  Hume  tells  us  that  the  principle  of 
causality,  based  as  it  is  upon  mere  association,  may 
be  fairly  used  to  connect  phenomena  with  each 
other,  but  that  it  is  altogether  insufficient  to  en- 
able   us    to    rise     from     phenomena    to    noumena — 


DIDEROT  AND  ROUSSEAU.  59 

from  the  world  to  God.  Thus  tlie  principles  of 
the  association  of  ideas  are  to  the  mind  of  man 
something  like  what  wings  are  to  the  ostrich  ;  they 
help  him  to  run  on  the  ground,  but  they  are  not 
strong  enough  to  make  him  fly.  As  a  succedaneum 
for  that  universal  element  in  thought,  whicli  would 
raise  us  to  the  knowledge  of  tilings  as  they  really 
are,  they  enable  us  to  arrange  the  appearances — 
the  shadows  of  our  cave — and  fJud,  for  the  practical 
purposes  of  the  cave,  is  all  that  we  require. 

While   the   English   followers   of  Locke   thus   con-  ^nd  the 

social  Atom- 
fined    themselves    to    the    development    of    his    ideas  ifp^ij^irby 

on  the  theory  of  knowledge,  his  French  followers  i.wdiste?'"* 
seized  upon  his  individualistic  theory  of  existence, 
and  used  it  as  an  instrument  to  undermine  the 
Catholic  faith,  and  the  whole  political  and  social 
system  connected  therewith.  Diderot  and  D'Holbach 
found  in  Atomism  the  readiest  weapon  to  assail  the 
popular  theology.  The  former  writer,  indeed,  some- 
times plays  with  the  atomic  theory  in  a  way  that 
reminds  us  of  the  earth-shaking  laughter  of  Aristo- 
phanes. In  infinite  time,  he  asks,  in  the  infinite 
number  of  throws  of  the  atomic  dice,  why  should 
not,  at  one  moment  or  another,  a  Cosmos  spring 
out  of  chaos  ?  and  the  Abbe  Galiani  can  only  hint, 
by  way  of  answer,  that,  somehow  or  other,  "  les 
des  de  la  Nature  sont  pipes."  Eousseau,  applying 
the   same    idea   to    Sociology,    proclaims    the    eiuanci- 


GO        THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

pation  of  the  natural  man,  and  develops  the  theory 
of  the  Social  Contract,  the  theory  which  reduces 
the  state  to  a  creation  of  the  individual  will.  Yet 
Eousseau  had  some  uncertain  glimpses  of  the  truth 
that  the  individual  has  no  rights  or  claims,  except 
so  far  as  he  is  an  organ  of  the  universal ;  and  with 
strange  inconsistency  he  declares,  that  it  is  only 
through  social  life  that  the  human  being  "  ceases 
to  be  a  dull  and  limited  animal,  and  becomes  an 
intelligent  being  and  a  man." 
He  accepts        Now  it  is  cuHous  that  Comtc,  while  in  his  theory 

the  former,  '  •' 

Lue"?*^ '*'*'  of  knowledge  he  accepts  many  of  the  ideas  of  the 
school  of  Locke,  in  his  social  theory  takes  up  a 
position  of  intense  hostility  to  the  results  of  the 
same  philosophy.  That  very  individualism,  which 
in  Locke  and  Hume  had  been  the  ground  and 
presupposition  of  the  whole  attack  upon  metaphysic, 
is  assailed  by  Comte  as  the  very  essence  of  metaphysic. 
"  The  metaphysical  spirit,"  he  is  never  weary  of 
saying,  "  is  radically  incompatible  with  the  social 
point  of  view ; "  it  has  "  never  been  able  to  escape 
from  the  sphere  of  the  individual."  From  the  em- 
pirical philosophy  Comte  accepted  most  of  its 
negatives,  especially  its  rejection  of  the  possibility 
of  metaphysics  or  theology  as  sciences  of  things  in 
themselves,  and  its  denial  that  even  the  principles, 
on  which  experience  is  based,  are  themselves  derived 
from    anything   but    experience.     But    the    school  of 


THE  UNIVERSAL  NOT  UNREAL.  CI 

Locke  had  generally  set  aside  the  abstract  universal 
in  favour  of  the  equally  abstract  individual,  ami 
here  Cornte  declines  to  follow  them.  Individualism 
is  seen  by  him  to  be  an  inadequate  basis  for  social 
or  even  for  biological  theory,  and  the  blame,  as  a 
matter  of  course,  is  cast  upon  metaphysics.  The 
"  fate  of  metaphysical  theory,"  he  declares,  "  is  decided 
by  its  inability  to  conceive  of  man  otherwise  than 
individually " ;  whereas  "  the  true  human  point  of 
view  is  not  individual  luit  social."  "  Man  is  a  mere 
abstraction,  and  there  is  nothing  real  but  humanity, 
regarded  intellectually  and  yet  more  morally."""  It 
is,  in  fact,  just  this  thought  of  the  unity  and  the 
solidarity  of  men — not  the  mere  abstract  unity  of 
a  genus,  but  the  concrete  unity  of  one  life,  manifesting 
itself  in  many  members — which  enables  Comte  to 
look  at  the  history  of  the  past  in  a  way  so  different 
from  most  of  his  predecessors,  and  to  recognize  the 
affinity  of  that  social  synthesis  of  the  future,  whicli 
he  himself  is  trying  to  realize,  with  the  previous 
theological  synthesis  of  Catholicism.  It  is  this  also 
which  leads  him  to  create  a  new  religion  of  humanity, 
and  even,  in  the  end,  to  justify  that  poetic  license 
which  seems  necessary  to  complete  the  synthetic 
view  of  life,  and  to  bring  nature  into  unity  witli 
man.  In  the  "Politique  Positive"  Comte's  oppos- 
ition to  metaphysics,  as  tending,  in  the  language  of 
*  Phil.  Pos.  vi.  p.  692,  Miss  Martiueau's  Trans,  ii.  p.  508. 


02        THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

Burke,  to  dissolve  society  "into  the  dust  and  powder 
of  individuality,"  becomes  even  more  emphatic ;  and 
with  it  is  combined  a  continual  denunciation  of  the 
"  dispersive  regime "  of  the  particular  sciences,  which 
in  the  present  day  he  declares  to  be  pursued  by 
mere  specialists,  with  an  extreme  waste  of  human 
faculty,  and  without  any  regard  to  the  legitimate 
end  of  all  science,  the  furtherance  of  man's  estate. 
The  conception  of  life  and  science,  as  a  connected 
whole,  all  whose  parts  are  to  be  estimated  and 
developed  in  relation  to  each  other  and  to  the  idea 
of  the  whole,  is  by  Comte  as  firmly  held  and  as 
resolutely  carried  out  to  its  consequences  as  by  the 
most  extreme  idealist  or  pantheist.  The  only  dif- 
ference— which  still  shows  the  trace  of  the  indi- 
vidualistic philosophy  out  of  which  Positivism  was 
developed — is  that  the  synthesis  of  Comte  is,  in  his 
own  language,  suhjedivc,  not  objective ;  by  which  he 
means  that  the  whole,  in  relation  to  which  all 
things  are  to  be  interpreted,  and  of  which  the 
individual  man  is  to  be  regarded  only  as  a  part 
or  member,  is  humanity,  and  not  the  universe.  In 
other  words,  Comte  holds  that  we  transcend  the 
limits  of  knowledge  when  we  seek  to  regard  ourselves 
as  parts  of  the  universal  whole  or  system  of  things, 
and  therefore  as  living  under  the  providence  of  God ; 
but  that  we  do  not  transcend  the  limits  of  knowledge 
when   we  regard  ourselves  as  parts  of  the  one  great 


HOMO  MENSURA.  03 

organism  of  Huiuiinity,  and  therefore  as  liviiiL,^  under 
its  continual  providence.  We  are  not,  as  Berkeley 
and  Hume  had  taught,  confined  to  the  phenomena 
of  our  individual  consciousness;  but  neither  are  we 
capable  of  reaching  a  purely  objective  point  of  view. 
We  can  see  things  from  the  point  of  view  of  a 
whole,  but  not  of  the,  whole :  at  least  we  cannot 
so  regard  them  except  in  that  poetry  of  religion 
by  which  the  earliest  fetichist  affections  are  renewed, 
and  Space  and  the  Earth  are  worshipped  as  the 
friends  of  Humanity.  This,  however,  is  mere  poetic 
license ;  for  we  have  no  reason  to  believe  that  man 
has  any  friend  but  himself,  and  in  its  first  direct 
action  upon  him  the  world  shows  itself  to  be  anything 
but  a  system  arranged  for  his  benefit. 

Now,  without  for  the  present  discussing  the  truth  "o^^i^T^j, 
of  this  view,  we  may  remark  that  it  is  obviously 
the  result  of  a  compromise  between  the  two  oppo- 
site tendencies  of  thought,  which  divided  the  earlier 
history  of  modern  philosophy.  In  the  Cartesian 
philosophy  there  was  a  tendency— which  manifested 
itself  fully  in  the  two  greatest  followers  of  Descartes, 
in  Malebranche  and  Spinoza — to  regard  all  things 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  absolute  unity  of  the 
Universe,  and  to  treat  the  separate  existence  of  tlie 
parts  as  a  fiction  of  abstraction.  On  this  view,  the 
individual's  consciousness  of  himself  as  an  individual 
is    an    illusion,    and    Spinoza    would    have    said     the 


nes 
ism 
with  real- 
ism. 


64-        THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

same  thing  of  his  consciousness  of  himself  as  a 
member  of  the  race.  The  only  true  consciousness  is 
that  in  which  both  man  and  humanity  are  seen  as 
absorbed  in  Nature,  or,  what  is  the  same  thing,  in 
God.  The  followers  of  Locke,  again,  went  so  far  in 
the  opposite  direction  that  they  regarded  the  universal 
as  a  fiction  of  abstraction,  and  the  individual  as  the 
sole  reality.  Hence  they  sought  to  confine  the 
individual  in  theory  to  the  perception  of  his  own 
sensitive  states,  and  in  practice  to  the  seeking  of 
pleasant,  and  the  avoidance  of  painful,  feelings. 
Comte  steers  a  path  midway  between  the  two  ex- 
tremes. To  him,  as  to  Locke  and  Hume,  Nature 
is  the  vainest  of  abstractions,  the  last  delusion  of 
metaphysics ;  and  all  attempts  to  penetrate  into  the 
real  being  of  things  are  the  efforts  of  a  finite  creature 
to  get  beyond  his  own  limits.  Yet,  on  the  other 
hand,  to  him,  as  to  Spinoza,  it  seems  irrational  to 
separate  the  individual  from  the  whole  to  which 
he  belongs,  and  therefore.  Humanity,  instead  of  being 
regarded  as  a  vague  abstraction  like  Nature,  is 
asserted  to  be  the  most  real  of  all  things  or  beings. 
"  Man  is  a  mere  abstraction,  and  there  is  nothing 
real  but  Humanity."  And  Comte  is  so  far  from 
saying  that  the  individual  is  confined  to  the  data  of 
his  own  individual  consciousness  that  he  rather  main- 
tains that  we  are  unable  to  know  ourselves,  except 
as   we    know    something    else.       Thus    in    criticizing 


INTROSPECTIVE  PSYCHOLOGY.  G5 

the  psychological  method  of  internal  observation — 
which7  by  the  way,  he  supposes  to  lie  the_  charac- 
teristic method  of  metaphysics — (Joiiite  says : — "  This 
pretended  psychological   method  is    essentially   defec- 

livp  ;     for consider    to    what    suiridal    ].ior(Mlures    it 

iiniaediatel^,..leads ;  ou  the  one  hand,  it  bids  you 
isolate  yourself  as  far  as  possible  from  every  external 
perception,  and  therefore  proliibits  you  from  carrying 
on  any  intellectual  labour  ;  for  if  you  are  (.■mploycd 
m^ny,  even  the  simplest  caleulalidu,  wliat  would 
become  of  the  internal  observation  ?  On  tlic  <  it  la  a- 
hand,  after  having  finally  by  elaborate  eflort  and  ar- 
rangement attained  this  perfect  state  of  intellectual 
slumber,  you  are  called  upon  to  watch  the  opera- 
tions which  are  going  on  in  your  mind,  when  in 
fact  there  is  nothing  going  on  at  all."*  Comte  sees 
the  absurdity  of  a  psychological  method,  in  which 
the  mind  is  isolated  from  the  world  and  treated  as 
one  object  among  the  others  which  have  to  be  ob- 
served, instead  of  being  regarded  as  a  "  part  of  all 
it  knows,"  although  he  does  not  clearly  indicate  the 
source  of  the  error.  But  the  only  result,  as  we 
have  seen,  is  a  compromise,  in  which  the  individual 
is  supposed  to  be  capable  of  objective  knowledge, 
though  only  of  phenomena,  and  capable  also  of  an 
objective  aim,  which,  however,  he  cannot  identify 
with  the  absolute  end  of  all  things.  We  can  know, 
*  Phil.  Pes.  i.  p.  36. 

£ 


66        THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE, 

in  Comte's  opinion,  not  merely  what  is  relative  to 
our  individuals  minds,  but  to  the  human  mind  ;  and 
we  can  seek  as  our  end,  not  merely  our  own  individual 
pleasure  but  the  happiness  of  Humanity.  But  we 
cannot  know  what  things  really  are,  apart  from 
their  appearance  to  us  :  we  cannot  worship  any  God 
who  is  in  nature  as  in  man,  or  identify  ourselves 
with  any  divine  purpose  which  reaches  beyond  the 
compass  of  his  transitory  existence.  Whether  this 
compromise  is  more  than  a  compromise,  whether  it 
is  a  true  solution  of  the  difficulty,  or  a  reconcilia- 
tion of  the  opposite  tendencies  of  thought  in  a  higher 
unity,  we  have  yet  to  consider. 
Kulded'bv^  The  point,  however,  to  which  I  wish  here  to  call 
•  Hpirth^n"  attention  is,  that  Comte's  protest  against  metaphy sic 
loses  almost  all  its  weight  because  of  his  ignorance 
of  the  real  scope  and  tendency  of  the  metaphysical 
theories  of  the  past,  and  of  his  own  relation  to 
them.  He  seems  to  have  no  perception  of  the 
essential  distinction  between  the  two  tendencies  of 
thought  which  he  is  partly  opposing  and  partly  re- 
conciling. Beginning  with  a  denunciation  of  meta- 
physic,  because  it  treats  universals  as  real  entities, 
he  ends  by  insisting  on  the  truth  that  the  Family, 
State,  and  Humanity — though  iliey  undoubtedly  are 
universals — are  at  the  same  time  objectively  real. 
In  the  attempt  to  rise  above  the  abstractions  of 
earlier    thought    he    is    in    harmony    with    the    best 


COMTE'S  ME  7  APH  \  SIC. 


67 


metaphysics   of  his   time.      The  clei'ect  lies  in  Ills  un- 
consciousness   of    his    own     nietaphysic.    i.e.,    of    the 
categories   which   rule   his   thought,  and   which   cnahle 
him  to  interpret  the  facts  of  experience,  and  especially  -4^ 
the  facts  of  man's  social  life,  so  differently  from  his    ' 
predecessors.       For    him,    indeed,    there    is.  au    eaaj 
explanation   of  this   difference    between    himself   and/ ^^q^^t^" 
triephilosophers    of    an    earlier    time.       They    were>f^«*'P  V 
"  metaphysical,"  while  he  is  not ;   they  made  assump^ 
tions,  and  substituted  their  own  ideas  for  the  teaching 
of  experience,   while  he   has  simply  made  hi^  r.inul 
intoa  pirrnr  of  nature,  and  stated  the  fa^<-g  ^s\  t^^'^y'^ 
are.      Comte  forgets  what  his  own  principles  led  him 
on    other    occasions    to    perceive,    that    the    world    is 
what    it    is    to  us    by  the   development   of  our   own 
thoughts,  and  that  we  find  in  ic  only  what   we   are 
prepared  to  find.      Locke  also,  when   he  attacked  the 
Cartesians,    seemed     to    himself    to    be    substituting 
experience    for    mere   ideas,   reality    for    fiction,    ^^i^ 
did    not    observe    that    he    was    substituting   for   the 
presupposition   that   the   universal   alone   is   real,    the 
opposite  presupposition   tliat    the    individual    alone    is 
j^aEpiind.  that- 1 lie-- one   pi'esupposition   is   as    mueli 
an    idea    as    the    other.      And    Comte,    in    his    turn, 
guided    by   his   new   organic   idea   of  social   life   and 
development,    advances   to   the    attack   upon    the   in- 
dividualistic   philosophy,   with    the    same   naive    con- 
fidence i\^ii_Jiis  idea  is  not  an  idea  at  all,  but  a  fact. 


G8        THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

With  all  his  talk  of  experience,  he  has  never  asked, 
ox  he  has  not  understood  the  bearing  of  the  Kantian 
question,  What_is,...^^.exience  ?  For  if  he  had  done 
so,  he  must  have  discovered  that  his  own  so-called 
positive  thought  was  as  metaphysical  as  that  either 
of  the  Eealists  or  of  the  Nominalists,  and  was  indeed 
possible  only  as  the  result  of  a  development  which 
included  both. 
His  view  of       It  is  truc  that  Comte  in  his  "  Politique  Positive  " 

the  critical 

philosophy,  j^gfej-s  tQ  Kant's  criticism  of  experience,  though  in 
a  way  that  seems  to  show  that  his  knowledge  was 
derived  only  from  hearsay.  Kant  is  supposed  by  him 
to  be  the  philosopher  who  first  extended  to  the  mind 
the  general  biological  truth  of  the  action  and  reaction 
of  organism  and  jnedium  upon  each  other.  ^cause 
of_ this,  action  and  reaction,  in  which  the  mind  modifies 
the  object,  as  well  as  the  object  the  mind,  our 
thoughts  do  not  correspond  to  the  reality  of  things 
in  themselves ;  they  do  not  represent  the  object 
as  it  is,  but  only  as  it  appears  to  us,  and  our  con- 
ception of  the  world  is  not  therefore  absolute,  but 
only  relative.  On  the  other  hand,  we  must  not 
exaggerate  this  truth  so  far  as  to  suppose  that  the 
development  of  our  thought  is  purely  subjective ; 
or,  in  other  words,  that  it  belongs  to  the  mind 
apart  from  the  action  of  the  world  upon  it  (a  view 
which  Comte  attributes  to  the  German  idealists). 
The  true  theory  is  "  to  regard  the  world  as  furnish- 


THE  CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 


69 


in»,JJiil  iiiatU'i',  ;iinl  the  iiiiinl  ilir  Innn,  in  .'very 
positive  iiniiuu.  The  ru>i(iii  i>l'  tluM'  .Iniiciils  cannot 
take  [ilacr  except  by  reciplucal  sai  i  iliccs.  KxCQSS 
of  obJLTiivity  would  hinder  every  -ciKTal  \ic\v,  for 
generality  inijilius  abstiai  tion.  But  the__analysi§.. 
which  permits  us  to  abstract  wouhl  l)e  impossible, 
unless  we  couUl  suppress  the  natural  excess  of  sub- 
jectjyity.  Ev^^  man,_jL§,. lie ,  compares  himself  witli 
others,  spontaneously  takes  away  from  his  observa- 
tions _  that  which  is  peculiar  to  himself,  in  (inler  to 
realize  that  social  agreement  which  constitutes  the 
main  end  of  .contemplative  life;  but  the  degree  of 
subjectivity  which  is  connuou  tu  all  our  ^^^pecie^s 
ilgually  remains,  and  I'emains  without  any  serious 
inconvenience.  Nor  could  we  reduce  its  amount, 
^ccept  by  intellectual  inteix'ourse  with  the  other 
animals,  an  intercourse  which  is  rare  and  impcrliict. 
"Rpt^iMpq^  T-inwpypr  we  might  restrict  or  diminish  the 
subjective  influences  that  mould  our  thoup;hts.  in  the 

intelli- 


effort  to  come  to  an  understanding  witi 
Sjences  unlike  our  owm-.-still  our  conceptions  could 
np.ver  attipin  tn  n  purr  ubjectivityj  It  is^  tlierefore, 
as  impos8il;)le  as  it  is  useless  to  determine  exactly 
the  respective  contributions  of  the  internal  and  the 
^.production  of  knowledge."* 


external  in_ 

It  is   easy   from   this   passage   to   see    that   Comte 
has  not  fully  apprehended  the  bearing  of  the  Kantian 
*  Pol.  Pos,  ii.  38. 


K.iut'B  1-cal 
view  of 
Knowledge 


70        THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

criticism.  Ivaiit  does  not  seek  to  show  that  know- 
ledge springs  out  of  the  action  and  reaction  of 
subject  and  object  on  each  other,  l)ut  that  there 
are  certain  universals,  or  forms  of  thought,  by  which 
the  intelligence  must  determine  the  matter  of  sense 
ere  we  can  know  objects  as  such.  The  question 
whieli  he  discusses  is,  how  experience,  and  objects 
of  experience,  as  such,  are  possible.  Kant  would  jiot, 
therefore,__apy  tl^aA— k  is  impos.silJe  "  to  determine 
exactly  the  respective  conliikutiu-us  of  the  internal 
and  the  externjl_in  the^prg^Ui^tion  of  knowledge;" 
but  that  the  problem  is  an  absurd  one,  since  subject 
and  object  are  corfelairve" elements  in  the  unity  of 
knowledge,  and  not  two  separate  things,  by  the 
action  and  reaction  of  which  upon  each  other  knaw- 
ledge  is  ])r(jducc(l.  The  unity  of  experience  is  in-, 
capalde  df  l_»eing  transcended,  and  it  is  a  false  abstrac- 
tion__b}'  which  we  attempt  to  take  either  subject  or 
object  out  of  that  unity,  and  seek  to  determine  it 
as  a  thing  in  itself.  The  IntiUuji  and  the  esse  of 
things  are  one,  in  such  a  sense,  that  it  is  transcend- 
ing the  limits  of  experience  to  attempt  to  determine 
either   of  these    apart  from  the   other.*     All   know- 

*  It  is,  no  doubt,  inconsistent  with  this  that  Kant  coiild 
admit  the  existence  of  a  thing  in  itself,  which  produces  sensa- 
tions in  us,  as  in  many  passages  lie  seems  to  do.  But  it  would 
can-}'  us  too  fai-  to  discuss  this  subject  here.  Comte,  it  may 
be  admitted,  could  have  found  many  things  in  the  letter  of 
Kant  to  give  plausibility  to  his  view.     Cf.  below  p.  10^. 


THE   WORK  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  71 

ledge  or  experience  implies  and  presupposes  the  unity 
of  the  knowing  mind  and  the  categories  through 
which  it  determines  its  ohjects,  and  it  is  only  in 
virtue  of  these  that  there  exists  for  us  any  objective 
world  of  experience  at  all.  Hence  to  leave  out 
the  intelligence  in  our  account  of  the  intelligible, 
to  forget  the  constitutive  power  of  thought  in  speak- 
ing of  existence  (as  is  done  by  materialistic  and  so- 
called  empirical  theories),  is  to  mutilate  and  distort 
the  essential  facts  of  the  case. 

This  Kantian  view  of  nature  and  experience  leads  i'>'ii»»"i'i'y 

*■  corrcctx  I  lie 

directly  to  certain  important  conclusions  as  to  the  ollc^^'.o^.*''" 
work  of  philosophy.  For,  if  its  truth  be  admitted, 
it  necessarily  follows  that  the  ordinary  consciousness 
of  men — even  the  ordinary  scientific  consciousness — 
is,  in  its  view  of  the  world,  essentially  abstract  and 
imperfect.  The  ordinary  consciousness  generally,  we 
might  even  say  invariably,  deals  witli  objects  as  if 
they  were  given  independently  of  any  thinking  sub- 
ject. It  proceeds  as  if  an  intelligible  world  could 
exist  without  an  intelligence,  and  thus  leaves  out 
of  account  an  element,  and  indeed  the  most  important 
element,  in  the  facts  of  experience.  And  the  busi- 
ness of  the  philosopher  or  metaphysician  must  be 
to  correct  the  abstractness  of  ordinary,  even  of  scien- 
tific thought,  to  bring  to  clear  consciousness  the 
element  which  they  neglect,  and  to  determine  h<»w 
the  new  insight  into  the  nature  of  knowledge,  which 


72        THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

by  this  process  he  has  attained,  must  modify  and 
transform  our  previous  view  of  the  objects  known. 
In  doing  so,  the  metaphysician  (or  transcendentalist, 
as  Kant  calls  him)  is  not  introducing  a  new  method  ; 
he  is  simply  following  the  method  according  to  which 
we  are  continually  obliged  to  correct  and  complete 
the  results  of  one  science  by  another.  Science  is 
necessarily  abstract,  in  so  far  as  it  investigates  and 
determines  certain  aspects  and  relations  of  things, 
apart  from  their  other  aspects  and  relations.  Thus, 
in  geometry,  abstraction  is  made  of  everything  except 
the  relations  of  lines  and  figures  in  space,  in  order 
that  the  spatial  conditions  of  things  may  be  fully 
determined,  apart  from  their  other  conditions.  And 
in  like  manner,  "  the  dynamic  laws  of  weight  would 
still  be  unknown  to  us,  unless  we  had  first  abstracted 
all  consideration  of  the  resistance,  or  the  motion,  of 
the  atmosphere  or  other  medium."  The  science  of 
political  economy  is  based  on  an  effort  to  isolate, 
so  far  as  is  possible,  the  economical  from  all  the  other 
conditions  of  social  life.  In  short,  all  the  separate 
sciences,  in  this  point  of  view,  are  abstract ;  and  they 
tend  to  become  more  and  more  abstract  as  the  scien- 
tific division  of  labour  increases.  That  is,  they  tend 
to  confine  themselves  to  the  investigation  of  certain 
definite  relations  of  objects,  leaving  out  of  account 
all  their  other  relations  ;  or  (what  comes  to  much 
the  same  thing)  to  the  examination  of  certain  definite 


PHILOSOPHY  CORRECTS  ABSTRACTIOX.      73 


ol3Jects,  witliout  takiiiL,'  into  account  their  manifold 
relations    to   other   objects.       Now,  as  Conite  himself 

says,  "iliese   proliinjpnry   simplifiQtinns;  wi^fliont  which 

there  could  be  no  such  thing  as  science  in  the  true 
sense  of  tKe  word,  always^  involve  a  corresponding 
process  of  recduiposition,  when  pi'e\'isi(iii  of  actual 
fact  is  called  for.'  To  attain  a  complete  \iew  of 
_tlh'    truth,    ^ve    must   return   f''^"^    thf^   pi.ofv.w.f ;,,..    ,,f 


t\n:__  L'solated  scicuees  to  the  unity  of  nature,  in 
which  all  these  separate  objects  and  relations  are 
15rought  tpajether.  and  iu  which  they  modil'y  and 
detgfmifligeach  other.  And  philosoi)hy  only  goes 
a  step  farmer"  fn  the  same  direction,  when  it 
corrects  that  abstraction  from  the  thinking  self,  the 
unity  of  knowledge,  which  is  common  to  all  the 
sciences.  T^e  only  difference  is,  that  the  abstraction 
of  science  from  the  unity  of  the  oljjective  world,  as 
it  is  the  result  of  a  definite  act  of  thought,  is 
generally  conscious  ;  while  the  abstraction  which 
inliilo&o'phy  seeks  to  correct  is  generally  unconscioug,. 
The  geometrician  cannot  but  see  that  there  are 
other  than  spatial  conditions  of  existence,  and  that, 
for  his  own  purposes,  he  has  left  all  such  conditions 
out  of  account.  But  it  is  quite  possible,  as  every 
day's  experience  proves,  to  investigate  the  laws  of 
the  intelligible  world,  without  ever  adverting  to  its 
necessary  relation  to  the  intelligence,  and  without 
Ijeing    conscious    of   the    abstractness    of    a    view    of 


74        THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

things  ill  which  this  relation  is  left  out  of  account, 
rhilosophy,  therefore,  has  to  detect  and  bring  to 
the  light  of  day  certain  facts  or  relations  which 
enter  into  the  constitution  of  things,  which  indeed 
are  presupposed  in  all  our  consciousness  of  them, 
but  which,  nevertheless,  generally  escape  without 
notice.  Of  this  work  of  philosophy  or  metaphysics, 
howt'xcr,  f'Diiitc  lias  no  idea,  or  he  confuses  it  with 
the  methods  of  an  empirical  psychology,  which,  by 
an  opposite  abstraction,  would  separate  the  thinking 
mind  from  the  world  to  which  it  is  related.  ]3ut 
the  method  of  philosophy  is  not  mere  abstraction ; 
it  is  rather,  if  the  expression  may  be  allowed,  con- 
cretion. Philosophy,  as  Hegel  said,  is  "  thinking 
things  together  " — i.e.,  thinking  them  in  a  unity 
that  transcends  and  explains  their  differences  ;  and, 
if  it  ever  abstractly  considers  the  unity  and  move- 
ment of  thought  in  itself,  it  is  only  (as  geometry 
abstractly  considers  the  relations  of  space)  in  order 
more  surely  and  clearly  to  discern  that  unity  and 
movement  in  all  the  objects  of  thought. 
Metiipiiysic       It  Is  to  Kaiit.  ijrincipally,  that  this    new  wav  of. 

makes  ■ __^„j,i.a,„„^„^ 

sciouronrs  st^tiiig  the  problem  of  philosophy  is  due  ;  but  it 
principles,  would  be  altogether  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  he 
essentially  changed  the  problem  itself.  Metaphy- 
sicians, from  the  time  of  Socrates  and  Plato,  have 
always  sought  to  get  beyond  the  presuppositions  of 
the  ordinary  consciousness,  and  to  remould  that  con- 


PHILOSOPHY  IS  SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS.       75 

sciousness  by  bringing  to  light  the  principles  upon 
which  it  rests.  One  of  the  best  definitions  that 
has  been  given  of  philosophy  is  "  clear  self-conscious- 
ness." And  it  is,  indeed,  just  this  character  of 
metaphysical  thought  which  renders  plausible  Comte's 
attack  upon  it.  It  is  in  the  metaphysical  writers 
of  the  past  that  we  can  most  clearly  discern  the 
errors  of  the  past,  for  by  these  writers  the  errors 
of  the  past  are  not  merely  implied  and  presupposed, 
but  explicitly  stated.  Hence  such  writers  are  con- 
tinually suffering  from  that  natural  illusion  l)y 
which  we  take,  as  the  prominent  representatives  of 
an  idea  or  tendency  of  thought,  those  authors  by 
whom  it  has  been  most  distinctly  expressed  ;  whereas 
it  is  rather  they  who  first  enable  us,  even  if  they 
do  not  enable  themselves,  to  see  the  limitations  of 
that  idea  or  tendency,  and  to  transcend  it.  But^ 
_as  it  is  in  the  metaphysicians  that  we  find  the 
^  clftaje&t  and  inost  _dj^finjt^  eyprasLsious^jTLJ^-^''''^^  -lISl. 
fective  principles  of  past  though^-  wlv'"^^  ^^ — are 
seeking  to  transcend,  it  is  not  unnatural  that  we 
should  ^attribute — the — defpct,  itself  to  Tpetaphy'sip 
What,  however,  is  really  due  to  metaphysic  is  not 
the  error,  but  rather  that  clearness  and  definiteness 
of  its  expression  which  makes  our  refutation  of  it 
and  our  higher  point  of  view  possible.  Thus  the 
limit  of  Greek  thought,  the  point  at  which,  by  its 
own  development,   it   falls   into   error  and   self-contra- 


7G         THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

diction,  would  have  been  l)y  no  means  so  easy  to 
discern,  if  its  presuppositions  had  not  been  raised 
into  ideal  clearness  in  the  works  of  Plato  and 
Aristotle.  The  individualism  of  the  Stoics  and  Epi- 
cureans gives  us  a  key,  which  we  would  otherwise 
want,  to  those  new  experiences  of  independence  and 
isolation  which  came  to  men  under  the  Empire  of 
Eome,  after  the  l)reaking  up  of  the  ancient  municipal 
organization  of  social  life.  Descartes  and  Spinoza 
reveal  the  open  secret  of  that  new  view  of  the 
relation  of  man  to  God,  which  was  partly  expressed 
by  Luther  and  Calvin,  and  which  was  so  powerful 
in  moulding  the  political  and  social  life,  especially 
of  Protestant  countries,  and  in  awaking  in  them  a 
consciousness  of  individual  and  national  independence, 
combined  with  a  still  more  intense  consciousness 
that  the  individual  is  nothing,  except  as  the  servant 
of  a  higher  power.  Hence  it  was  in  a  criticism  of 
these  philosophies  that  Locke  and  Leibniz  found 
the  starting-point  for  their  fuller  assertion  of  the 
claims  of  the  individual.  Finally,  it  is  through  a 
struggle  with  Individualism,  especially  in  its  fullest 
expression  in  Hume  and  Rousseau,  that  Kant  and 
his  successors  in  Germany,  and  Comte  in  France, 
were  led  to  that  higher  organic  idea,  in  which  the 
individual  and  universal  cease  to  be  opposed  to 
each  other  as  reality  to  fiction,  and  come  to  be 
regarded   as   different   but   complementary   aspects   of 


PHILOSOPHY  AND  PROGRESS.  77 

reality.  If  we  no  longer  say,  "  The  universal  alone 
is  real,  and  the  individual  is  an  abstraction ; "  or, 
"The  individual  alone  is  real,  and  the  universal  is 
a  name ; "  but,  "  The  individual  is  real,  but  only  as 
the  realization  of  the  universal,  and  the  universal 
is  real,  but  only  as  manifesting  itself  in  the  indi- 
vidual," it  is  due  to  the  whole  past  movement  of 
philosophic  thought.  Nor,  again,  would  it  be  difticult 
to  show  that  the  successes  or  failures  of  science  at 
different  times  were  closely  connected  with  the 
sufficiency  or  insufficiency  of  the  ultimate  principles 
of  thinking  then  acknowledged  or  presupposed.  For 
it  is  the  development  of  man's  spirit  which  enables 
him  to  ask  and  to  answer  new  questions  in  regard 
to  the  world  of  objects ;  nor  can  his  growing  know- 
ledge of  that  world  be  separated  from  his  growing 
consciousness  of  himself.  To  one  who  regards 
metaphysic  from  this  point  of  view,  its  continual 
apparent  failures  will  be  as  little  suggestive  of  a 
despair  of  philosophy  as  the  fall  of  the  Greek  State, 
or  of  the  feudal  system,  is  suggestive  of  a  disbelief 
in  the  possibility  of  social  and  political  life.  It 
may  even  be  said  that  no  stage  of  culture,  no 
limited  form  of  human  thought  or  existence,  is 
ever  completely  exhausted  and  transcended,  till  it 
has  risen  to  a  clear  consciousness  of  itself  in  a 
metaphysic,  or  something  of  the  nature  of  a  meta- 
physic.     It  is  the  disentanglement    of  the  principle. 


78         THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

the  central  idea,  the  fundamental  category,  which 
has  previously  ruled  men  almost  without  their 
knowing  it,  that  first  enables  them  to  see  its  value 
and  relation  to  that  unity  of  the  whole  ;  with  which 
it  was  necessarily  confounded  so  long  as  it  remained 
merely  a  moving  force  in  the  depths  of  the  popular 
mind.  Comte  himself  \vas_ metaphysical,  in  so  far 
as  he  soiight  to  transcend  the  one-sided  and  im- 
perfect categories  of  earlier  philosophy,  and  to 
reconcile  them  by  means  nf  »  highor  t.bni]CTht.  __His 
defect  lay  in  this,  that  he  was  not  metaphysical 
enough  ;  that  his  analysis  of  his-xiwn  thought  was 
imperfect ;   and  that  he  was  therefore  tlie  instrument 


of  a  movement  of  human  intelligeaice,  of  the 
meaning  of  which  he  was  never  clearly  conscious. 
Otherwise  he  would  have  perceived  that  his  "positive" 
stage  was  not  simjDly  a  negation  of  the  metaphysical 
and  theological  stages  which  preceded  it  and  a 
return  to  fact  and  experience,  but  that  it  was 
essentially  a  new  reading  of  experience,  which 
implied,  therefore,  a  new  form  of  metaphysics  and 
theology, 
corate'sun-       It  is  this  unconsciousu^ss  of  his--&wu.  fundamental 

conscious- 

ownguiding  categories,    which    explaiae— 6uml(i's    rtldii3ai    miseon- 
pnncipes.    ggp|.JQj^  ^f  l^j^g  whole_  history..of  tlieology  and  meta- 
physics.     The   third   stage   of  Positivism   is    not   the 
unity    which     transcends,     while    it     reconciles,     the 
previous  stages  of  human  development ;  on  the  con- 


DE  VELOPMENT  B } '  NEC.  I  TION.  79 

trary,  it  involves  the  total  renunciation  of  those  prin- 
ciples of  thought  which  had  prevailed  during  the  two 
previous  stages.  According  to  this  view,  all  that  we 
can  say  is,  that  a  germ  of  positive  tliought  existed 
from  the  first,  and  that,  by  its  development,  theology 
and  metapliysics  were  gradually  driven  from  the 
whole  sphere  of  knowledge.  Fositivinii]  i''  t.lim:— U^^. 
concentration  of  human  thought  within  cfj^-.f^,in  liinifs 
which  at  first  it  did  not  respect,  but  which  it 
gradually  learns  to  be.  for  it.  impassable.  And  the 
only  result  of  the  process  is,  that  the  whole  field  of 
the  non-plienomenal  is  abandoned  to  poetry,  which 
is  still  to  be  permitted  under  certain  restrictions  to 
fill  up  the  vacaut  spaces  of  the  unknowable  with 
shapes  drawn  according  to  our  wishes.  Theology 
and  metaphysics  are  but  more  or  less  thinly  dis- 
guised anthropomorphisms,  which  once  subserved  a 
social  purpose,  and  which  apart  from  tliat  purpose 
have  no  value  for  the  intelligence;  nor  is  there 
any  element  of  truth  in  them  which  needs  to  be 
preserved  under  the  new  intellectual  regime.  Their 
history  was  not  a  development,  but  a  purely  negative 
process — a  process  whereby  they  became  attenuated 
and  dissolved,  until  the  rich  concrete  meaning  of 
the  first  Fetichism  had  entirely  disappeared  in  the 
negations  of  the  revolutionary  philosophy.  Mono- 
theism, the  last  religion,  was  but  the  l)are  abstract 
residuum    of    theology,   as    tlie    idea    of   Nature   was 


80        THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

the  last  abstract  residuuiu  of  metaphysics.  And  the 
whole  result  of  the  long  striving  of  human  intelli- 
crence  to  penetrate  into  the  absolute  is  merely  the 
knowledge  of  its  own  limits. 
deSfbL  Now,  it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  this  view 
develop-  ^^  involves   a   fundamental    misrepresentation,   and   even 

mMit  of  1        1  •  r'         1  •     •  TIM 

reii>fion.  inversioH,  of  the  whole  history  or  religion  and  phil- 
osophv.  Its  plausibility  at  first  sight  arises  from  a 
common  confusion  as  to  the  idea  of  abstraction.  In 
one  sense  it  may  be  said  that  there  is  no  one  so 
concrete  in  his  view  of  things  as  the  child  or  the 
savage ;  in  another  seube,  it  may  be  said  that  there 
is  no  one  so  abstract.  The  mind  of  the  child 
clings  to  the  immediate  images  of  things;  it  cannot 
rise  above  their  pictured  presence  in  space  and  time  ; 
it  cannot  sever  them  in  thought  from  their  immediate 
surroundings.  On  the  other  hand,  the  child's  thought 
is  abstract  and  simple ;  it  confuses  all  things  together; 
it  scarcely  distinguishes  at  first  between  animate 
and  inanimate,  between  man  and  animal.  With 
Comte  we  may  call  the  child  a  Fetichist ;  not  because 
his  imagination  raises  all  things  to  the  level  of  man, 
but  because  he  still  lives  in  a  simplicity  or  confusion 
of  thought  for  which  there  are  no  distinct  differences 
of  level.  On  the  other  hand,  as  the  child  advances 
to  maturity,  the  pictures  of  sense  may  partially  fade, 
but  his  ideas  of  things  become  more  complex  and 
adequate.      It    ceases    to    be    impossible    for    him    to 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  RELIGION.  81 

separate  objects  from  the  definite  circumstances  of 
space  and  time,  in  which  they  have  Ijeen  at  first 
perceived ;  but  at  the  same  time,  his  knowledge  of 
those  objects,  in  their  unity  and  difference — their 
permanent  nature  and  their  manifold  phases  and 
aspects — is  continually  growing.  If,  therefore,  the 
movement  of  his  thought,  in  one  point  of  view,  is 
toward  greater  generality  and  al^stractness,  in  another 
point  of  view  it  is  toward  greater  particularity  and 
concreteness.  To  use  a  favourite  modern  phrase, 
the  development  of  human  thought  is  by  differen- 
tiation and  integration,  by  induction  and  deduction 
at  once.  Now  Comte's  history  of  theology  and  meta- 
physics is  greatly  distorted  by  the  fact  that  he 
detects  in  it  only  a  movement  of  generalization  and 
abstraction ;  and  not  also  a  movement  towards 
greater  complexity  and  completeness.  Yet,  even  a 
superficial  glance  at  the  development  of  religion  is 
enough  to  let  us  see  that  the  Christian  idea  of  God 
in  man  is  less  simple  and  abstract  than  Jewish 
Monotheism  or  Oriental  Pantheism.  If,  indeed,  we 
were  to  judge  of  a  religion  by  mere  wealth  of 
fantastic  sensuous  symbolism,  it  might  seem  possible 
to  regard  the  earliest  religions  as  the  richest ;  though 
even  this  might  be  disputed,  seeing  that  the  fancy 
of  the  savage  Fetichist,  while  capricious  and  way- 
ward, is  at  the  same  time  singularly  monotonous 
and  uninventive.      But  to  anyone  who  would  classify 


82        THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

religions  according  to  the  complexity  and  depth  of 
the  thought  involved  in  them,  it  must  be  apparent 
that  they  become  more  full  and  definite — not  more 
vague  and  simple — as  time  advances.  Their  progress 
toward  greater  universality  is  at  the  same  time  a 
progress  toward  greater  specification.  In  the  Indian 
faith  we  discern,  from  very  early  times,  the  presence 
of  an  idea  of  the  divine  unity.  But  it  is  a  vague 
and  abstract  idea,  and  for  that  very  reason  it  stands 
side  by  side  with,  or  produces,  a  lawless  Polytheism, 
in  which  there  is  neither  method  nor  meaning ; 
which,  as  Goethe  says,  does  not  subserve  the  true 
purposes  of  a  religion,  since  it  adds  another  chaotic 
element  to  life,  instead  of  supplying  a  guiding  prin- 
ciple through  all  its  confusion  and  difficulty.  In 
the  Jewish  religion  we  have  a  true  Monotheism,  in 
which  the  unity  is  no  longer  that  of  an  abstract 
substance,  but  of  a  spiritual  or  self-conscious  being 
— a  personal  will  which  manifests  itself  in  a  definite 
purpose,  in  a  moral  government  of  men  and  nations. 
In  Christianity,  finally,  we  have  the  idea  of  a  God, 
who  is  not  merely  an  absolute  substance — not  merely 
a  Creator  and  Euler  of  the  world,  but  a  self-revealing 
Spirit;  a  Spirit  who  reveals  himself  in,  as  well  as 
to,  his  creatures — an  idea  which  combines  in  one 
the  earlier  Pantheistic  and  Monotheistic  conceptions. 
To  regard  the  process  in  which  these  are  three  of 
the   main   stages   as   merely  a  process  of  abstraction 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  S3 

and  negation  is  surely  to  take  a  most  external  and 
superficial  view  of  it.  The  truth  is,  that  this  and 
the  similar  sketch  in  Hume's  "  Dialogues  on  Natural 
Eeligion  "  are  rather  based  on  a  preconceived  theory 
as  to  the  development  of  human  thought  in  religion, 
than  on  the  phenomena  of  religious  history.  And 
in  Comte's  "  Social  Dynamics,"  he  has  frequently  to 
mention  facts  which  are  altogether  inconsistent 
with  it. 

Nor  is  Comte's  view  of  the  history  of  metaphysic  Defect  in 

his  view  of 

less     fictitious    and    inaccurate.      Accordinc;    to    that  *^'^  dev-eiop- 

o  ment  of 

view,  the  earliest  philosophies  ought  to  be  the  most  P'"^'"*°i'^y- 
concrete  and  complete,  and  the  latest,  the  most 
simple  and  abstract ;  but  the  very  reverse  is  the 
fact.  It  is  in  the  dawn  of  speculation  that  men 
are  content  to  explain  the  universe  by  such  ab- 
stractions as  "being"  and  "becoming."  The  ancient 
philosophy  contrasts  with  the  modern,  as  simple 
with  complex ;  for  while  the  former  is  occupied 
with  questions  about  "  the  one "  and  "  the  many," 
the  "  universal "  and  the  "  particular,"  the  latter  is 
concerned  from  the  first  with  the  relations  of 
self-consciousness  to  the  objective  world.  Again, 
confining  ourselves  to  modern  philosophy,  we  find 
the  abstract  Universalism  (if  we  may  use  the 
expression)  of  Descartes  and  Spinoza,  yielding  in 
the  next  generation  to  two  opposite  forms  of  In- 
dividualism,   and    ending    in    the    attempt    of    Kant 


84        THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

iind  his  successors  "  to  read  Locke  with  the  eyes 
of  Leibniz,  and  Leibniz  with  the  eyes  of  Locke,"* 
and  (we  may  add)  to  unite  the  elements  of  truth 
in  both  by  a  deeper  view  of  the  principle  imperfectly 
expressed  in  Spinoza.  In  short,  the  whole  move- 
ment of  philosophy  is  a  movement  towards  a  more 
complex,  and  at  the  same  time  towards  a  more 
systematic,  view  of  the  world.  Philosophical  thought 
is  ever  seeking  on  the  one  hand  to  distinguish,  and 
even  to  oppose  to  each  other,  the  different  sides  of 
truth  which  were  at  first  confused  together ;  and 
again,  on  the  other  hand,  to  show  that  what  were 
at  first  supposed  to  be  contradictory,  are  really 
complementary,  aspects  of  things.  This  progress  of 
philosophy  by  differentiation  and  integration  Comte's 
theory  does  not  explain,  but  it  explains  him.  For, 
as  has  been  indicated,  Comte's  whole  view  of  the 
relation  of  the  individual  to  society,  and  of  the 
present  to  the  past,  manifests  that  same  effort  to 
concentrate  and  combine  in  one  view  different  and 
even  opposed  motives  of  thought,  which  is  shown  in 
the  idealistic  philosophy  of  Germany.  Only,  as  Comte 
is  not  conscious  of  this  affiliation  of  his  thought, 
but,  on  the  contrary,  supposes  Positivism  to  be 
the  simple  negation  of  metaphysics,  his  possession 
of  the  higher  idea  shows  itself,  not  in  a  new  meta- 
physic,  but  only  in  a  better  comprehension  of  the 
*  Green's  Introduction  to  Hume's  Works,  §  3. 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  SCIENCE.  85 

social  life  and  development  of  the  race.  Hence, 
also,  he  sees  no  positive  connection  between  his 
own  speculations  and  the  previous  history  of  phil- 
osophy, but  connects  it  solely  with  the  past  progress 
of  physical  science. 

This   inadequacy   of    Conite's__yiew   of  the   history  Defect  in 

'  his  view  of 

of  philosophy  and  theology  leads  to  an  opposite  ^^i^"^  ^ev'jiop- 
inadequacy  in  his  view  of  the  history  of  scienc^e.  '''^^°"'=^- 
As  the  former  is  conceived  by  him  to  be  a  mere 
process  of  abstraction,  which  ends  in  nothing,  so 
the  latter  is  conceived  by  him — at  least,  in  his  first 
general  account  of  it — purely  as  a  movement  from 
the  abstract  and  general  to  the  concrete  and  par- 
ticular. There  are  thus  two  laws  for  the  progress 
of  the  human  mind — the  law  of  its  progress  to 
science,  and  the  law  of  its  progress  in  science.  The 
progress  to  science  is  merely  the  gradual  destruction 
of  the  imaginative  synthesis  in  which  civilization 
began ;  the  process  in  science  consists  in  the  gradual 
building  up  of  the  scientific  synthesis  in  which 
civilization  must  end.  Science  begins  with  the  con- 
sideration of  the  simplest  and  most  abstract  relations 
of  things,  with  arithmetic  and  geometry,  and  it  ends 
with  the  investigation  of  their  most  complex  and 
concrete  relations,  with  sociology  and  morals.  This, 
with  slight  modifications,  is  the  historical  order  of 
the  genesis  of  the  sciences,  and,  what  is  even  more 
important   in    Comte's   eyes,   it   is  the  order  of  their 


8G        THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

logical  dependence  or  filiation,  and  therefore  the 
order  of  a  duly  arranged  scientific  education.  For 
each  of  the  successive  sciences — mathematics,  astro- 
nomy, physics,  chemistry,  biology,  sociology,  and 
morals — includes  a  deductive  part,  in  which  it  de- 
pends on  previous  sciences,  and  an  inductive  part, 
in  which  it  makes  a  fresh  start  from  experience  for 
itself ;  and  therefore  no  one  can  be  fully  equipped 
for  the  investigation  of  the  more  complex,  who  has 
not  made  himself  master  of  the  laws  of  the  simpler, 
phenomena.  Like  Plato,  Comte  would  write  over 
the  portals  of  science,  fxi]  ayeo^iJ.erptjTO'i  eialroD,  and 
he  would  add, — Let  no  one  enter  upon  the  study  of 
chemistry  who  is  not  a  master  of  the  principles  of 
physics  ;  upon  the  study  of  biology,  who  is  not  a 
master  of  the  principles  of  chemistry ;  nor  upon  the 
study  of  sociology,  who  is  not  a  master  of  the 
principles  of  all  the  previous  sciences. 
Mr  spcn-         This  view  of  the  historical  and  logical  filiation  of 

cer's  criti- 
cism of  that  ^i^Q    sciences    has    been     attacked    with    considerable 

view. 

force  in  an  Essay  by  Mr.  Spencer  upon  the  "  Genesis 
of  Science."  In  that  Essay,  Mr,  Spencer  points  out, 
what,  indeed,  Comte  himself  had  very  fully  acknow- 
ledged, that  historically  every  science  in  turn  has 
been  an  instrument  in  the  development  of  the 
others.  Even  in  the  time  of  Aristotle  politics  and 
biology  had  made  no  inconsiderable  advance,  while 
as  yet  physics  and  chemistry  could  scarcely  be  said 


MR.  SPENCER'S  CRITICISM.  87 

to  be  in  existence.  And  this  is  only  what  was  to 
be  expected,  for  some  knowledge  of  the  conditions  of 
social  order  is  a  practical  condition  of  the  develop- 
ment of  any  other  kind  of  science ;  and  the  neces- 
sary art  of  medicine  forced  men  at  a  very  early 
period  to  pay  some  attention  to  physiology.  As- 
tronomy had  to  wait  for  optics  to  furnish  it  not 
only  with  instruments  but  with  definite  conceptions 
of  the  dispersion  and  refraction  of  light ;  and  physical 
investigation  could  not  proceed  very  far  without 
some  kind  of  solution  of  biological  and  even 
psychological  questions  in  relation  to  sense  per- 
ception. It  was  the  advance  of  geometry  that  led 
to  the  invention  of  algebra,  and  the  transcendental 
analysis  of  Newton  and  Leibniz  was  directly  sug- 
gested by  the  problems  of  physics.  These  and 
many  other  facts  of  the  same  kind  seem  to  show 
that  a  serial  arrangement  of  the  sciences  misrepre- 
sents at  once  the  historical  order  of  their  develop- 
ment and  the  logical  order  of  their  dependence. 
And  in  both  points  of  view  it  would  be  nearer  the 
truth  to  regard  the  different  sciences  (as  Comte 
himself  sometimes  regards  them)  as  "  les  diverses 
branches  d'un  tronc  unique."  Tor  this  "  suggests 
the  facts  that  the  sciences  had  a  common  origin, 
that  they  have  been  developing  simultaneously,  and 
that  they  have  been  from  time  to  time  dividing 
and   subdividing."     Yet    even    this    metaphor    is    in- 


88        THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

adequate,  for  "it  does  not  suggest  the  yet  more 
important  fact  that  the  divisions  and  subdivisions 
thus  arising  do  not  remain  separate,  but  nov^  and 
again  reunite  in  direct  and  indirect  ways.  They 
inosculate;  they  severally  send  off  and  receive  con- 
necting grov^ths ;  and  the  intercommunion  has  been 
ever  becoming  more  frequent,  more  intricate,  more 
widely  ramified.  There  has  all  along  been  higher 
specialization  that  there  might  be  a  larger  general- 
ization ;  and  a  deeper  analysis  that  there  might  be 
a  better  synthesis.  Each  larger  generalization  has 
lifted  sundry  specializations  still  higher ;  and  each 
better  synthesis  has  prepared  the  way  for  still 
deeper  analysis."* 
Littr/toMr.  To  these  objections,  Comte  would  probably  have 
rjpencer.  answered,t  as  Littre  has  answered  for  him,  that 
there  is  a  difference  between  the  determination  of 
some  of  the  laws  of  a  particular  class  of  phenomena 
and  the  constitution  of  a  science  of  these  phenomena ; 
and  that  a  science  cannot  be  regarded  as  constituted 
till  its  inductive  and  deductive  parts  are  separated. 
It  cannot  be  denied  that  physics  involves  all  the 
relations  discussed  in  mathematics,  and  something 
more  ;  that  chemistry  involves  all  the  relations  dis- 
cussed in  physics,  and  something  more ;  that  biology 
involves    all   the   relations   discussed  in  physics    and 

*  Spencer's  "Essays,"  i.  p.  145. 

tCf.  Pol.  Pos.  i.,  Introduction  Fondamentale. 


THE  UNIVERSAL  AND  THE  GENERAL.       89 

chemistry,  and  sometliini;-  more ;  and  that  sociology 
involves  the  relations  discussed  in  all  the  previous 
sciences,  and  something  more.  Now,  it  is  a  hopeless 
task  for  tlie  weak  human  intellect  to  deduce  this 
"  something  more "  in  the  more  complex,  from  the 
principles  of  the  less  complex  sciences,  even  if 
absolutely  such  a  deduction  is  possible.  Hence 
we  cannot  regard  a  science  as  constituted,  until 
its  special  subject-matter  has  been  separated  from 
the  subject-matter  of  the  simpler  sciences,  and 
until,  in  relation  to  that  subject-matter,  certain 
laws  have  been  determined  which  cannot  be  de- 
duced from  the  principles  of  those  sciences.  Thus, 
in  Comte's  opinion,  biology  was  not  constituted 
as  a  science  until,  in  quite  modern  times,  the 
phenomena  of  life  were  seen  at  once  in  their 
relative  dependence  on,  and  their  relative  separation 
from,  physical  and  chemical  phenomena.  Nor  could 
sociology  be  constituted  as  a  science  until,  by  Comte 
himself,  the  law  of  social  development  was  deter- 
mined, and  the  phenomena  of  human  life  were 
thereby  separated  from  phenomena  of  life  in  general, 
which  fall  under  the  province  of  biology.  Jn  this 
sense,  therefore,  it  is  argued  that  the  historical  and 
the  logical  order  of  the  sciences  are  coincident ;  and 
that,  while  it  is  quite  true  that  the  advance  of  one 
of  the  simpler  sciences  is  often  stimulated  by  re- 
quirements   of    the    more     complex     sciences,    it    is 


J)0        THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

equally  true  that  tlie  more   complex   science   has   to 
wait  for  the  development  of  the  simpler  science,  ere 
it  can  rise  above  its  first  empirical  stage. 
Ambiguity        It    would    bo    bevond    the    scope   of  this   volume, 

of  tho  oppo-  •'  *■ 

'tween 'the    Gvcn  if  it  wcrc  in  the  power   of  the  writer,  to   dis- 
"nd'thr      cuss  in  all  their  bearings  these  different  views  as  to 

p:ii-tifular. 

the  arrangement  of  the  scdences ;  but  it  may  be 
remarked  that  the  most  important  of  Mr.  Spencer's 
objections  are  directed,  not  against  the  specific  account 
which  Comte  gives  of  the  historical  and  logical 
relations  of  the  sciences,  but  rather  against  his  asser- 
tion that  science  progresses  from  the  general  to  the 
particular,  from  the  abstract  to  the  concrete.  That 
progress,  he  maintains,  is  "  at  once  from  the  special 
to  the  general,  and  from  the  general  to  the  special." 
If  arithmetic  comes  before  geometry,  and  geometry 
before  physics  ;  on  the  other  hand  it  is  equally  true, 
that  geometry  comes  before  algebra,  and  algebra 
before  transcendental  analysis,  in  which  mathematics 
reaches  its  highest  generalization.  The  "  special  " 
geometry  of  the  ancients  is  contrasted  by  Comte  him- 
self with  the  "general"  geometry  of  the  moderns; 
and  the  Newtonian  theory  of  gravitation  was  more 
general  than  the  laws  of  Kepler,  by  the  aid  of 
which  it  was  discovered.  Now,  looking  at  such 
illustrations  as  these  by  which  Mr.  Spencer  supports 
his  case,  we  cannot  but  think  that  the  controversy 
really    turns    upon    the    ambiguity    of  "  general "    or 


THE  UNIVERSAL  AS  PRINCIPLE.  91 

"abstract,"  to  which  reference  has  l)cen  made;  and 
that — in  spite  of  what  both  Comte  and  his  critic 
have  said  about  the  different  meanings  that  may  be 
given  to  these  words,  neither  of  them  has  consist- 
ently kept  in  view  the  difference  between  the 
"  general "  with  which  science  begins,  and  that  with 
which  it  ends.  In  one  sense  of  the  word,  trans- 
cendental analysis  is  more  "  general  "  than  arithmetic 
and  algebra,  but  in  another  sense  it  is  more  specific. 
For  transcendental  analysis  includes  and  explains 
both  arithmetic  and  algebra,  and  casts  its  light  even 
beyond  their  sphere  ;  but  it  does  so,  not  by  becom- 
ing vaguer  and  less  definite,  but  quite  the  contrary. 
It  is  a  universal  that  does  not  leave  out  of  account 
the  differences  of  the  particulars  included  under  it, 
but  rather  determines  them  more  fully.  And  the 
same  thing  may  be  said  of  the  laws  of  Newton  as 
contrasted  with  the  laws  of  Kepler.  It  is  easy 
enough  to  reach  the  general,  if  all  that  is  wanted 
is  a  common  element ;  for  in  that  case  we  need 
only  to  abstract  from  everything  but  the  simple 
idea  of  "  being,"  and  we  have  at  one  step  reached 
the  top  of  the  logical  tree  of  Porphyry,  the  highest 
universal  of  thought.  But  the  universal  of  science 
and  philosophy  is  something  different  from  this ;  it 
is  not  merely  a  generic  name,  tinder  which  things 
are  brought  together,  but  a  principle  which  unites 
them   and   determines   their    relation    to    each    other. 


92        THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

It  is  a  unity,  the  thought  of  which  does  not  exclude, 
but  rather  is  correlative  with,  a  knowledge  of  the 
differences.  In  this  point  of  view  the  Platonic 
view  of  science,  as  a  search  for  unity  and  the 
universal,  and  the  Aristotelian  view  of  it  as  a  search 
for  difference  and  the  particular,  are  but  opposite 
.sides  of  the  shield  of  knowledge,  which  cannot  be 
separated  from  each  other.  Now  the  defect  of 
Conite's  general  description  of  the  progress  of  science 
is,  that  he  has  chosen  to  look  solely  at  one  side  of 
the  shield,  and  to  regard  it  merely  as  a  movement 
of  specification ;  and  the  consequence  is,  that  in  the 
sequel  he  is  obliged  continually  to  correct  himself, 
and  to  observe  in  particular  cases  that  it  involves 
also  a  movement  of  generalization.  Mr,  Spencer  sees 
both  sides,  and  therefore  progress  is  for  him  a 
movement  at  once  of  differentiation  and  integration  ; 
yet  in  his  criticism  of  Comte,  and  in  his  "  First 
Principles,"  there  are  passages  in  which  he  seems 
to  confuse  the  universal  of  science  with  a  mere 
abstraction  or  logical  genus,  and  to  overlook  the 
essential  correlativity  and  interdependence  of  the 
two  opposite  movements   of   thought.'"      The    defects 

*Mr.  Spencer,  it  may  be  remarked,  takes,  like  Comte,  a 
negative  view  of  the  progress  of  religion,  and  to  him,  therefore, 
the  last  religion  is  the  worship  of  the  Unknown,  and,  indeed, 
of  the  Unknowable.  But  Comte  practically  retracts  this  view 
when  he  makes  the  worship  of  Humanity  the  last  form  of 
religion. 


CO MTE'S  NEGATIONS.  93 

of  l)otli  writers,  however,  lie  mainly  on  the  meta- 
physical side  ;  in  their  analysis  of  the  idea  of 
development  rather  than  in  their  application  of 
it.  And  it  is  the  power  and  fertility  of  resource 
with  which  they  apply  it  to  life  and  history,  which 
gives  them,  and  especially  which  gives  Comte,  a 
claim  to  an  important  place  among  modern  philo- 
sophical writers. 

In  this  chapter  I  have  tried  to  trace  to  their 
origin  Comte's  ideas  of  social  and  intellectual  de- 
velopment, and  to  examine  the  motives  which  led 
him  to  reject  theology  and  metaphysics,  as  legitimate 
forms  of  science.  In  the  following  chapter  I  shall 
go  on  to  consider  more  fully  the  subjective  synthesis 
by  which  he  would  supply  their  place. 


94 


CHAPTEE  III. 

THE  POSITIVE  OR  CONSTEUCTIVE  SIDE  OF  COMTE's  PHILO- 
SOPHY— HIS  SUBSTITUTES  FOR  METAPHYSIC  AND 
THEOLOGY. 

His  recognition  of  the  need  of  substitutes  for  Theology  and 
Metaphysic — His  assertion  that  his  philosophy  is  relative  and 
subjective — Double  meaning  of  the  relativity  of  knowledge  as 
involving  the  assertion  or  the  denial  of  real  or  absolute  hiotv- 
ledge — Collision  of  Gonitis  earlier  and  later  views  on  this 
point — Comte's  subjective  synthesis  not  subjective  in  the  sense 
of  Individualism,  nor  yet  in  the  sense  that  a  conscious  subject 
is  implied  in  all  objects — His  compromise  between  these  opposite 
theories — His  doctrine  that  man  sees  the  world  in  ordine  ad 
hominem  but  not  in  ordine  ad  universum — Impossibility  of 
separating  nature  from  man  or  of  criticising  the  tohole  system 
to  which  man  belongs — Defects  of  Comte's  religion  according 
to  his  own  idea  of  religion — Schisms  in  the  school  of  Comte. 

Ix  the  preceding  chapter  I  have  tried  to  explain 
how  Comte  was  led  to  treat  Metaphysics  and 
Theology  as  merely  transitional  forms  of  human 
thought,  and  to  show  that  this  view  not  only  involves 
a  false  conception  of  their  nature,  but  also  necessi- 
tates   an   entire    misrepresentation    of    the    course    of 


HIS  VIEW  OF  DEVELOPMENT.  95 

•*  their  historical  development.  To  regard  the  liistory 
of  Metaphysics  and  Theology  as  a  purely  nr(/ative 
process,  by  which  the  first  concrete  fulness  of  religious 
conceptions  was  gradually  attenuated  till  nothing  re- 
mained but  the  bare  abstract  idea  of  Nature ;  and, 
on  the  other  hand,  to  think  of  the  history  of  science 
as  the    corresj)onding  jyositivc   process,    by   which   the 

'  mind  of  man  advanced  from  the  general  to  the 
special,  from  the  investigation  of  the  simplest 
numerical  and  spatial  relations  of  things  to  the 
knowledge  of  the  complex  social  nature  of  man — this 
is  a  view  of  man's  intellectual  history,  recommended 
by  its  simplicity  and  clearness,  as  well  as  by  its 
correspondence  with  the  most  popular  philosophy  of 
the  present  time^  But,  as  we  have  seen,  it  involves 
a  one-sided  conception  of  the  movement  of  human 
thought  in  its  scientific,  and  still  more  in  its 
theological  and  metaphysical,  aspect.  Comte  him- 
self enables  us  to  see  that  his  first  description  of 
the  history  of  science  is  incomplete,  if  not  misleading ; 
and  that  its  movement  is  towards  greater  generality 
as  well  as  towards  more  definite  specification.  Now, 
as  Metaphysic  is  only  the  clearest  form  of  self-con- 
sciousness, and  as  man's  consciousness  of  himself 
deepens  and  widens  with  his  consciousness  of  the 
o1)jective  world,  we  might  expect  to  find  that  Meta- 
physic also  develops  at  once  towards  the  universal 
and    towards    the    particular ;    autl    when    we    look   at 


90        THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE 

the  facts  of  the  history  of  Philosophy  we  find  this 
expectation  amply  realized.  Nor  is  it  otherwise 
with  religion — which  is  to  the  heart  and  the  imagi- 
native intuitions  of  man  what  philosophy  is  to  his 
self-conscious  intelligence;  for  the  latest  religion  is 
at  once  the  deepest  and  the  richest,  the  most  com- 
plex and  the  most  universal. 
Need  of  su))-       We  caunot,  however,  give  a  completely  satisfactory 

stitntes  for 

and  tu'eT'''  answer  to  Comte's  criticism  of  Metaphysics  and  Theo- 
'°^*'  logy   without  considering   more   fully  the   substitutes 

which  he  would  put  in  their   place.     For   Comte   is 
not  simply  an  Agnostic  ;  K^  ^lr^*>»^*^i^r]<^ny  f-hp  rfflll'tY 
of  Lhc  wants  which  Metaphysics  and  Theolog^JtiaXfi-. 
hitliertu    striven   to   satisfy ;    nor   does   he   hold   that . 
these  wants  are,  by  the  nature  of  things  and  of  the 
human  intelligence,  for  ever  precluded  from  satisfac- 
tion^   He  does  not,  lil-ce  some  modern  writers,  reduce 
philosophy   into   a  consciousness  of  the  limits  of  the 
hm^iqTi   mind,  and  religion  into  a  vague  awe_  oL.tbe 
Unknowable.     On  the  contrary,  he  holds  that  Positiv- 
ism for  the  first  time  supplies  complete   satisfaction 
to  all   the   tendencies   of   the   many-sided    nature    of 
man ;   whereas  all  earlier   systems   had   been   obliged 
to  purchase  one  kind   of  culture  at   the  expense  of 
another, — to    gratify    the    affections    by    the    sacrifice 
of   intellectual    freedom,   or    to   cultivate   the   intelli- 
gence   to    the    neglect    of   the    claims   of    the    heart. 
'I'll   tlie  Metaphysician   he   grants  the  necessity  of  a 


NEED  OF  PHILOSOPHY  AND  RELIGION.      97 

systematizing  of  knowledge  in  relation  to  one  general 
principle,  which  sliall  iurnisli  at  once  its  first  pre- 
supposition and  its  end.  To  the  Theologian  he 
grants  that  that  inner  harmony  with  self  and  with 
the  world,  which  wc  call  religion,  can  only  be  se- 
cured by  a  firm  belief  and  trust  in  some  "  Grand 
Etre "  who  transcends  and  comprehends  our  narrow 
individuality,  "  in  whom  we  live,  and  move,  and 
have  our  being."  But  while  (in  opposition  to  the 
tendencies  of  that  scientific  empiricism,  to  which 
the  name  of  Positivism  is  usually  given)  Comte 
thus  recognizes  those  claims  of  the  intelligence  and 
of  the  heart  for  which  Philosophy  and  Theology 
had  tried  to  provide,  he  still  adopts  as  his  own 
the  empiricist  condemnation  of  Ijoth,  and  seeks  to 
show  that,  on  the  basis  of  Qnipjririisi'^  it.aaL£r-j«a-umv 
secure  the  complete  satisfaction  of  all  our  spiritual 
wants.  It  is  to  this  claim  of  Comte,  fu  orcujiv 
in  the  name  of  Science  the  place  from  which 
Theology  and  Metaphysics  have  been  expelled,  that 
we  must  now  direct  our  attention. 

The  contrast  vvhich  Comte  draws  between  his  own  Distinctions 

-    -  -  —     ■  ' ~  of  subjec- 

philosopby  and  religion,  and  those  of  his  predecessors,  ^^''.''^•^^?^g 
is   expressed   in   the  words   "  relative "   and    "  subjec-  av'so/ilte,""** 
tive."     His    purpose,    he    tells    us,    is    a   "  subiecti\:ii  ''^" 
synthesis^"  while  his  predecessors   had   aimed    at    an  / 

"  objective   synthesis  " — i.e.,  ^Acy  had__endeaA:our<Ml   \a) 

comprehend     the    world    in    itself,    by    carrying     its 


98        THE  SOCIAL  r HI LO SOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

phenomena  back  to  an  objective,  principle  to  which 
theT-^fTall 'equally  related,  and  of  which  they-^re- 
all  the  manifestations  ;  while  he  is  content  to  take 
hir'sta'nd  on  the  subjective  unity  of  the  human 
race,  a  unity  which  has  grown  out  of  the  conscious 
or  unconscious  co-operation  of  all  past  generations, 
and  which  now  manifests  itself  in  the  love  and 
reverence  of  men  for  each  other,  and  for  the  GraTid 
Eire,  Humanity,  that  comprehends  them  all*  I  For 
the  existence  of  this  Great  Being  is  a  fact  which 
we  can  empirically  verify,  although  we  are  totally 
unal)le  to  discover  the  meaning  of  that  wider  objec- 
tive fatality,  to  which  ultimately  the  fortunes  and 
life  of  mankind  are  subjected.  Again,  Comte  con- 
trasts  his  own  philosophy  with  that  of  his  predecessors, 
as  "relative"  with  _^labsolute." \\ By  tlni  he  rne^s 
that  Positivism  does  not  seek  to  base  itself  on  al^soTute 
knov/ledge,  i.e.,  on  that  knowledge  of  noumenai  causes 
which  was  claimed__l2y  rnp.tfl  physic,  but  merely  on 
a  knowledge  of  the  laws  of  phenomena ;  and  that, 
therefore,  the  only  centre  to  which  our  knowledge 
can  be  referred  and  by  reference  to  which  it  can 
be  organized  is  the  relative  centre  of  Humanity,  and 
l^not  the  real  or  absolute  centre  of  the  universe\> 
Comte    also    often    uses    the    word    "  relative "    in    a 

*  I  need  not  do  more  than  refer  to  Comte's  view  of  Humanity 
as  "  incorporating "  only  its  best  members  with  itself.  Some- 
thing will  be  said  of  this  below. 


RELATIVITY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  99 

slightly  modified  sense  to  indicate  that  his  phil- 
osophy takes  due  accouut  of  all  llio  various  cou- 
ditious  under  which  humanity  progresses  towards 
its  ideal,  and  does  not  seek  to  set  up  an  absolute 
standard  of  perfection  without  reference  to  the 
necessary  limitations  of  each  stage  of  development. 
Now,  as  it  is  always  best  to  criticize  a  writer  l)y 
reference  to  his  own  principles  and  aims,  I  shall 
attempt  to  show  that  the  main  errors  of  Comte 
arise  from  his  being  not  "  subjective,"  not  "  relative  " 
enough,  even  in  the  sense  which  he  himself  gives 
to  these  words.  He  is  not  "  subjective "  enough  ; 
for  in  the  development  of  his  theory  he  admits  a 
kind  of  separation  between  thought  and  existence, 
which  a  logical  development  of  his  own  principles 
must  have  led  him  to  reject.  And  he  is  not  "  rela- 
tive "  enough ;  for  he  starts  from  philosophical 
principles  which  involve  the  denial  of  any  neces- 
sary connection  between  man  and  the  world,  and 
even  between  the  different  elements  in  the  nature 
of  man ;  and  he  ends  with  a  religion  in  which 
poetry  is  divorced  from  truth,  and  truth  from 
poetry. 

In    the    first    place,    however,    it    is    necessary    to  A^{j'X'J,*^y 
clear    up    a    certain    ambiguity    as    to    the    idea    of '■°'^*''"'^'- 
relativity.      It    is   a   commonplace    of   the    sensation- 
alist and  empiricist  school  at  the    present   day,   that 
we    are    confined    to    the    knowledge   of    phenomena, 


100      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

and  cannot  rise  to  the  knowledge  of  noumena,  or 
things  in  themselves.  Conite  usually  expresses  this 
idea  by  saying  that  science  is  limited  to  the  in- 
vestigation of  the  laws  of  phenomena,  and  that  it 
was  the  error  of  Theology  and  Metaphysics  to 
seek  to  determine  their  causes.  When,  however, 
we  try  to  ascertain  the  exact  force  of  this  oppos- 
ition, we  find  that  it  may  have  two  distinct  mean- 
ings. For  it  is  one  thing  to  say,  that  Theology 
and  Metaphysics  gave  false  answers  to  a  legiti- 
mate question,  which  was  afterwards  more  correctly 
answered  by  science ;  and  it  is  quite  another  thing 
to  say  that  they  attempted  to  answer  a  question 
different  from  the  c^uestion  of  science,  and  which 
it    is    beyond    the    powers    of    the    human    mind    to 

answer.      Now,   Comte    sometimes    sppaV«    g«    if   tihp 

error  of  the  Theologians  were  {iaJ,Tfip^,7  til'-'^^'  ^■^^^ 
sought  to  explain  all  phenomena  by  regarding,  thefla 
as  the  expressions  of  divine  wills  and  intelligences 
analogous  to  our  own;  and  us  il'  tlie  error  of  Uiu 
Metaphysicians  were  simply  that  they  repeated  this 
"explanation  in  a  more  irrational  form,  substituting 
personified  abstractions  for  Gods.  At  other  tinies__ 
he  speaks  as  if  the  error  of  Theology  and  Meta- 
physics were  that  they  attempted  to  determine  the 
real  nature  of  things,  wliich  can  be  known  bv  us 
only  in  tlieir  phenomena.  On  the  former  view, 
Theolo-y    and     Metaphy.sica._are     provisional    hypo- 


riVO  VIEWS  OF  RELATIVITY. 


101 


treses,  in  relation  to  the  objects  of  experience ; 
which  lose  credit  when  it  iff  Hisnnvp.rp.fl^  tjmt  many 
•t^f""t'h6^e  ob.lfiCts.,,_wluch  were  ill  tint  nnniiTiirl  to 
be  like  ma",  j^j-f>  -jm  mau}  waya^  milike  him.  ( ) n^ 
the  latter  view^  they  arc  i^nviiMnlcil  scicin'c-.,  \\liii;h_^ 
do  not  relate  to  the  iilu'iionn'iial  dlijccts  nf  ex- 
perience at  all,  but  to  (H'llaiu  realities,  supposed 
to  be  beneath  or  holiind  ilu'ui.  When  we  dis- 
enlEangTe'" these  two  dillerent  views  i'loni  each  otlier, 
wa'Uftd'  tlhali  theY  d"  in't  rest  on  the  same  Irigical 
basis,  and  that^^  thev  do  nut  l)y  any  means  imply 
each  other.  The  former  view  imi'lics  oidy  that 
our  ideas  of  the  world  are  confused  aud  niiperfeet, 
and  rc4uire  tu  be  coutiniially  corrected  by  fresh 
thoujoht  and  experience.  The  latter  implies  that 
there  are  certain  objects  other  than  phenomena, 
tlie  existence  of  wliieh  we  know,  Init  the  nature 
of  wliieli  wo  gradually  discover  ourselves  to  be 
incapable  of  deti'rmining.  It  implies,  in  fact,  .,that 
our  intelligence  can  discern  its  own  limits  ;^^or, 
what  is  the  same  thing,  can  know  that  there  is 
something  beyond  those  limits.  Now  wliile,  with 
certain  modifications  we  might  not  licsitate  to  -raut 
the  truth  of  the  former  of  these  doctrines,  we  sliould 
require  sonie-  proQf  of  the  latter,  or  even  of  its 
logical  possibility.  J]or  by  it  wc  are  brought  face 
to    face    with    the    difficulty    of    conceiving    how    we 


should    be    able    to    ask   fj[uestions,    which — not   from 


1(,2      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

external  circumstances^  but  from  the  essential  nature 
of  our'TrTtelllgeiQce — are  alto-eUur  uii;iiis\Yerab]e,  and 
which  therefore,  we  can  say  with  certainty,  we  shall. 
never  be  able  to  answer^ .  ^'bis  wbic]^  ^/Tv  gponr^^i^ 
attempts_to^roye — by  very  inadequate  reasonings  as^ 
seems  to  me^^-Comte^jjSSume^wi^^ut^^a^ 

Hence,  while  he  pretends  to  renmmp.ft  Tnp.ta,- 
'-'^prysics,  he  has  committed  himself  to  one. of  the  most 
indefensible  of  all  metaphysical  positions.  /  For  the 
assertion  that  we  know  only  phenomena,  has  no  mean- 
ing except  in  reference  to  the  doctrine  that  there  are, 
or  can  by  us  be  conceived  to  be,  things  in  themselves — 
i.e.,  things  unrelated  to  thought  ;  and  that,  while  we 
know  them  to  exist,  we  cannot  know  what  they  are. 
Now  this  dogma  is  siinply  the  scholastic  realism,  or 
wliat  (_'(»iiit(;  (Tills  nu'tapliysics,  in  its  most  al)stract  a^d 
irrational  form.  It  is  a  residuum  of  bad  metaphysics, 
which,  by  a  natural  nemesis,  seems  almost  invariably 
to  haunt  the  minds  of  those  writers  who  think  they 
have  renounced  metaphysics  altogether. 
Idealistic  The  authority  of  Kant  is  often  quoted  in  support 

view  of  the  •  •'  ^  -'--'- 

kn^wiedk'e°^  of  the  doctriue  of  the  existence  of  things  in  themselves: 
indeed,  it  seems  to  be  the  doctrine  which  is  most 
generally  associated  with  his  name.  But,  in  spite 
of  some  ambiguities,  Kant  was  precisely  the  writer 
who,  by  the  general  direction  and  tendency  of  his 
thought,  did  most  to  free  modern  speculation  from 
such    an    illusion.      For    it    was    his    main    aim    and 


IDEALISTIC  VIEW  OF  RELA  TIVITY.        103 

purpose  t(i  sliiiw  tliLit  the  duLcnuiiiulinu  df  (^ibiects 
as  such,  is  p(jssil)le  <iiil3'  iii  rckilidu  In  ilic  uiij^jYof 
apperception,  or,  in  other  words,  ol'  scil'-cnusciuusness, 
and  b)  means  of  certain  universal  principles  of- 
tllUUght' "which  he  calls  the  Calc-nric^.  l\;iiii,  iiidred, 
says  tliat  the  objects  thus  kuowu  are  merely  pheno- 
mena, and  that  things  in  themselves  are  unknowable. 
But  even  things  in  themselves  are  not,  in  his  view, 
altogether  out  of  relation  to  consciousness.  They 
are  thinkable,  though  they  are  not  knowable ;  we 
have  a  consciousness  of  them  through  the  ideas  of 
reason,  though  they  are  not  objects  of  experience ; 
and  our  moral  life,  bringing  with  it  a  consciousness 
of  freedom,  turns  the  thought  of  them  into  a  con- 
viction of  their  reality.  Further,  the  later  German 
philosophers,  who  sought  to  develop  the  principles 
of  Kant  to  further  issues,  and  to  clear  away  the 
inconsistencies  of  his  first  expression  and  application 
of  them,  found  it  necessary  to  bridge  over  the  gulf, 
which  Kant  had  left,  between  faith  and  reason, 
between  noumena  and  phenomena.  Accordingly  we 
find  them  insisting  upon  the  correlation  between 
object  and  subject,  and  pointing  out  that,  if  this 
correlation  be  taken  strictly,  it  is  a  false  abstraction 
to  speak  at  all  of  things  in  themselves  which  are 
not  relative  to  thought,  or  of  a  noumenon  which 
is  a  mere  negation  of  the  phenomenal.  There  can 
be   no   absolute    opposite   or   negative   of    that    unity 


104      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

of  thought  and  being,  which  is  presupposed  in  all 
knowledge  and  experience,  and  even  to  speak  of  its 
existence  is  to  use  words  without  meaning.  As  Heine 
says,  "  The  distinction  of  oljjects  into  phenomena  and 
noumena,  i.e.,  into  things  that  for  us  exist,  and  things 
that  for  us  do  not  exist,  is  an  Irish  bull  in  philosophy." 
Comte  sometimes,  especially  in  the  Politique  Positive, 
comes  near  to  the  perception  of  this  truth,  but  his  full 
apprehension  of  it  is  prevented  by  the  presuppositions 
from  which  he  started,  and  from  which  he  could 
never  completely  free  himself  Thus  in  a  passage 
quoted  in  the  previous  chapter,'"  Comte's  idea  seems 
to  be  that  the  images  of  things — individual  objects 
as  such — are  immediately  given  in  sense  ;  that  the 
mind  reacts,  in  the  processes  of  abstraction  and 
generalization,  to  raise  perception  into  knowledge ; 
and  that  this  knowledge,  just  because  of  its  generality, 
is  subjective  or  relative  knowledge.  Now  this  seems 
to  be  only  a  revival  of  Locke's  view  that  general 
ideas  are   necessarily  fictitious,  because  they  are   the 

*In  Pol.  Pos.  i.  439,  Comte  seems  to  come  still  nearer  to 
the  Kantian  principle  that  all  existence  is  existence  for  a 
conscious  self,  but  (1)  he  confounds  this  principle  with  the 
idea  that  there  is  an  action  and  reaction  between  subject  and 
object,  which  are  identified  with  the  organism  and  the  environ- 
ment respectively  ;  and  (2)  he  does  not  draw  the  necessary 
inference  that  the  thing  in  itself  is  a  fiction  of  abstract  thought, 
or,  in  other  words,  that  there  is  no  meaning  whatever  in 
speaking  of  an  existence  which  is  not  relative  to  the  thinking 
self.     Cf.  Pol.  Pos.  iii.,  p.  18  seq. 


UNCERTAINTY  OF  COMTE'S  LANGUAGE.    1();5 

"  work  of  the  miiul."  Yet,  in  tlie  same  parai^raph, 
Comte  goes  on  to  speak  as  if  the  one  defect  of  our 
knowledge,  which  prevents  it  from  being  adequate 
to  reality,  were  that  our  point  of  view  is  not  riuite 
universal,  and  that  we  are  incapable  of  entirely 
freeing  it  from  what  is  subjective.  By  comparing 
our  views  with  those  of  other  men,  we  can  rise  above 
individual  and  national  prejudices ;  but  we  cannot 
free  our  views  from  those  idola  tribus,  which  are 
common  to  the  whole  human  race,  because  we  are 
unable  to  establish  any  satisfactory  conniiunication 
with  the  animals.  Whatever  may  be  thought  of 
the  last  suggestion,  the  passage  at  least  shows  a 
view  of  the  hindrances  to  knowledge  which  is  not 
consistent  with  any  absolute  division  between  pheno- 
mena and  noumena.  For,  if  man  can  escape  from 
the  necessity  of  viewing  things  in  ordine  ad  indi- 
vidimm,  i.e.,  in  relation  to  his  individual  self,  he 
is  at  least  on  the  way  towards  regarding  them  in 
ordine  ad  universum.  This  point,  however,  will  be 
considered  below,  when  we  come  to  treat  more 
directly  of  the  sense  in  which  Comte's  synthesis  is 
"  subjective."  Here  we  need  only  call  attention  to 
the  difference  of  this  view  from  tliat  which  is 
suggested  by  other  passages  (especially  in  his  ex- 
position of  the  "  law  of  the  three  stages  ")  in  which 
the  knowledge  of  relations  of  phenomena  is  con- 
trasted  with   the   knowledge   of  causes.      From   such 


100      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 


The  noil- 
nicnal,  ur 
tiling;  ill 
itself,  is 
really  the 
universal, 


and,  there- 
fore, can  be 
known. 


passages  we  should  gather  that  causes  belong  to  an 
order  of  reality,  which  is  absolutely  hidden  from 
us,  and  to  the  knowledge  of  which  all  our  acquain- 
tance with  phenomena  does  not  enable  us  to  make 
any  approximation. 

The  truth  seems  to  be  that  the  absolute  distinction 
of  phenomena  and  noumena — resting  as  it  does  on 
an  irrational  separation  between  thought  and  being — ' 
is  tenable  only  from  the  point  of  view  of  a  philosophy 
which  regards  the  individual  as  the  only  reality, 
and  the  universal  as  a  name  or  an  abstraction.  From 
the  point  of  view  of  Individualism,  it  was  natural 
and  even  necessary  for  Comte  to  assail  a  metaphysic 
which  claimed  to  apprehend  a  reality  beyond  and 
beneath  the  phenomenal  individuals  and  their  ex- 
ternal relations  to  each  other,  and  which  found  in 
this  reality  the  vera  causa  of  all  phenomenal  existence. 
It  was  natural  for  him  to  maintain  that  such  reality 
is  unknowable  for  us,  and  that  the  general  terms 
which  seem  to  express  it  are  mere  collective  names 
for  individuals,  or,  at  best,  abstract  ideas  of  elements 
common  to  many  individuals. 

But  when  Comte  had  so  far  changed  his  point  of 
view  as  to  hold  that  "  man  is  a  mere  abstraction, 
and  that  there  is  nothing  real  but  humanity,"  he 
had  lost  the  right  to  use  such  language.  He  had 
seen  that  the  individual  is  an  abstraction,  and  he 
was    even    in    danger    of    forgettino'    that    the    mere 


CA  USES  AND  LA  WS.  107 

universal  is  an  abstraction  also.  ISTow  modern  nieta- 
physic,  by  showing  the  relativity  of  objects  to  a 
thinking  subject,  has  banished  the  idea  of  real  entities, 
or  things  in  themselves,  lying  liehind  and  l)eyond 
the  phenomena ;  and,  at  the  same  time  and  by  the 
same  process  of  reasoning,  it  has  proved  that  the 
individual  cannot  be  separated  from  the  universal, 
any  more  than  the  universal  can  be  separated  from 
the  individual.  In  other  words,  it  has  proved  that 
the  world  cannot  be  conceived  in  the  spirit  ol" 
abstract  nominalism  as  a  collection  of  individual 
objects  and  events,  related  merely  as  similar  or 
dissimilar,  or  co-existent  or  successive,  any  more 
than  it  can  be  conceived  in  the  spirit  of  scholastic 
realism,  as  a  mere  phenomenal  appearance  of  certain 
noumenal  substances,  which  correspond  to  general 
terms.  From  this  point  of  view,  the  universal  is 
at  once  a  law  and  a  cause ;  for  it  is  a  principle 
of  unity,  which  manifests  itself  in  the  differences 
of  particulars,  and  through  their  relations  binds  them 
into  one  individual  whole.  IfComte  had  realized 
the  meaning  of  the  categories  by  which  he  was 
really  guided,  he  must  have  altered  his  whole  con- 
ception of  the  relation  of  metaphysic  to  positive 
scieiice.  For  it  was  his  own  best  achievement  to 
apply  this  idea  of  the  unity  of  the  universal  and 
the  particular  to  one  great  department  of  science.  It 
was   to   show   that    society,   whether   in    the   form   of 


108      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

the  family,  of  the  nation,  or  of  humanity,  is  not 
merely  a  collection  of  similar  individuals,  but  a 
unity  of  organically  related  members ;  and  that  its 
development  is  not  merely  a  succession  of  events, 
but  the  evolution  of  one  life  which  remains  identical 
with  itself  through  all  its  changes.  And  in  this 
he  was  not  refuting  metaphysic,  but  following  directly 
in  the  course  of  the  great  metaphysicians  of  the  pre- 
ceding generation.  It  might,  indeed,  be  shown,  that 
none  of  the  greatest  names  in  philosophy — not  Plato 
or  Aristotle,  not  Spinoza  or  Leibniz — was,  strictly 
speaking,  either  a  scholastic  realist  or  a  scholastic 
nominalist,  though  in  all  before  Kant  there  were 
tendencies  to  one  or  other  of  these  extremes. 
But  the  idealistic  movement  that  took  its  origin 
with  Kant — and  which  Comte  should  have  criti- 
cized, if  his  criticism  on  metaphysic  was  to  be, 
according  to  his  own  frequent  phrase,  "on  the 
level  of  his  age " — had  set  before  itself  as  its 
distinctive  purpose  and  aim,  to  transcend  this 
opposition.  In  that  philosophy  Comte  would  have 
found  just  what  he  wanted — a  way  of  assert- 
ing the  reality  of  the  universal,  which  should  not 
involve  the  denial  of  the  reality  of  the  individual. 
For  want  of  this  principle,  the  end  of  his  system 
<3omes  into  contradiction  with  its  beginning.  For 
while  Comte  begins  with  a  vehement  denial  of  the 
luniversal    as    existent    in   itself, — a   denial   which   is 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  SYNTHESIS.  109 

expressed  in  the  individualistic  language  of  tlie 
school  of  Locke, — he  ends  with  an  equally  vehement 
assertion  of  the  social  universal  against  the  individ- 
ualism of  Eousseau.  And  his  "  subjective  synthesis," 
even  its  latest  form,  is  embarrassed  by  hesitations 
and  inconsistencies,  which  are  due  mainly  to  his 
inability  to  shake  himself  free  from  that  implicit 
nominalism  with  which  he  had  started. 

It  is  to  this  last  point  that  we  must  now  direct  "vesyn-^'^ 

TTT-i  1  /^         i  1  •         tliesis  is  not. 

our   attention.      What    does    Comte   mean    by   saying  sensational- 

ism. 

that  the  ultimate  synthesis  of  knowledge  is  "  not 
objective  but  subjective "  ?  If  we  took  the  words 
in  their  most  natural  meaning,  we  should  be  led  to 
suppose  that  Comte  held  that  theory  of  subjec- 
tive individualism,  which  was  the  logical  result  of 
Berkeley's  so-called  idealism,  and  the  basis  of  the 
scepticism  of  Hume.  Among  later  writers  this  theory 
has  Ijeen  most  fully  expressed  in  some  of  the  works 
of  J.  S.  Mill,  and  it  is  still  offered  by  Mr.  Spencer 
and  Professor  Huxley  as  one  of  the  two  alternative 
theories  (the  other  being  materialism)  between  which 
philosophy  must  for  ever  fluctuate.  According  to 
this  view,  the  individual  directly  knows  nothing 
except  the  states  of  his  own  subjectivity ;  or,  if  he 
seems  to  know  anything  else,  it  is  through  a  process 
of  association,  the  result  of  which  can  never  be 
verified,  seeing  that  no  one  can  go  beyond  the 
bounds  of  his  own  consciousness.     Now  it  is  obvious 


110      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

that,  if  tliis  be  the  truth,  "  the  subjective  "  and  "  the 
individual"  go  together  and  imply  each  other;  for, 
if  we  cannot  transcend  our  own  individuality,  so  as 
to  apprehend  other  things,  or  come  into  communica- 
tion with  other  beings,  then  we  must  live  a  purely 
subjective  life.  And  if,  on  the  other  hand,  it  can 
be  shown  that  we  know  other  things  and  beings 
as  directly  and  immediately  as  we  know  ourselves, 
then  our  subjectivity  is  no  longer  a  limit  to  us, 
but  a  "  subjective  synthesis "  may  be  at  the  same 
time  "  objective."  Now,  it  was  one  of  the  principal 
results  of  the  German  idealism  to  show  that  this 
latter  view  was  the  true  one,  and  that  thought  is 
not  merely  a  state  of  the  individual  subject  as  such. 
To  speak  of  the  consciousness  of  the  individual  as 
limited  to  the  apprehension  of  his  subjective  states, 
is,  indeed  the  reverse  of  the  truth ;  for  the  con- 
sciousness of  self  implies  the  consciousness  of  the 
not-self,  and  grows  with  it,  and  by  means  of  it. 
We  are  "  a  part  of  all  that  we  have  known,"  and  all 
that  we  have  known  is  a  part  of  us.  Our  life 
widens  with  our  world,  and  is  indeed  the  same 
thing  from  an  opposite  point  of  view.  When  we 
realize  this  correlativity  of  subject  and  object  in 
knowledge,  we  can  no  longer  contemplate  a  think- 
ing being  as  merely  one  individual  among  the  other 
individuals  of  the  world.  We  are  forced  to  recognize 
that  the  consciousness  of  self  lifts  him  to  a  universal 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  WHICH  IS  OBJECTIVE.  \\\ 

or  central  point  of  view, — a  point  of  view  which  is 
central,  not  merely  in  relation  to  his  own  feelings  and 
states,  but  central  also  in  relation  to  the  objective 
world.  The  being  who  knows  himself  as  an  individual 
is,  for  that  very  reason,  not  merely  individual ;  lie  can 
know  a  reality,  which  is  not  merely  that  of  his 
own  subjective  states  or  sensations,  and  lie  can 
identify  himself  with  an  end,  which  is  not  merely 
his  own  expected  pleasure.  The  possibility  of  an 
intellectual  life  for  us,  indeed,  lies  just  in  this,  that 
we  can  regard — nay,  that  to  a  certain  extent  we 
cannot  hut  regard — our  own  individuality  from  an 
"  objective "  point  of  view, — a  point  of  view  in 
which  it  has  no  more  importance  than  other  indi- 
vidualities ;  or  in  which,  at  least,  all  its  importance 
is  derived  from  its  relation  to  the  whole  of  which 
it  is  a  part.      And  the  poet  who  said, — 

"Unless  above  himself  lie  can 
Exalt  himself,  how  mean  a  thing  is  man  ! " 

had  truly  discerned  that  moral  life  also  is  dependent 
on  the  transformation  of  man's  individuality  by  this 
universal  consciousness  with  which  it  is  linked  and 
bound  up. 

Now   this   view   of  self-consciousness,   as   ol)jective  N'oryetisit 

Idealism. 

in  spite  of  its  subjectivity,  universal  in  spite  of  its 
individuality,  necessarily  leads  to  a  conception  of 
man,  not  merely  as  one  of  the  many  existences  in 
the  manifold  universe,  but  as  the  existence  in  which 


112      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

all  the  others  are  summed  up,  and  through  which 
they  are  to  l)e  explained.  On  one  side  of  his 
being,  indeed,  we  must  regard  him  as  a  "part  of 
this  partial  world";*  and,  in  this  point  of  view,  we 
can  understand  his  life  only  in  relation  to  the  other 
things  and  beings  which  limit  him  on  every  side. 
Nay,  as  he  is  the  most  complex  and  dependent  of 
existences,  we  can  only  rise  to  a  satisfactory  know- 
ledge of  him,  after  we  have  laid  a  basis  for  this 
knowledge  in  the  study  of  the  simpler  phenomena 
of  the  organic  and  inorganic  world.  But,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  possibility  of  all  this  objective 
science — of  the  knowledge  by  man  of  that  which 
is  not  man — lies  in  this,  that  he  is  not  merely 
part  of  the  whole, — not  merely  the  most  complex 
existence  in  the  world, — but  that  the  universal 
principle,  the  principle  which  gives  unity  to  the 
world,  manifests  itself  in  him.  It  is  because,  as 
has  been  said,  "  Nature  becomes  conscious  of  itself 
in  man,"  that  man  in  his  turn  can  read  the  open 
secret  of  Nature.  In  spelling  out  the  meaning  of 
nature  and  history,  he  is  taking  the  true  way,  and 
indeed  the  only  way,  to  the  knowledge  of  himself; 
l)ut  this  knowledge  would  be  to  him  impossible,  if 
the  self-consciousness  that  makes  him  man  were  not 
also  the  principle  of  unity  in  the  objective  world. 
Comte  himself  has  an  obscure  perception  of  this 
*Cf.  Green's  Introduction  to  Hume's  Works,  S  152. 


MICROCOSM  AND  MACROCOSM.  113 

truth  when  he  says  that,  "  strictly  speaking  there  is 
no  phenomenon  within  our  experience  which  is  not 
in  the  truest  sense  human ;  and  that,  not  merely 
because  it  is  man  that  takes  cognizance  of  it,  but 
also  because,  from  a  purely  objective  point  of  view, 
man  sums  up  in  himself  all  the  laws  of  the  world, 
as  the  ancients  truly  felt."*  If  Comte  had  only 
brought  together  the  subjective  and  the  objective 
unity — the  unity  of  knowledge,  and  the  unity  of 
existence — both  of  which  he  here  finds  in  man, 
and  if  he  had  recognized  the  necessary  relation  of 
the  two,  he  would  have  reproduced  the  highest 
lesson  of  German  idealism.  Tor  that  lesson  is  that 
the  subjective  unity,  the  unity  of  self-consciousness, 
which  is  presupposed  in  all  knowledge  or  experi- 
ence of  the  world,  must  at  the  same  time  be  re- 
garded as  the  objective  principle  of  its  existence. 
The  macrocosm,  to  use  an  ancient  conception,  of 
which  Comte  somewhere  speaks  with  approval,  can 
be  comprehensible  only  to  the  microcosm,  which 
finds  in  the  great  world  the  means  of  understanding 
itself,  just  because  in  another  way  it  has  in  itself 
the  key  for  the  understanding  of  the  world.  Man 
can  know  that  which  is  not  himself,  because  from 
another  point  of  view  there  is  nothing  in  which  he 

does  not,  or  may  not,   find  himself.  For  ideal- 

ism doea  not 

It    follows    from   this    that    the    last    science,   the  oppose  the 

subjective 

*Pol.  Pos.  iv.  181  ;  Traiisl.  IGl.  objective 

H 


114      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

science  of  man,  in  so  far  as  it  is  also  the  science 
of  mind,  cannot  merely  be  built  upon  and  added  to 
the  physical  and  natural  sciences,  but  must  react 
upon  them  and  transform  them.  For,  though  the 
knowledge  of  man  presupposes  the  knowledge  of 
nature,  yet,  on  the  other  hand,  the  knowledge  of 
nature  which  we  get  when  we  abstract  from  its 
relation  to  man,  is  imperfect  and  incomplete.  The 
true  idea  of  nature  cannot  be  attained  except  when 
it  is  viewed  in  relation  to  that  being  who  is  at 
once  its  culmination  and  its  explanation.  Or,  to 
put  this  in  another  point  of  view,  the  intelligence 
which  appears  in  man  is  presupposed  in  every 
object  of  the  intelligible  world.  Self-consciousness 
is  not,  therefore,  an  episodic  appearance  in  a  world, 
which  is  unprepared  for  it,  and  which  might  exist, 
or  be  understood,  without  it.  It  is  the  revelation 
of  the  meaning  of  all  that  went  before.  What 
Dr.  Tyndall  stated  not  long  since  as  the  modern 
view  of  Materialism,  that  matter  contains  in  itself 
"  the  promise  and  the  potency "  of  life  and  even 
of  mind,  may  be  willingly  accepted  as  an  expres- 
sion of  their  own  doctrine  by  Idealists ;  for  the 
converse  of  this  proposition  is,  that  mind  is  the 
■"realization,"  and  therefore  the  only  key  to  the 
ultimate  nature,  of  matter.  Hence  all  the  sciences 
which  treat  of  the  mathematical,  physical,  chemical, 
and   vital   relations    of  things,   must   be   regarded   as 


IDEALISTIC  TENDENCIES  IN  COMTE.       115 

hypothetical  and  based  upon  abstraction  ;  for  tliought, 
spirit,  mind,  is  implied  in  all  such  relations,  nor 
can  a  complete  or  adequate  conception  of  them  be 
attained,  until  we  have  regarded  the  self-conscious- 
ness that  makes  us  men  as,  in  this  point  of  view, 
not  only  the  last,  but  also  the  first,  not  merely 
the  end,  but  also  the  beginning  of  nature.  In  this 
sense  the  analytic  separation  of  the  sciences  from 
each  other  and  from  tliought  must  be  modified  and 
corrected  in  a  final  synthesis,  which  will  indeed 
be  "  subjective,"  in  so  far  as  it  brings  into  view 
the  unity  of  the  subject  presupposed  in  all  know- 
ledge. But  to  one  who  has  understood  the  full 
meaning  of  the  process,  this  "  subjective  synthesis " 
will  also  be  objective ;  and,  indeed,  it  alone  will 
be  able  to  vindicate,  while  it  explains,  the  limited 
objectivity  of  the  other  sciences. 

Now   it   is    Comte's   merit   that   he    altogether  re-  He  ends, 

therefore,  in 

pudiates  that  false  subjective  synthesis,  which  was  •^1°™'"^°' 
the  natural  result  of  the  principles  of  Locke  and 
Berkeley.  Ptcjecting  the  doctrine  that  what  we 
know  immediately  is  only  the  states  of  our  own 
consciousness,  he  takes  his  stand  at  an  objective 
point  of  view,  and  arranges  the  sciences  in  an 
objective  order,  which  begins  with  the  inorganic 
world,  and  ends  with  man  as  the  most  complex 
of  all  existences.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  also 
his    merit    that    he  sees    the    necessity   of   that   true 


116      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

'  subjective  synthesis  "  wliich  arises  from  the  reaction 
of  the  last  science,  the  science  of  man,  upon  those 
that  went  before  it ;  or,  in  other  words,  from  the 
perception  that  man  is  not  merely  the  end,  but 
also  in  a  sense  the  beginning  of  nature.  But  this 
ultimate  correction  and  re-organization  of  science 
from  a  subjective  point  of  view  appears  in  Comte 
in  a  distorted  and  imperfect  form,  in  a  form  that 
leaves  "  subjective  "  and  "  objective  "  synthesis  still 
opposed  to  each  other,  or  only  gives  room  for  an 
artificial  or  external  reconciliation  between  them. 
For  Comte  (in  spite  of  all  he  says  of  relativity) 
does  not  clearly  recognize  the  subjectivity  implied 
in  our  first  objective  knowledge  of  the  world ;  *  and, 
hence,  when  he  goes  on  to  speak  of  the  subjective 
side  of  that  knowledge,  he  seems  to  be  introducing  a 
new  and  independent  point  of  view,  and  not  simply 
to  be  bringing  into  clear  consciousness  what  was 
presupposed  in  the  previous  movement  of  thought. 
In  other  words,  the  subjective  synthesis  of  Comte 
does  not  arise  from  a  perception  that  the  sub- 
jectivity of  men  is  universal,  and  therefore  objec- 
tive. On  the  contrary,  he  denies  the  possi- 
bility of  discovering  any  principle  of  unity  in 
the  objective  world,  and  maintains  that  the  objec- 
tive sciences,  when  left  to  themselves,  tend  to- 
wards the  "  divagations  indefinies "  of  a  wayward 
*  Pol.  Pos.  i.  420. 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  PRINCIPLE.  117 

and  lawless  curiosity.  Hence  the  principle  of  unity, 
which  is  necessary  to  l)ring  order  and  system  into 
our  knowledge,  must  be  imported  into  these  sciences 
from  without.  On  this  view,  we  can  organize  know- 
ledge only  in  reference  to  a  subjective  principle 
supplied  by  the  altruistic  affections, — affections  which 
bind  men  together  so  as  to  make  all  humanity 
through  all  space  and  time  into  one  great  organism, 
and  which  thus  supply  a  definite  end  and  aim  to 
all  the  intellectual,  as  well  as  to  all  the  active, 
energies  of  the  individual.  This  subjective  principle, 
in  Comte's  view,  has  been  the  unconscious  stimulus 
of  all  the  efforts  of  the  social  and  intellectual 
leaders  of  men  in  the  past ;  it  has  been  the  source 
of  all  that  organized  co-operation  of  families  and 
nations  on  which  man's  physical  and  moral  progress 
has  depended.  Positivism  has  only  to  make  it  into 
the  direct  aim  and  conscious  purpose  of  human 
endeavour,  and  thereby  to  check  that  vain  and 
wasteful  application  of  man's  limited  powers,  which 
has  prevailed  in  the  past,  especially  during  the 
revolutionary  period  of  transition  now  coming  to 
an  end.  Hence  Comte  condemns,  not  only  meta- 
physicians, who  search  into  things  altogether  out 
of  the  reach  of  man,  but  also  scientific  men, 
who  seek  to  extend  the  knowledge  of  their 
special  subjects  indefinitely,  in  every  direction  sug- 
gested   by    an    empty    curiosity,    without    regard     to 


118      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

the  practical  end  of  all  science.  The  Mathematician, 
who  wastes  himself  in  the  discovery  of  forms  and 
methods  which  have  no  relation  to  the  requirements 
of  physics ;  the  Biologist,  who  speculates  on  the 
origin  of  species,  forgetting  how  little  light  such 
inquiries  can  throw  on  the  development  of  man ; 
even  the  Sociologist,  who  pursues  remote  investiga- 
tions into  the  history  of  climate  and  race,  "  before 
such  studies  are  made  necessary  by  the  practical 
difficulty  of  extending  the  civilization  of  the  West, 
regenerated  by  Positivism,  to  the  populations  that 
are  less  advanced  in  civilization " — are  all  brought 
under  the  Comtist  anathema,  as  guilty  of  wasting 
the  small  powers  of  man  on  questions  which  are 
not  immediately  necessary  or  useful.  "  The  public 
and  its  teachers  should  always  refuse  to  recognize 
investigations  which  do  not  tend  either  to  deter- 
mine more  precisely  the  material  and  physical  laws 
of  man's  existence,  to  throw  greater  light  on  the 
modifications  which  these  laws  admit,  or  at  least 
to  render  the  general  method  of  investigation  more 
perfect."  *  "  It  is  necessary  that  the  sciences  should 
in  the  first  instance  be  studied  independently ;  but 
this  study  should  in  each  case  be  carried  only  so 
far  as  is  necessary  to  enable  the  intellect  to  take 
a  solid  grasp  of  the  science  next  above  it  in  the 
scale,  and  thus  to  rise  to  the  systematic  study  of 
*Pol.  Pos.  i.  370. 


KNOWLEDGE  NOT  AN  END  IN  ITSELF.    HO 

Humanity,  its  only  permanent  field."  '  On  this 
principle,  the  priests  of  Positivism  are  not  to  be 
specialists ;  nor,  indeed,  are  any  of  them  to  devote 
their  lives  to  scientific  investigation  alone ;  except, 
it  may  be,  a  few  distorted  and  unbalanced  natures, 
in  whom  an  abnormal  tendency  to  intellectual  pur- 
suits has  stunted  the  growth  of  the  moral  sympathies. 
To  make  scientific  men  renounce  the  intellectual  life 
as  an  end  in  itself,  and  to  direct  all  their  energies 
to  the  solution  of  those  problems  which  seem  to 
have  most  immediate  relation  to  the  improvement 
of  man's  estate,  is  one  of  the  main  objects  which 
Comte  has  in  view  in  restoring  the  spiritual  power. 
A  free  development  of  each  science  for  itself  apart 
from  the  rest,  and  a  free  development  of  science 
as  a  whole,  without  reference  to  action  for  ends 
determined  by  social  sympathy,  are  equally  opposed 
to  the  Comtian  ideal.  The  world  and  all  objects 
in  it  are  to  be  regarded  by  the  Positivist  merely 
as  means,  which  we  seek  to  know  not  for  them- 
selves, but  only  in  order  that  we  may  use  them 
for  a  predetermined  end.  For,  according  to  Comte, 
the  energies  of  the  intelligence  run  to  waste  except 
when  they  are  directed  by  an  es'prit  cV ensemble;  and 
the  only  totality,  with  reference  to  which  such  sys- 
tematic direction  is  possible,  is  the  "  subjective " 
totality  of  humanity. 

*  Pol.  Pos.  i.  383. 


120      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 
f'omte  I     iifive    already    indicated    to     some    extent    the 

'idmits  a  *' 

!n1n*'whicil'  grounds   on   which   I   would   criticize   this   theory   of 
merely        "  subjcctive    svnthesis."      It    implies,    for    one    thing, 

individual.  o  j  „      ,  • 

that  there  is  no  natural  convergence  of  the  sciences, 
due  to  the  unity  of  the  parts  of  the  intelligible 
world  with  each  other  and  with  the  intelligence ; 
but  that  the  synthesis  of  knowledge  is  artificial, 
and  forced  upon  it  from  without.  Man,  in  Comte's 
point  of  view,  is  not  a  microcosm,  who  finds  himself 
again  in  the  macrocosm.  He  is  like  a  stranger  in 
a  foreign  country,  who  seeks  to  arm  himself  with 
such  fragments  of  knowledge  about  it  as  are  neces- 
sary for  his  protection  and  his  own  private  ends.  Yet 
this  statement,  without  qualification,  would  not  be 
altogether  just  to  Comte ;  for,  in  his  view,  the 
individual  man  docs  find  himself  in  the  presence 
of  one  "  object,"  which  is  also  "  subjective," — of  one 
Great  Being,  whom  he  has  not  to  treat  as  an  ex- 
ternal means  to  ends  of  his  own,  but  rather  in 
whom  he  has  to  find  his  own  end.  The  synthesis 
of  knowledge,  therefore,  is  not  subjective  so  far 
as  Sociology  and  Morals*  are  concerned,  whatever 
it  may  be  in  regard  to  the  other  sciences.  The 
unity,  in  reference  to  which  knowledge  is  to  be 
organized,  is   not   merely   the    unity  of  man's  nature 

*The  distinction  made  in  the  Politique  Positive  between 
Sociology  and  Morals,  depending  as  it  does  on  the  opposition 
of  the  intellect  to  the  heart,  will  be  discussed  afterwards. 


THE  SOCIAL  POINT  OF  VIEW.  121 

as  an  indi\'idii;il,  but  i-allier  as  a  "collective"  heiiit,' 
(a  bad  adjective  surely  to  apply  to  mankind,  when 
they  are  regarded  as  "  members  one  of  anotlier "). 
Comte  thus  I'epeats  the  "homo  mcnsvra"  in  tlie 
sense  that  Humanity  is  for  each  man  I  lie  measure 
of  all  things  (though  things  in  themselves  escape 
all  our  measuring).  "We  can  transcend  ourselves 
so  far  as  to  take  the  point  of  view  of  humanity, 
though  not  so  far  as  to  take  the  point  of  view 
of  the  objective  unity  of  the  world.  Xay,  it  may 
even  be  said  that  we  must  so  transcend  ourselves, 
for  Comte  denies  that  the  individual  can  separate 
himself  from  his  race,  except  by  a  forced  and  ille- 
gitimate abstraction.  "  Man,  as  an  individual,"  he 
declares,  "  cannot  properly  be  said  to  exist  except 
in  the  too  abstract  brain  of  modern  metaphysicians ; " 
and  the  same  principle  on  its  ethical  side  leads 
him  to  condemn  the  doctrine  of  absolute  personal 
rights,  and  to  say  that  "  individuals  should  be  re- 
garded not  as  so  many  distinct  beings,  but  as  organs 
of  the  one  Great  Being."  According  to  these  prin- 
ciples it  would  be  impossible  for  ns  either  to  know 
ourselves  as  men,  or  to  live  a  life  in  accordance 
with  our  nature,  if  we  were  confined  within  the 
limits  of  a  purely  individual  consciousness.  Our 
consciousness  of  ourselves  is  essentially  social,  and 
the  individualistic  point  of  view  is  the  result  of 
a  false  abstraction,  which    can   never   be    more    than 


122      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

;i  partial  abstraction.  For,  strive  as  we  will,  we 
cannot  in  thought,  any  more  than  in  reality,  isolate 
the  individual  from  society,  without  at  the  same 
time  taking  from  him  all  that  characterizes  him 
even  as  an  individual.  To  speak,  therefore,  of 
knowing  man,  except  as  a  member  of  the  family, 
of  the  nation,  of  the  race,  is  irrational.  The  science 
of  man  would  be  impossible  if  we  were  not  able 
to  get  beyond  our  individuality,  and  to  look  at 
it,  as  well  as  at  all  other  individualities,  from  the 
point  of  view  of  humanity.  \ 
Yet  it  is  not      Xo    sucli    a    conccption    of    the    essentially    social 

a  universal  ■■■  '' 

principle,  mature  of  man  few,  at  the  present  day,  would  object. 
But  a  "  metaphysician "  might  wish  to  carry  it  a 
little  further,  and  to  recognize  not  only  the  essen- 
tial relation  of  man  to  man,  but  also  the  essential 
relation  of  man  to  the  universe.  If  it  is  a  fiction  of 
abstraction  to  separate  the  individual  from  society, 
is  it  a  less  fiction  to  isolate  him  from  the  world  in 
which  he  lives,  and  in  relation  to  which  all  his 
powers  and  tendencies  have  been  developed  ?  Can 
we  really  apply  the  idea  of  organic  unity  to  the 
life  of  man  witliout  extending  it  so  as  in  some 
sense  to  include  also  the  environment  in  which 
that  life  develops  ?  To  ask  what  man  would  have 
been  in  a  different  world  is  surely  as  absurd  a 
question  as  to  ask  what  he  would  have  been  had  he 
not  lived  with  his  fellow-men.      If  it  be  allowed  and 


THE  UNIVERSALITY  OF  THOUGHT.        123 

asserted  that  the  objective  or  universal  point  of 
view  is  possible,  or  even  necessary,  in  relation  to 
humanity,  there  seems  to  be  no  good  ground  for 
denying  that  it  is  possible  and  necessary  in  relation 
to  the  universe.  Once  admit  that  the  individual 
can,  and  even  nmst,  so  transcend  his  own  individ- 
uality as  to  regard  himself  as  part  of  a  greater 
whole  and  to  measure  his  actions  by  another  standard 
than  his  own  pleasures  and  pains,  and  you  are  no 
longer  free  to  reject  the  possibility  of  an  objective 
synthesis.  If  the  relativity  of  man  to  man  makes 
it  imj^ossible  to  know  him  except  from  the  point  of 
view  of  humanity,  the  relativity  of  man  to  the 
world  makes  it  impossible  to  know  humanity  except 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  unity  of  the  whole. 
To  stop  short  at  the  universal  of  humanity  is  a 
mere  compromise,  which,  like  many  compromises,  is 
less  rational  than  either  of  the  extremes  between 
which  it  stands.  All  knowledge  implies  the  uni- 
versality of  •  thought,  i.e.,  it  implies  that  man,  as  a 
thinking  being,  can,  and  indeed  must,  apprehend 
the  world  from  a  subjective,  which  is  also  an 
objective  point,  of  view.  For  man's  consciousness 
of  himself  is  at  the  same  time  a  consciousness  of 
the  not-self,  and  of  the  unity  to  wliieli  both  these 
correlative  elements  belong.  From  the  dawning  of 
self- consciousness  he  is  thus  lifted  above  his  own 
separate   and  partial  existence    as    an    individual ;    hi- 


124.      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

lives   a   life   which   is   not   merely   his  own   life,   but 

the  life  of  the  world.     He  is,  and  can  become  more 

and  more  completely,  the  organ  of  that  universal  spirit 

which  transcends  and  includes  all  things,  which 

"Lives  through  all  life,  extends  to  all  extent, 
Spreads  undivided,  operates  unspent." 

It  is  this  that  makes  him  capable  of  science,  of 
morality,  and  of  religion ;  for  in  so  far  as  he  speaks 
his  own  words,  or  does  his  own  deeds,  or  thinks 
his  own  thoughts,  he  speaks  and  acts  and  thinks 
folly  and  evil  ;  and  it  is  only  in  so  far  as  he 
becomes  the  instrument  of  some  universal  power 
or  interest,  that  his  individual  action,  or  thought, 
or  utterance  can  have  any  dignity  or  value.  It 
shows  an  imperfect  apprehension  of  this  truth  to 
say  with  Comte  that  Humanity  and  not  God  is 
the  universal  power  in  whose  service  the  individual 
is  to  find  spiritual  freedom ;  and  that,  therefore,  the 
ultimate  synthesis  must  be  subjective  and  not  ob- 
jective. For  the  only  philosophical  difficulty  is  to 
conceive  how  man  can  transcend  his  individual 
subjectivity  at  all ;  and,  if  that-  is  shown  to  be  for 
him  possible,  and  even  necessary,  there  is  no  reason 
whatever  to  deny  that  he  can  and  must  rise  to  the 
knowledge  of  God,  the  absolute  or  objective  unity 
comte'8       of  the  world. 

changing 

reL-^ionof^        Comtc,  howcvcr,  is  hindered  from  recognizing  this 
man.'^^  °     truth  by  another  class  of  considerations.      In  opposi- 


A  BENEFICENT  NECESSITY.  125 

tion  to  that  external  optimistic  teleology,  which 
was  so  common  at  the  end  of  last  century,  and  at 
which  the  Encyclopedists  aimed  so  many  blows,  he 
was  led  in  his  Philosophic  Positive  to  dwell  upon 
the  fact  that,  from  the  point  of  view  of  human 
happiness,  the  arrangements  of  the  universe,  astro- 
nomical, physical,  and  biological,  are  anything  but 
perfect.  Poetry,  indeed,  may  be  allowed  to  imagine 
that  the  powers  of  nature  are  the  friends  of  man ; 
but  Science,  according  to  Conite,  must  recognize  that 
the  world  in  which  man's  lot  is  cast  is  far  from 
furnishing  the  best  conceivable  sphere  for  his  exist- 
ence and  development ;  and  that  it  has  only  become 
so  favourable  to  his  progress  as  it  at  present  is,  by 
the  long  "  providential  action  "  of  man  himself.  At 
this  point,  however,  there  is  a  crossing  of  opposite 
lines  of  thought  in  Comte's  philosophy.  For  it  is 
one  of  the  leading  conceptions  of  the  Politique  Posi- 
tive that  the  influence  of  an  external  limiting  fatality, 
which  forces  upon  man  the  surrender  of  his  natural 
self-will,  was  the  necessary  condition  of  the  develop- 
ment of  all  his  higher  powers  of  intelligence  and 
heart.  Comte  is  never  weary  of  showing  that  the 
growing  preponderance  of  the  altruistic  affections, 
which  alone  can  give  unity  to  human  life,  is  depend- 
ent upon  the  existence  of  those  limits  which  are 
put  upon  the  desires  of  man  by  the  external  world. 
"  Without     this    continual     ascendant,"    he     declares, 


126      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

"  mail's  feelings  would  Ijecome  vague,  his  intelligence 
wanton,  and  his  activity  sterile.  If  this  yoke  were 
taken  away,  the  problem  of  human  life  would 
remain  insoluble,  since  altruism  could  never  conquer 
egoism.  But  assisted  by  the  supreme  fatality,  uni- 
versal love  is  able  habitually  to  secure  that  person- 
ality should  be  subordinated  to  sociality.  The 
sophisms  of  human  pride  cannot  hinder  the  positive 
spirit  from  recognizing  that  all  revolt  springs  from 
egoistic  impulses.  A  forced  submission  tends  in- 
directly to  make  altruism  prevail  by  the  very  fact 
that  it  represses  egoiiLiu.  But  this  moral  reaction 
is  supremely  efficacious  when  obedience  becomes 
voluntary,  because  then  sympathy  is  directly  de- 
veloped, and  no  jarring  emotion  any  longer  hinders 
us  from  getting  the  benefit  of  our  subjection.'"^'' 
From  this  point  of  view  the  external  fatality  can 
no  longer  be  called  unfriendly,  or  even  indifferent 
to  man ;  rather,  its  immediate  appearance  as  his 
enemy  is  the  condition  of  its  being,  in  a  higher 
sense,  his  friend.  Kant,  in  his  short  treatise  on 
history  (with  which  Comte  was  acquainted,  and  which 
probably  had  no  little  influence  upon  the  Politique 
Positive),  applies  a  similar  thought  to  the  struggle 
and  competition  of  mankind  with  each  other.  The 
very   selfish   rivalry   of  men,  he   contends,  is   in   the 

*  Synthese   Subjective,    p.    16 ;    cf.   Pol.   Pos.   i.   p.    414  seq., 
and  above,  p.  30  seq. 


GOOD  OUT  OF  EVIL.  127 

long  run  the  means  of  developing  a  higher  sociality 
than  could  have  existed  among  a  race  of  beings 
with  whom  personal  feeling  was  at  first  less  intense. 
Egoism  itself  becomes  the  means  of  elevating  men 
above  egoism.  Thus  in  both  cases,  conditions  whicli, 
in  the  first  instance,  seemed  to  be  hostile  to  the 
intellectual,  and  still  more  to  the  moral,  development 
of  man,  become,  because  of  the  inner  reaction  which 
they  call  forth  in  his  nature,  the  best  means  to  that 
development.  "  Out  of  the  eater  comes  forth  meat  ; 
out  of  the  strong  sweetness."  On  such  a  view  it 
seems  a  fair  criticism  to  make  that  it  looks  very 
like  a  proof  that  those  things  which  seem  in  the 
first  instance  to  be  evils,  and  which,  indeed,  taken 
by  themselves,  mx  evils,  are  the  necessary,  though 
negative,  conditions  of  higher  good.  But  a  negative 
condition  is  still  a  condition,  and  the  gods  are  not 
envious  because  they  refuse  man  a  lower  good  in 
order  to  make  him  seek  one  which  is  higher.  No 
conclusion  unfavourable  to  Optimism,  in  any  high 
sense  of  the  word,  can  be  founded  on  the  fact  that 
the  world  is  not  arranged  for  the  immediate  happi- 
ness of  man,  if  that  immediate  happiness  would 
have  been  purchased  by  his  moral  degradation ;  or 
even  if  it  would  have  been  less  powerful  to  call 
forth  the  higher  energies  of  his  nature.  If  the 
noblest  love  is  a  transmuted  and  transcended  egoism, 
then   even   an    infinite    benevolence    would    not    seek 


128      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

directly  to  stop  the  unlovely  and  selfish  struggle 
whicli  darkens  and  poisons  the  life  of  man  on  earth. 
The  best  kind  of  optimism — the  optimism,  if  we 
may  so  term  it,  of  the  deepest  and  tenderest  spirits 
who  have  called  themselves  Christian — has  not  been 
based  upon  a  shallow  and  imperfect  view  of  the 
misery,  still  less  of  the  moral  evil,  of  man's  life. 
Eather  it  has  been  attained  through  the  clearest 
perception  of  l)oth.  It  lias  been  an  Optimism  that 
"  descended  into  the  grave "  of  human  happiness, 
and  even,  if  we  miglit  so  interpret  the  creed  of 
Christendom,  into  the  "  hell "  of  human  guilt,  that 
it  might  rise  again  "  leading  captivity  captive."  * 
And  Comte,  who  in  his  primary  opposition  to  theology 
and  metaphysics,  had  rejected  all  absolute  or  theo- 
logical conceptions  of  the  world,  is  led  by  the 
natural  development  of  his  thought  to  find  a  higher 
design  in  the  immediate  negation  of  design,  and  to 
extend  to  the  universe  that  idea  of  unity  which  in 
the  first  instance  he  had  applied  only  to  humanity. 
But,  as  he  could  never  quite  forget  the  negations 
with  which  he  had  started,  his  recognition  of  this 
unity  was  imperfect,  and  he  was  ultimately  forced 
to  cast  upon  poetry  the  office  for  which  science 
seemed  to  be  inadequate, 
tionaiityof  ^^^  truth  to  whicli  these  inconsistencies  of  Comte 
criticisu^*^  point  is,  that  all  criticism  of  the  whole  system  of 
*  Cf.  Von  Hartmann's  Selhst-zersetzung  des  Christenthums. 


OPTIMISM  RATIONAL-IN  WHAT  SENSE?  129 

things  to  which  we  belong  is,  from  a  truly  "  relative  " 
point  of  view,  irrational.  For  the  critic,  and  the 
standard  by  which  he  criticizes,  cannot  be  separated 
from  that  system.  To  criticize  things  as  particulars 
is  not  unreasonable,  because  we  can  test  the  parti- 
culars by  the  universal  ;  but  to  criticize  the  general 
'sy.stem  of  which  they  and  we  are  parts,  and  by 
which  our  development — and  of  course  among  other 
things,  the  development  of  our  moral  standard — is 
made  possible,  is  to  stand  on  our  own  heads  and  to 
leap  off  our  own  shadow.  If,  indeed,  we  could  assifme 
an  individualistic  point  of  view,  if  we  could  isolate 
ourselves  at  once  from  the  world  which  is  our  only 
sphere  of  activity,  and  from  the  social  life  of  the 
race  which  is  the  source  of  all  our  culture,  we 
might  then  take  the  pleasures  and  pains,  tlie  feelings 
that  belong  to  us  as  sensitive  individuals,  as  a 
standard  by  which  to  criticize  the  world.  But  in 
any  other  point  of  view,  criticism  is  possible  only 
as  a  reference  of  the  individual  to  the  universal,  of 
the  part  to  the  whole,  of  the  various  elements  and 
phases  of  the  system  of  things  to  the  idea,  which 
forms  the  unity  of  that  system  and  the  principle  of 
its  development.  It  has  often  been  pointed  out  that 
a  logical  scepticism  cannot  be  universal,  for  every 
intelligible  view  of  things  implies  an  ultimate  unity 
of  thought  and  of  existence,  of  the  e&se  anil  the 
intelligi.      Doubt   must   rest   on   a   basis    of    certitude. 


130      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

or    it    will    destroy   itself.      But  it   is   not  less   true, 
though  it  is  less  frequently  noticed,  that  all  criticism 
of  the  world,  while  it  detects  evil  in  particular,  im- 
plies  an   ultimate   optimism.     Tor,   if  such   criticism 
pretends  to  be  more  than  the  utterance  of  the  tastes 
and  wishes  of    an  individual,   it   must   claim    to    be 
the  expression  of  an  objective  principle — a   principle 
which,  in  spite  of  all  appearances  to  the  contrary,  is 
realizing    itself   in    the    world.       If,    as    Hegel    said, 
the   "  history   of  the  world   is   the  judgment   of   the 
world,"  then,  conversely,  every  true  moral  judgment 
is   an   anticipation   of  history :   it   is   a   discovery   of 
the  hidden  forces  that  are  already  working  out  their 
triumph  in  the  world,  even  by  means  of  that  which 
seems    most    to    oppose    them :     it    is    a    prophetic 
sympathy    with   the   "  spirit  of  the   years    to    come," 
which  is   "yearning  to  mix  itself  with   life."      It  is 
this  objective  character  which  often  makes  the  words 
of  genius   carry  with   them  such  weight  and  power. 
"  He  spake  as  one  having  authority  and  not  as  the 
scribes,"    could    be    truly    said    only    of    one,    whose 
.speech  was  like  some  natural  force  in  its  independence 
of   merely    individual    and    of   temporary    influences. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  is  the  limited  and  subjective 
character  of  many  of  the  ordinary  moral  judgments 
of   men — of   much    of    their    fault-finding    with    the 
conditions   of   existence,   the   defects   of  their   neigh- 
bours, and  the  errors  and  evils  of  the  time — which 


SUBJECTIVE  CRITICISM  OF  LIFE.  131 

makes  us  treat  such  judgments  with  iiidiilcreuce. 
We  feel  that  they  are  in  great  part  the  expression 
of  personal  likes  and  dislikes,  though  clothing  them- 
selves in  the  lion's  skin  of  a  moral  censorship ; 
and  that  the  only  answer  which  they  deserve  is, 
that  "  there  is  no  disputing  about  tastes."  Much 
of  the  superficial  pessimism  of  our  day  is  the 
offspring,  not  of  deep  sympathy  with  the  real  evils 
of  humanity,  but  of  a  weakness  of  moral  fibre,  which 
might  tempt  us  to  cut  the  knot  of  difficulty  with 
the  apparently  unfeeling  words  of  St.  Paul,  "  Shall 
the  thing  formed  say  to  him  who  has  formed  it, 
Why  hast  thou  made  me  thus  ? "  But  there  is 
another  moral  judgment  than  this,  which  is  not 
the  mere  expression  of  the  tastes  and  wishes  of 
individuals,  but  of  the  inner  law  and  the  necessity 
of  things;  or,  in  other  words,  of  the  universal  spirit 
of  man,  which  in  the  long  struggle  of  development 
is  becoming  more  and  more  clearly  conscious  of 
itself  and  of  the  law  of  the  world.  It  is  only  as 
the  organ  of  this  spirit  that  the  individual  can 
claim  to  "  judge  the  world  " ;  nor  can  he  make  that 
claim  without  taking  up  the  ground  of  a  philo- 
sophical optimism,  and  acknowledging  that  the  "  soul 
of  the  world  is  just."  For  the  sentiment  or  idea 
of  good  implied  in  such  judgment,  must  either  l»e 
the  last  result  of  the  development  of  man  in  the 
world — in    which    case    the    system    of    things    that 


132      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

conditioned  the  result  cannot  be  criticized  by  it : 
or  it  must  be  the  pure  utterance  of  individual 
feeling,  in  which  case  it  has  no  objective  value 
whatever.  To  suppose  with  Comte  that  it  is 
ohjcdive,  as  being  something  which  belongs  not  to 
the  individual  but  to  the  race,  yet  subjective,  as 
being  something  that  belongs  to  human  nature  and 
not  to  the  nature  of  things  in  general,  is  a  hopeless 
attempt  to  combine  in  one  two  inconsistent  points 
of  view — the  point  of  view  of  the  philosophy  of 
Locke,  by  which  the  individual  consciousness  is 
conceived  as  confined  to  the  apprehension  of  its 
own  states,  and  the  point  of  view  of  modern  idealism, 
according  to  which  the  consciousness  of  the  thinking 
subject,  as  such,  is  universal  and  objective. 
coSws'^^''^  At  this  point  it  may  be  useful  to  look  back 
tencfeT  and  to  sum  up  the  various  contradictions,  or  let 
us  rather  say,  the  various  forms  of  the  same  con- 
tradiction, which  aj)pear  and  reappear  in  different 
parts  of  the  system  of  Comte.  Beginning  with 
the  rejection  of  metaphysics,  because  it  treats  uni- 
versals  as  real  entities,  and  with  the  individualistic 
definition  of  science  as  having  to  determine  only 
the  successions  and  resemblances  of  phenomena, 
Comte  soon  has  to  point  out  that  in  sociology  and 
even  in  biology  we  have  to  deal  with  existences 
whose  parts  and  successive  phases  are  indefinable, 
except    in    and    through    the    whole    to    which    they 


OBJECTIVE  CRITICISM  OF  LIFE.  133 

belong.  Beginning  with  objective  science,  and  tlius 
unconsciously  assuming  that  the  subjectivity  of 
thought  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  knowledge  of 
objects  as  such,  he  ends  by  asserting  that  only  a 
"  subjective  synthesis "  is  possible.  Yet  this  sub- 
jective synthesis  is  itself  objective,  for  its  point 
of  view  is  determined,  not  by  the  sensations  and 
feelings  of  the  individual  subject  as  such,  Init  by 
the  idea  of  humanity  as  a  corporate  unity.  Thus 
the  opposition  between  subject  and  object  reduces 
itself  to  a  dualism  between  the  world  and  man. 
Hence,  in  place  of  the  worship  of  God,  the  absolute 
unity  to  which  all  thought  and  existence  are  referred, 
Comte  would  substitute  the  worship  of  Humanity, 
"  the  real  author  of  the  benefits  for  which  thanks 
were  formerly  given  to  God."  Finally,  even  this 
dualistic  view  of  the  world  is  practically  withdrawn. 
For  the  negative  relation  of  the  external  fatality 
to  man's  immediate  wishes,  is  proved  to  be  instru- 
mental to  his  ultimate  attainment  of  a  still  higher 
good.  And — as  if  this  were  not  enough — poetry  is 
called  in  to  give  completeness  to  the  synthetic  view 
of  the  world,  and  to  reconcile  the  two  independent 
sentiments  which  must  combine  in  order  to  produce 
a  religion,  submission  and  love.  For,  although 
Comte  at  first  thinks  it  sufficient  to  say  that  the 
necessity  of  nature  is  mediated  to  us  by  Humanity, 
yet    in    the    end    he    feels    that    there    will    be    an 


-<; 


134      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

essential  imperfection  in  his  religious  system,  if  it 
cannot  identify  the  ultimate  fatality  to  which  we 
must  submit  with  the  Great  Being  whom  we  are 
to  love  and  serve.  On  this  point  a  few  additional 
remarks  may  be  useful. 
Defects  of         Comte    defines    religion    (and   we    cannot   but   ac- 

Conito'sreli- 

fn°'tohT/'^'  knowledge  the  substantial  truth  of  the  definition) 
ovmidea  ^^  ^^^  Concentration  of  the  three  altruistic  affections 
— of  Eeverence  towards  that  which  is  above  us, 
Love  towards  that  which  helps  and  sustains  us, 
and  Benevolence  towards  that  which  needs  our  aid. 
It  is  impossible  to  give  the  highest  unity  to  the 
inward  and  outward  life  of  man,  except  by  devotion 
to  a  Being  in  relation  to  whom  these  three  affections 
are  identified.  Nor  can  it  be  denied  that  a  faith 
which  has  more  or  less  perfectly  fulfilled  these 
conditions,  has  been  the  mainspring  of  human  life 
in  all  those  periods  of  history  in  which  man  has 
shown  the  highest  powers  of  his  spirit.  "  The  deepest, 
nay,  the  one  theme  of  the  world's  history,"  says 
Goethe,  "  to  which  all  others  are  subordinate,  is 
the  conflict  of  faith  and  unbelief.  The  epochs  in 
which  faith,  in  whatever  form  it  may  be,  prevails, 
are  the  marked  epochs  of  human  history,  full  of 
heart-stirring  memories,  and  of  substantial  gains 
for  all  after-times.  On  the  other  hand,  the  epochs 
in  which  unbelief,  in  whatever  form  it  may  be, 
gains    its    unhappy    victories,     even    when    for    the 


THE  RELIGION  OF  HUMANITY.  135 

moment  they  put  on  a  semblance  of  glory  and 
success,  inevitably  sink  into  insignificance  in  the 
eyes  of  a  posterity  which  will  not  waste  its  thoughts 
on  things  barren  and  unfruitful."  The  tenderest 
harmonies  of  affection,  the  highest  achievements  of 
passionate  energy,  the  deepest  glances  of  insight 
into  men  and  things,  the  greatest  powers  of  inspired 
utterance,  cannot  be  reached  except  by  minds 
which  are  consciously  at  one  with  themselves  and 
with  the  law  of  the  universe ;  and  this  oneness  is 
what  we  call  a  religion.  Man  can  do  his  best 
work  only  when  he  feels  that  he  is  the  organ 
or  instrument  of  a  power  or  spirit  which  is  uni- 
versal, and  therefore  irresistible ;  which  embraces 
and  subordinates  even  that  which  seems  to  resist  it. 
Whether  such  a  faith  in  its  widest  sense  is  still 
possible  to  man,  or  whether  Christianity  is  the  last 
vanishing  form  of  it,  and  we  have  now  to  look  about 
for  such  substitute  for  it  as  may  still  be  within  our 
reach,  may  be  a  question.  But  it  can  scarcely  be 
questioned,  that  the  Comtist  worship  of  Humanity 
is  only  such  a  substitute,  and  not  the  thing  itself. 
Eeligion,  as  Comte  himself  maintains,  implies  a  com- 
bination of  spontaneity  in  the  worshipper  with 
complete  submission  and  self-surrender  to  the  higher 
power  that  controls  his  life — a  combination  which 
can  be  attained  only  by  one  who  loves  the  power 
to  which   he  submits.     But   man's  life  is   ultimately 


136      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

limited  and  determined  by  cosmical  and  physical 
conditions,  and  in  these  Comte  sees  only  a  fatality 
which  cannot  possibly  be  made  the  object  of  love. 
This  difficulty,  as  we  have  seen,  he  tries  to  escape 
by  showing  that  the  ultimate  fatality  is  mediated  to 
us  by  Humanity,  which,  in  the  long  process  of  its 
history,  has  been  gradually  adapting  the  sphere  of 
our  existence  to  our  physical  and  moral  necessities. 
He  feels,  however,  that  this  is  only  a  partial  answer, 
and  that  the  idea  of  an  indifferent  outward  necessity 
must  be  a  hindrance  to  the  perfect  combination  of 
submission  and  love.  Hence  he  calls  in  the  aid  of 
poetry  to  revive  the  spirit  of  Fetichism,  and  to 
reanimate  the  dead  world  by  the  image  of  benevolent 
divine  agencies.  "  The  Cultus  of  Space  and  of  the 
Earth,  completing  that  of  Humanity,  makes  us  see 
in  all  that  surrounds  us  the  free  auxiliaries  of 
Humanity."  Comte  therefore  ends  in  what  some 
one  has  called  the  system  of  "  spiritual  book-keeping 
by  double  entry,"  in  which  imagination  is  allowed 
to  revive,  for  practical  purposes,  the  fictions  which 
science  has  destroyed.  In  this  way  poetry  has  not 
merely  to  give  sensuous  form  and  life  to  our  creed, 
by  enabling  us  to  see  in  the  part  what  reason  could 
otherwise  find  only  in  the  whole ;  it  has  also  to 
supply  the  defects  of  a  truth  which  is  too  hard  and 
painful  to  satisfy  the  heart  of  man.  It  has  to  make 
us  forget  in  our  worship  the  dualism  of  Nature  and 


AN  ARTIFICIAL  RELIGION.  137 

Humanity,  and  to  reconcile  us  to  Fate  by  givin,L(  it 
the  semblance  of  a  Providence.  It  is  obvious  that 
poetry  is  thus  made  into  a  kind  of  deliberate  super- 
stition, which  stimulates  the  outflow  of  religious 
feeling  by  hiding  from  us,  for  the  moment,  the 
realities  of  our  position.  But  the  explanation  is  that 
Comte  was  driven  by  the  ultimate  development  of 
his  own  thought  to  seek  for  a  kind  of  unity  in  the 
universe,  which  yet  he  could  not  admit  without 
recognizing  the  error  of  his  original  presuppositions. 
There  is  a  certain  irony  of  fate  in  the  process  of 
unconscious  dialectic,  by  which  Comte,  the  enemy  of 
theology,  was  led  to  set  up  that  strange  "  Trinity  in 
Unity,"  which  is  the  last  word  of  Positivism. 

In  Comte's  re-construction  of  religion  there  seems  ^{,^^^i"^ter*"^ 
to  be  something  artificial  and  factitious,  something 
"  subjective,"  in  the  worst  sense.  It  is  a  religion 
made,  so  to  speak,  out  of  malice  prepense.  "  We 
have  derived,"  he  seems  to  say,  "  from  the  experience 
of  our  own  past  and  of  the  past  of  humanity,  a  clear 
idea  of  what  a  religion  should  be  :  and  we  also 
know  from  the  same  experience  that,  without  a 
religion,  we  cannot  have  that  fulness  of  spiritual  life 
of  which  we  are  capable.  Go  to,  let  us  make  a 
religion,  as  nearly  corresponding  to  the  definition  of 
religion  as  modern  science  will  permit.  '  Gather  up 
the  fragments  that  remain,  that  nothing  be  lost.' 
God,    the    Absolute    Being,    is    hidden    from    us,   but 


138      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

Humanity  will  serve  for  a  '  relative '  or  '  subjective ' 
kind  of  God :  or  rather  not  Humanity,  but  the 
selected  members  of  the  race,  whose  services  entitle 
them  to  our  recognition,  and  whom  therefore  we,  in- 
corporate in  the  '  Great  Being.'  And  as  for  the 
inscrutable  fatality  that  bounds  all  our  views,  and 
on  which  in  the  last  resort  the  fate  of  humanity 
must  depend,  to  it  we  can  but  submit;  or  (since 
such  a  separation  of  submission  from  love  is  so  far 
irreligious)  we  can  invoke  the  powers  of  imagination 
to  hide  it  from  our  eyes.  To  Humanity,  as  repre- 
sented to  us  by  the  good  and  wise  of  the  past,  we 
can  present  the  old  offerings  of  praise  and  prayer, 
in  a  spirit  that  is  perfectly  disinterested  ;  for  we 
have  no  reason  to  believe  that  tliey  exist  except  in 
our  memory  of  them,  or  that  the  '  Great  Being,'  in 
whom  they  are  incorporated,  has  any  gift  to  bestow 
upon  us  in  the  future  except  a  similar  life  in  the 
memory  of  others.  For,  after  all,  the  '  Great  Being,' 
who  alone  makes  things  work  together  for  our  good 
and  whom  alone  we  can  love,  is  not  absolute  or  objec- 
tive ;  and  of  the  real  Absolute  Being  or  Principle  of 
the  Universe,  we  know  nothing,  except  perhaps  that 
He  or  It  is  not  what  men  call  good." 
^ifkm^il  ^-"^  ^^^  earlier  part  of  this  chapter  I  have  tried 
no  religion.  ^^  show  that  Comtc's  vicw  of  the  limits  of  knowledcre 
cannot  be  maintained  except  on  principles  which 
would   be  fatal  to    the   existence   of  knowledoe  alto- 


RELIGION  MUST  BE  ABSOLUTE.  139 

gether;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  tliat  the  possibility 
of  a  subjective  synthesis,  such  as  he  demands  and 
supposes  himself  to  have  achieved,  would  involve 
also  the  possibility  of  an  objective  or  absolute 
synthesis.  Here  I  wish  only  to  point  out,  that  if 
Comte's  general  view  of  things  be  admitted,  religion, 
according  to  his  own  definition  of  it,  is  impossible. 
A  "  relative "  religion  is  not  a  religion  at  all :  it  is 
at  best  a  morality,  trying  to  gather  to  itself  some 
of  the  emotions  which  were  formerly  connected  with 
religious  belief.  If  there  is  no  warrant  for  the 
Christian  faith  which  finds  God  in  man,  and  man 
in  God,  which  makes  us  regard  the  Absolute  Being 
as  finding  his  best  name  and  definition  in  what  we 
most  reverence  and  love ;  or,  what  is  the  same  thing 
from  the  other  side,  makes  us  see  in  that  growing 
idea  of  moral  perfection,  which  is  the  highest  result 
of  human  development,  the  interpretation  or  revela- 
tion of  the  Absolute ;  then  we  must  give  up  the 
hope  of  a  revival  of  religion,  and  of  that  har- 
monious energy  to  which  religion  alone  can  awake 
the  soul  of  man.  In  this  point  of  view  Mr.  Spencer 
and  Comte  seem  to  divide  the  elements  of  the  truth 
between  them.  Mr.  Spencer,  regarding  the  Absolute  L 
as  unknowable,  and  perceiving  that  religion  implies 
a  relation  to  the  Absolute,  reduces  religion  to  the 
bare  feelings  of  awe  and  mystery.  Comte,  also 
regarding  the  Absolute  as  unknowable,  seeks  to  find 


140       THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

an  object  nearer  home  for  the  emotions  that  hitherto 
have  been  directed  to  God.  But  the  religion  of  Mr. 
Spencer,  if  it  ever  could  become  a  reality,  would  be 
a  renewal  of  the  superstitious  pantheism  of  India, 
the  worship  of  a  power  without  moral  or  spiritual 
attributes.  And  the  religion  of  Comte  could  scarcely 
become  more  than  a  pious  aspiration,  unless  the 
poetic  license  of  worship  were  carried  to  the  point 
of  self-deception.  Of  this  Comte  seems  to  be  par- 
tially aware,  when  in  his  latest  works  he  insists  so 
strenuously  on  the  theme  that  art,  rather  than  science, 
is  the  true  field  for  man's  intelligence;  and  that  it 
is  a  desirable  and  useful  thing  to  allow  our  minds 
to  dwell  on  ideal  conceptions,  which  are  beyond  the 
reach  of  scientific  proof,  provided  these  conceptions  are 
favourable  to  the  development  of  altruistic  senti- 
ment. "  The  logic  of  religion,"  he  declares,  "  when 
freed  from  scientific  empiricism,  will  not  restrain 
itself  any  longer  to  the  domain  of  hypotheses  which 
are  capable  of  verification,  though  these  alone  were 
compatible  with  the  Positive  preparation  for  it. 
It  must  in  the  end  find  its  completion  in  the  domain, 
much  wider  and  not  less  legitimate,  of  those  con- 
ceptions which,  without  offending  the  reason,  are 
peculiarly  suited  to  develop  the  feelings.  Better 
adapted  to  our  moral  wants,  the  institutions  of  true 
Poetry  are  as  harmonious  as  those  of  sound  Philo- 
sophy with  the  intellectual  conditions  of  the  relative 


POETRY  AND   TRUTH.  141 

synthesis.  They  ought  therefore  to  obtain  as  great 
extension  and  intluence  in  our  efforts  to  systematize 
our  thoughts  ;  and  Positivism  permits  of  their  doing 
so  without  any  danger  of  confusion  between  the 
two  distinct  methods  of  thinking,  which  it  openl}' 
consecrates,  the  one  to  reality  and  the  other  to 
ideality."  ■^'"  Is  it  possible  to  express  more  clearly  a 
desire  to  combine  the  advantages  of  believing,  with 
the  advantages  of  disbelieving,  in  the  accordance  of 
objective  reality  with  our  highest  feelings  and 
aspirations  ?  But  a  worship  of  fictions,  confessed 
as  such,  is  impossible.  Art,  indeed,  is  kindred  with 
Eeligion ;  and  Art,  as  Plato  said,  is  "  a  noble  untruth." 
This,  however,  means  only  that  Art  is  untrue  to  the 
immediate  appearances  of  things,  in  order  that  it 
may  suggest  the  deeper  reality  that  underlies  them. 
But,rTn  Comte's  view,  the  service  of  imagination  isj/ 
to  supply  wants  of  the  heart,  which  cannot  be 
supplied  by  reality,  either  in  its  superficial  or  in 
its  deeper  aspect ;  it  is  to  nurture  our  moral  nature 
on  conceptions  that  are  purely  fictitious.  It  is  not 
difficult  to  prophesy  that  the  schism  of  the  head 
and  the  heart  thus  introduced  must  end  in  the 
sacrifice  either  of  the  one  or  of  the  other ;  either 
in  the  dogmatic  assertion  of  the  optimism  of  poetry, 
or  in  a  violent  recoil  from  it,  which  will  separate, 
not  only  man  from  the  world,  but  also  the  individual 
*  Synthase  Subjective,  p.  40. 


142      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

I'ruiu  the  race ;  and  which  must  ultimately  reduce 
Humanity  from  an  object  of  worship  into  a  subjective 
moral  ideal.  For  religion,  as  Comte  himself  rightly 
saw,  cannot  exist  except  where  thought  and  feeling, 
intelligence  and  heart,  are  harmonized  in  a  con- 
sciousness of  the  highest  siibjcctive  ideal,  as  being  at 
the  same  time  the  ultimate  objective  reality.  What, 
indeed,  is  the  use  of  religion,  if  it  does  not  plant 
our  feet  upon  the  "  IJock  of  Ages,"  but  leaves 
us  still  on  the  "  sandbank  "  of  the  contingent 
and  the  temporal  ?  \__  "  All  the  nations,"  says  Hegel, 
"  have  felt  that  the  religious  consciousness  was  that 
in  which  they  possessed  truth,  and  it  is  for  this 
reason  that  they  have  ever  regarded  it  as  that 
which  gives  dignity  and  consecrated  joy  to  their 
lives.  All  that  awakes  doubt  and  anguish,  all  sorrow 
and  care,  all  the  limited  interests  of  finitude,  the 
religious  spirit  leaves  behind  on  the  sandbank  of 
time.  And  as,  on  the  highest  top  of  a  mountain, 
removed  from  definite  view  of  the  earth  below,  we 
peacefully  overlook  all  the  limitations  of  the  landscape, 
so  to  the  spiritual  eye  of  man  in  this  pure  region, 
the  hardness  of  immediate  reality  dissolves  into  a 
semblance,  and  all  the  divisions,  the  crude  lights 
and  shadows  of  the  world  are  softened  to  eternal 
peace  by  the  beams  of  the  spiritual  sun."-  ,  If  we 
cannot  any  longer  have  this  consciousness  of  things 
sub    specie   ceternitatis,  —  in    that    highest    truth    and 


\ 


MILL  AND  LITTRE.  143 

unity  in  which  all  (lillieulties  and  clissoiianccs  an'  lost^ 
— without  self-deception,  it  would  be  l)etter  lor  us 
to  forswear  it  altogether  than  to  connect  our  highest 
feelings  with  a  poetic  illusion. 

It  is  a  natural  question   to  ask  whether  and   how  ^^'''T" *!' 

'-  the  school 

far  the  history  of  Comte's  philosophy  illustrates  any  "^*^"'"*''" 
of  the  difficulties  and  contradictious  which  we  have 
found  in  the  writings  of  its  author.  The  first 
schism  in  the  ranks  of  those  who  are  commonly 
called  Positivists  was  that  which  is  connected  in 
France  with  the  name  of  Littre,  perhaps  the  most 
distinguished  of  Comte's  disciples  ;  and  in  England, 
with  the  names  of  Mill  and  Lewes — who,  however, 
were  never,  strictly  speaking,  his  disciples  at  all. 
These  writers  broke  away  from  Comte,  whenever 
Comte  decidedly  broke  away  from  the  individual- 
istic philosophy  of  the  last  century.  In  their 
eyes  Comte's  great  achievements  were  the  law 
of  the  three  stages  of  mental  development  ami  the 
arrangement  of  the  sciences ;  and  if  they  accepted 
his  sociological  speculations — even  those  which  appear 
in  his  first  great  work — it  was  with  many  reserves. 
Mill  regards  Comte's  continual  denunciation  of 
metaphysics  as  objectionable,  so  soon  as  he  finds  it 
to  be  directed  against  the  individualists*  as  well  as 
against  the  scholastic  realists ;  and  he  thinks  Comte's 
"  inordinate  demand  for  unity  and  systematization  " 
*  Mill's  Comte  and  Positivism,  jj.  73. 


144      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

only  an  instance  of  "  an  original  mental  twist  very 
connnon  in  French  writers,  and  by  which  Comte 
was  distinguished  above  them  all."  *  Littre  finds 
little  to  object  to  in  Comte's  first  great  work,  and 
is  not  unwilling  to  admit  that  the  "  individual  man 
is  an  abstraction,  and  that  there  is  nothing  real  but 
humanity;"  but  he  recoils  when  Comte  begins  to 
speak  of  the  "  Great  Being,"  and  to  change  his 
philosophy  into  a  religion.  Both  attack  the  "  sub- 
jective synthesis "  as  a  new  variety  of  metaphysics, 
seeing  clearly  that,  as  Comte  states  it,  it  involves  a 
desertion  of  the  point  of  view  of  science ;  and 
neither  of  them  is  able  to  admit  any  other  point 
of  view  from  which  the  subjective  unity  might 
itself  be  seen  to  be  objective. 
Mr.  Con-  ^   jess    important    schism    has    recently  t  occurred 

greve  and  ^  '' 

M.  Lafitte.  ^yj^^jj^j^  \\^q  Positivist  Church,  or,  in  other  words, 
among  those  who  accept  the  system  of  Comte  in 
its  entirety,  as  a  religion  no  less  than  as  a  philo- 
sophy. Mr.  Congreve,  and  those  who  think  with 
him,  have  broken  away  from  the  general  body  of 
Positivists  under  M.  Lafitte,  who  was  appointed  to 
be  its  head,  or,  at  least,  its  provisional  head,  after 
the  death  of  Comte.  The  difference,  however,  is 
one  only  of  policy,  and  not  of  principle.  "  There 
exists  no  difference,"  says  Mr.  Congreve,  "  in  regard 
to  the  doctrine,  taken  as  a  whole  ;  it  is  only  as  to 
*  Id.  p.  140.  t  Written  in  1879. 


METHODS  OF  RELIGIOUS  TEACHING.      145 

the  manner  of  presenting  that  wliole  tliat  we  are 
at  variance."  At  the  same  time  this  "  schism," 
thougli,  as  M.  Lafitte  says,  it  is  not  a  "  heresy," 
might  easily  lead  to  one,  if  there  be  any  truth  in 
what  has  been  said  above  as  to  the  ultimate 
opposition  of  poetry  and  philosophy  in  the  system 
of  Comte.  '  M.  Lafitte  contends  tliat  the  Positivist  i, 
priesthood  should,  in  the  first  instance  at  least, 
seek  to  address  the  heart  through  the  intelligence  ; 
"  for  it  is  clear  that  their  direct  sentimental  (or 
moral)  action  would  want  a  basis,  and  could  indeed 
have  no  serious  result,  unless  general  opinion  had 
previously  been  modified  to  a  certain  degree  by 
Positive  teaching."  On  the  other  hand,  Mr.  Congreve 
argues  that  Positivism  must  triumph  in  the  first 
instance,  like  Christianity,  by  a  direct  "  appeal  to 
the  women  and  the  proletaries " ;  which  means  that 
an  effort  must  be  made  to  influence  "  the  heart," 
without  waiting  for  the  intelligence ;  and  that,  in 
the  words  of  Comte  himself,  the  "  weapon  of  per- 
suasion is  to  be  used  in  preference  to  that  of  ( 
conviction^ ,  "  What  we  seek  to  constitute,"  says 
Mr.  Congreve,*  "is  a  union  of  the  faithful,  a 
Church  in  the  highest  sense  of  the  term,  i.e.,  a 
society  in  which  the  religious  element  will  pre- 
ponderate ;  will,  indeed,  be   so  decisively  and   boldly 

*I  translate  from  the  French,  as  I  have  not  seen  the  English 
edition  of  Mr.  Congreve's  circular. 

K 


146      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

emphasized,  as  to  leave  no  doubt  of  our  intentions; 
a  society  which  can  rally  to  itself  all  who  feel  the 
need  of  shelter  or  support,  of  the  consolation  of  an 
active  and  sympathetic  faith.  It  is  thus  that  we 
conceive  ourselves  bound  to  commence  the  preaching 
of  Humanity  as  a  principle  of  union,  with  the 
view  of  gathering  together  a  solid  body,  made  up 
mainly  of  the  women  and  the  populace,  which  may 
serve  as  a  foundation  for  the  rest.  In  this  body 
the  order  of  instructors  could  find  their  support 
(and  by  an  order  of  instructors  I  mean  naturally  a 
priesthood  and  priests,  and  not,  what  seems  to  be 
offered  in  its  place,  professors  and  a  professoriate) ; 
as,  on  the  other  hand,  without  the  stimulating 
reaction  of  such  an  audience,  they  would  want  a 
solid  basis  as  well  as  a  sphere  of  activity."  It 
would  be  an  impertinence  for  any  one  who  is  not 
a  member  of  the  Positivist  Church  to  say  anything 
on  the  personal  or  semi-private  questions,  which 
are  necessarily  involved  in  such  a  division  as  this 
between  those  who  are  otherwise  united.  But  there 
can  be  no  intrusion  in  saying  that,  if  Positivism  is 
ever  to  become  an  effective  Church,  it  must  find 
some  such  direct  way  of  addressing  the  people  as 
Mr.  Congreve  suggests,  without  waiting  for  those  who 
have  time  to  be  instructed  in  the  principles  of  the 
six  or  seven  sciences  of  the  Positivist  system ;  and 
Mr.  Dix  Hutton  has  sufficiently   shown    that   Comte 


THE  HEART  AND  THE  HEAD.  147 

himself  would  have  approved  of  such  a  policy.'"' 
"  God  hath  chosen  the  weak  things  of  the  world 
to  confound  the  mighty ; "  and  it  may  be  safely 
said  that  no  great  moral  or  spiritual  movement 
will  ever  be  accomplished,  if  its  leaders  wait  till 
they  have  convinced  the  mass  of  the  educated 
classes.  The  only  question  which  suggests  itself  to 
one  who  has  considered  the  difticulties  of  the 
"  subjective  synthesis  "  is,  whether  the  appeal  made 
to  the  heart  would  not  necessarily  contain  elements 
which  afterwards  it  would  be  impossible  to  justify 
to  the  head.  For  if  it  were  so,  "  the  old  quarrel  of 
the  poets  and  the  philosophers,"  of  faith  and  reason, 
would  repeat  itself  again  in  the  Positivist  Church ; 
and  it  would  not  be  less  bitter  from  the  fact 
that  that  Church  was  founded  expressly  with  the 
design  of  putting  an  end  to  the  quarrel  alto- 
gether. 

Can  there  be  a  division  of  the  intelligence  against  Tiie  heart 

"  °  and  the 

the  heart,  which  is  not  more   properly   described  as  ^^^"^ 
division  of  the  intelligence  against  itself  ?     This  is  a 
question  which  is  inevitably  suggested   by  the  whole 
tenor  of  Comte's  later  works.      In  my  final  chapter 
I  shall  say  something  upon  this  question,  and  shall 

*  I  have  to  offer  to  Mr.  Dix  Hutton  my  best  thanks  for  liis 
courtesy  in  furnisliing  me  with  copies  of  the  circulars  and 
letters  of  himself,  of  Mr.  Cougreve,  and  of  M.  Lafitte,  on 
the  subject  of  the  division  among  the  Positivists. 


148      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

then  try  to  show  how  Comte's  defective  answer  to 
it  naturally  led  to  other  defects  in  his  view  of 
the  history  of  the  past,  especially  of  Christianity, 
and  also  in  his  view  of  the  social  ideal  of  the 
future. 


149 


CHAPTER  IV. 

comte's  view  of  the  relation  of  the  intellect  to 

THE     heart its     EFFECT     ON     HIS      CONCEPTION     OF 

HISTORY    AND    OF    THE    SOCIAL    IDEAL. 

The  necessity  for  unity  in  man's  intellectual  and  moral  life — 
Nature  of  the  conflict  between  the  intelligence  and  the  heart — 
It  is  really  a  conflict  of  intelligence  with  itself — Criticism  of 
Comte's  doctrine  that  the  intelligence  must  be  subjected  to  the 
heart — Its  effect  upon  his  conception  of  history,  especially  of 
the  history  of  Christianity — The  ttoo  elements  in  Christianity, 
their  conflict  and  reconciliation  in  its  development — The  nega- 
tive tendencies  of  mediceval  Catholicism  and  the  positive  tend- 
encies of  the  modern  era — Comte's  imperfect  conception  of  the 
Reformation  and  the  Revolution — Ris  restoration  of  the 
mediceval  ideal — His  general  position  as  a  Philosopher. 

In  the  last  chapter  I  considered  the  subjective 
synthesis  of  Comte,  or,  in  other  words,  his  attempt 
to  systematize  human  knowledge  in  relation  to  the 
moral  life  of  man.  For  it  is  his  view,  as  we  have 
seen,  that  science  can  never  yield  its  highest  fruit 
to  man  unless  it  be  systematized — i.e.,  unless  its 
different    parts    be    connected    together    and    put    in 


150      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

their  true  place  as  parts  of  one  whole.  Scattered 
lights  give  no  illumination  ;  it  is  the  esprit  d' ensemUe, 
the  general  idea  in  which  our  knowledge  begins  and 
ends,  that  ultimately  determines  the  scientific  value 
of  each  special  branch  of  knowledge.  But  while 
synthesis  is  necessary,  it  is  not  necessary,  according 
to  Comte,  that  the  synthesis  should  be  objective. 
The  error  of  mankind  in  the  past  has  been  that 
they  supposed  themselves  able  to  ascertain  the  real 
or  objective  principle  which  gives  unity  to  the 
world,  and  able,  therefore,  to  make  their  system 
of  knowledge  an  ideal  repetition  of  the  system  of 
things  without  them.  Such  a  system,  however,  is 
entirely  beyond  our  reach.  The  conditions  of  our 
lot,  and  the  weakness  of  our  intelligence,  make  it 
impossible  for  us  to  tell  what  is  the  real  principle 
of  unity  in  the  world,  or  even  whether  such  a 
principle  exists.  The  attempts  to  discover  it,  made 
by  Theology  and  Metaphysics,  have  been  nothing 
more  than  elaborate  anthropomorphisms,  in  which 
men  gave  to  the  unknown  and  unknowable  reality 
a  form  borrowed  from  their  own  self-conscious  nature. 
They  saw  in  the  clouds  about  them  an  exaggerated 
and  distorted  reflection  of  themselves,  and  regarded 
this  Brocken  spectre  as  a  controlling  power  whose 
activity  was  the  source  and  explanation  of  every- 
thing. Positivism,  on  the  other  hand,  arises  when- 
ever   men    come    to    recognize    the     nature     of    this 


HOW  TO  SYSTEMATIZE  KNOWLEDGE.     Ml 

illusion,  and  to  confine  their  ambition  to  that  whicli 
is  within  the  limit  of  their  intelligence.  All  that 
we  can  know  is  the  resemblances  and  successions  of 
phenomena,  and  not  the  things  in  themselves  that 
are  their  causes ;  and  if  we  seek  to  find  a  principle 
of  unity  for  these  phenomena,  we  must  find  it  in 
ourselves  and  not  in  them.  We  must  organize 
knowledge  with  reference  to  our  own  wants,  rather 
than  with  reference  to  the  nature  of  things.  We 
must  regard  everything  as  a  means  to  an  end, 
which  is  determined  by  some  inner  principle  in 
ourselves — not  as  if  we  supposed  that  the  world 
and  all  that  is  in  it  were  made  for  us,  or  found 
its  centre  in  us — but  simply  because  this  is  the 
only  point  of  view  from  which  we  can  systematize 
knowledge,  as  it  is  indeed  the  only  point  of  view 
from  which   we  need  care  to  systematize  it. 

It  may  be  asked  why  system  is  necessary  at  all,  unftTand"^ 
why  we  should  not  be  content  with  a  fragmentary  *y^'^™' 
consciousness  of  the  world,  without  attempting  to 
gather  the  dispersed  lights  of  science  to  one  central 
principle.  To  critics  like  J.  S.  Mill,  Comte's  effort 
after  system  seems  to  be  the  result  of  an  "  original 
mental  twist  very  common  in  French  thinkers,"  of 
"  an  inordinate  desire  of  unity."  "  That  all  perfec- 
tion consists  in  unity,  Comte  apparently  considers  to 
be  a  maxim  which  no  sane  man  thinks  of  question- 
ing :    it   never   seems   to   enter    into    his    conceptions 


1.52      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

that  any  one  could  object  db  initio,  and  ask,  why 
this  universal  systematizing,  systematizing,  system- 
atizing ?  Why  is  it  necessary  that  all  human  life 
should  point  but  to  one  object,  and  be  converted 
into  a  system  of  means  to  a  single  end  ? "  *  To 
this  Mr.  Bridges  answers  that  unity  in  Comte's  sense 
is  "the  first  and  most  obvious  condition  which  all 
moral  and  religious  renovators,  of  whatever  time  and 
country,  have  by  the  very  nature  of  their  office  set 
themselves  to  fulfil."  t  In  other  words,  all  moral 
and  spiritual  life  depends  upon  the  harmony  of  the 
individual  with  himself  and  with  the  world,  A 
divided  life  is  a  life  of  weakness  and  misery  ;  nor 
can  life  be  divided  intellectually,  without  being,  or 
ultimately  becoming,  divided  morally.  Such  unity, 
indeed,  does  not  exclude — and  in  a  being  like  man 
who  is  in  course  of  development  cannot  altogether 
exclude — difference  and  even  conflict.  In  the  most 
steadily  growing  intellectual  life  there  are  pauses  of 
difficulty  and  doubt ;  in  the  most  continuous  moral 
progress  there  are  conflicts  with  self  and  with  others. 
But  such  doubts  and  difficulties  will  not  greatly 
weaken  or  disturb  us,  so  long  as  they  are  partigd, 
so  long  as  they  do  not  aft'ect  the  central  principles 
of  thought  and  action,  so  long  as  there  is  still  some 
fixed    faith    which    reaches    beyond    the    disturbance, 

*  "Comte  and  Positivism,"  p,  140. 

t  "  The  Unity  of  Comte's  Life  and  Doctrine,"  p.  26, 


THE  WEAKNESS  OF  DOUBT.  153 

some  certitude  which  is  untouched  by  the  doubt. 
If,  however,  we  once  lose  the  consciousness  that 
there  is  any  such  principle,  or  if  we  try  to  rest  on 
a  principle  which  we  at  the  same  time  feel  to  be 
inadequate,  our  spiritual  life,  in  losing  its  unity  or 
harmony  with  itself,  must  at  the  same  time  lose  its 
purity  and  energy.  It  must  become  fitful  and 
uncertain,  the  sport  of  accidental  influences  and 
tendencies ;  it  must  lower  its  moral  and  intellectual 
aims.  This,  in  Comte's  view,  is  what  we  have  seen 
in  the  past.  The  decay  of  the  old  faiths,  and  of 
the  objective  synthesis  based  upon  them,  has  eman- 
cipated us  from  many  illusions,  but  it  has,  as  it 
were,  taken  the  inspiration  out  of  our  lives.  It 
has  made  knowledge  a  thing  for  specialists  who 
have  lost  the  sense  of  totality,  the  sense  of  the 
value  of  their  particular  studies  in  relation  to  the 
whole ;  and  it  has  made  action  feeble  and  wayward 
by  depriving  men  of  the  conviction  that  there  is 
any  great  central  aim  to  be  achieved  by  it.  And 
these  results  would  have  been  still  more  obvious, 
were  it  not  that  men  are  so  slow  in  realizing  what 
is  involved  in  the  change  of  their  beliefs ;  were  it 
not  that  the  habits  and  sympathies  developed  by  a 
creed  continue  to  exist  long  after  the  creed  itself 
has  disappeared.  In  the  long  run,  however,  the 
change  of  man's  intellectual  attitude  in  relation  to  the 
world  must  bring  with  it  a  change  of  his  whole  lil'e. 


154      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

Ceasing  to  have  faith  in  the  creed  whicli  once  recon- 
ciled him  to  the  world  and  bound  him  to  his  fellows, 
he  must  be  thrown  back  upon  his  own  mere  individu- 
ality, unless  he  can  find  another  Qreed  of  equal  or 
greater  power  to  inspire  and  direct  his  life.  And 
mere  individualism  is  nothing  but  anarchy.  This, 
indeed,  was  not  seen  by  those  who  first  expressed 
the  individualistic  principle ;  on  the  contrary,  they 
seemed  to  themselves  to  find  in  the  assertion  of 
individual  right,  not  only  an  instrument  for  destroy- 
ing the  old  faith  and  the  old  social  order,  but  also 
the  principle  of  a  better  faith,  and  the  means  of 
reconstructing  a  better  order  of  life.  But  to  us  who 
have  outlived  the  period  when  it  could  be  supposed 
that  the  destruction  of  old,  involves  in  itself  the 
construction  of  new,  forms  of  life  and  thought,  it 
cannot  but  be  obvious  that  the  j)rinciples  of  private 
judgment  and  individual  liberty  are  nothing  more 
than  negations.  JFor,  as  the  real  problem  of  our 
intellectual  life  is  how  to  rise  to  a  judgment  which 
is  more  than  private  judgment,  so  the  real  problem 
of  our  practical  life  is  how  to  realize  a  liberty  that 
is  more  than  individual  license.  Hence  it  is  that 
Comte  speaks  of  the  last  three  centuries  as  a  period 
of  the  insurrection  of  the  intellect  against  the  heart, 
an  expression  by  which  he  means  to  indicate  at  once 
the  gain  and  the  loss  of  the  revolutionary  movement  ; 
its  gain,  in  so  far  as  it  emancipated  the  intelligence 


THE  HEART  AGAINST  THE  HEAD.         155 

from  superstitious  illusions :  and  its  loss,  in  so  far 
as  it  destroyed  the  faith  wliicli  was  the  bond  of 
social  union,  without  substituting  any  other  faith 
in  its  room.  At  the  same  time,  this  expression 
points  to  a  peculiarity  of  Comte's  Psychology,  which 
affects  his  whole  view  of  the  history,  and  especially 
of  the  religious  history,  of  man  ;  and  which  it  is 
therefore  necessary  to  subject  to  a  careful  examina- 
tion. 

Is  it  possible  for  the  intellect  to  be  in  insurrection  Possibility 

of  conflict 

against  the  heart  ?  In  the  sense  already  indicated  "^^.^l^^ 
this  is  possible.  It  is  possible,  in  short,  that  the  ""'^  ^^'"^■ 
moral  and  intellectual  spirit  of  a  belief  may  still 
control  the  life  of  one  who,  so  far  as  his  explicit 
consciousness  is  concerned,  has  renounced  it.  Hooted 
as  the  individual  is  in  a  wider  life  than  his  own, 
it  is  often  but  a  small  part  of  himself  that  he  can 
bring  to  distinct  consciousness.  Purther,  so  little 
are  most  men  accustomed  to  self-analysis,  that  they 
are  seldom  aware  what  it  is  that  constitutes  the 
inspiring  power  of  their  beliefs.  Generally,  at  least 
in  the  first  instance,  they  take  their  creed  in  gross, 
without  distinguishing  between  essential  and  unessen- 
tial elements.  They  confuse,  in  one  general  consecra- 
tion of  reverence,  the  primary  principles  which  give  that 
creed  its  spiritual  value,  and  the  local  and  temporary 
accidents  of  the  form  in  which  it  was  first  presented 
to   them ;  and    they  are  as  ready  to  accept  battle  (l 


15C      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

Voutrance  for  some  useless  outwork  as  for  the  citadel 
itself  And,  for  the  same  reason,  they  are  ready  to 
think  that  the  citadel  is  lost  when  the  outwork  is 
taken ;  to  suppose,  e.g.,  that  the  spiritual  nature  of 
man  is  a  fiction,  if  he  was  not  directly  made  by 
God  out  of  the  dust  of  the  earth ;  or  that  the 
Christian  view  of  life  has  ceased  to  be  true,  if  a 
doubt  can  be  thrown  on  the  possibility  of  proving 
miracles.  Yet,  however  little  the  individual  may 
be  able  to  separate  the  particulars  which  are  assailed 
from  the  universal  with  which  they  are  accidentally 
connected,  his  whole  nature  must  rebel  against  the 
sacrifice  which  logical  consistency  seems  in  such  a 
case  to  demand  from  him.  It  is  a  painful  experience 
when  the  first  break  is  made  in  the  implicit  unity  of 
early  faith,  and  it  is  painful  just  in  proportion  to 
the  depth  of  the  spiritual  consciousness  which  that 
faith  has  produced  in  the  individual.  Unable  to 
separate  that  which  he  is  obliged  to  doubt  from 
that  in  which  lies  the  principle  of  his  moral,  and 
even  of  his  intellectual,  life,  he  is  "  in  a  strait 
betwixt  two " ;  and  no  course  seems  to  be  open  to 
him  which  does  not  involve  the  surrender,  either  of 
his  intellectual  honesty,  or  of  that  higher  conscious- 
ness which  alone  "  makes  life  worth  living."  Such 
a  crisis  is  commonly  described  as  a  division  between 
the  heart  and  the  head,  because  in  it  the  articulate 
or    conscious   logic   is   generally   on   the  side  of  dis- 


THE  HEART  WISER  THAN  THE  HEAD.     157 

belief,  while  the  resisting  conviction  takes  the  form 
of  a  feeling,  an  impulse,  an  intuition,  whidi  tlie 
individual  has  for  himself,  but  which  he  is  unable 
to  communicate  in  the  same  force  to  another.  And, 
as  such  feelings  and  intuitions  of  the  individual  are 
necessarily  subject  to  continual  variation  of  intensity 
and  clearness,  so  the  struggle  between  doubt  and 
faith  may  be  long  and  difficult,  the  objections,  which 
at  one  time  seem  as  nothing,  at  another  time  ap- 
pearing to  be  almost  irresistible.  Not  seldom  the 
result  is  a  broken  life,  in  which  youth  is  given  to 
revolt,  and  the  rest  of  existence  to  a  faith  which 
vainly  strives  to  be  implicit.  There  is,  indeed,  no 
final  and  satisfactory  issue  from  such  an  endless 
internal  debate  and  conflict,  until  the  "  heart "  has 
learned  to  speak  the  language  of  the  "  head," — i.e., 
until  the  permanent  principles,  which  underlay  and 
gave  strength  to  faith,  have  been  brought  into  the 
light  of  distinct  consciousness,  and  until  it  has  been 
discovered  how  to  separate  them  from  the  accidents, 
with  which  at  first  they  were  necessarily  identified. 
The  hard  labour  of  distinguishing,  in  the  traditions 
of  the  past,  between  the  germinative  principles  out 
of  which  the  future  must  spring,  and  those  external 
forms  and  adjuncts  which  every  day  is  making  more 
incredible,  must  be  undertaken  by  any  one  who 
would  restore  the  broken  unity  of  man's  life.  We 
begin  our  existence  under  the  shadow  and  influence 


158      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

of  a  faith  which  is  given  to  us  as  it  were,  in 
our  sleep;  but  in  no  age,  and  in  this  age  less 
than  any  other,  can  man  possess  spiritual  life  as 
a  gift  from  the  past  without  reconquering  it  for 
himself 
^f^thr^**"'"  In  this  sense,  then,  we  can  understand  how  Comte 
opposi  ion.  j^-gj^|.  speak  of  an  insurrection  of  the  intelligence 
against  the  heart,  which  must  be  quelled  ere  the 
normal  state  of  humanity  could  be  restored ;  for 
this  would  be  only  another  way  of  saying  that,  in 
the  modern  conflict  of  faith  and  reason,  the  sub- 
stantial truth,  or  at  least  the  most  important  truth, 
had,  up  to  Comte's  own  time,  been  on  the  side  of 
the  former.  In  this  view,  the  deep  unwillingness  of 
those  nourished  in  the  Christian  or  Catholic  faith 
to  yield  to  the  logical  battery  of  the  Encyclopedists 
was  not  merely  the  result  of  an  obscurantist  hatred 
of  light ;  it  was  also  in  great  part  due  to  a  more 
or  less  definite  sense  of  the  moral,  if  not  the  in- 
tellectual, weakness  of  the  principles  which  the 
Encyclopffidists  maintained.  For,  while  the  insur- 
rection was  justified  in  so  far  as  it  asserted  the 
claims  of  the  special  sciences,  it  was  to  be  condemned 
in  so  far  as  it  involved  the  denial  of  all  synthesis 
whatever,  and  also  in  so  far  as  it  was  blind  to  the 
elements  of  truth  in  the  imperfect  synthesis  of  the 
past.  It  thus  tended  to  destroy  the  spirit  of  totality 
and  the  sense  of  duty  {Vesprit  cVenseinble  et  le  sentiment 


CAN  HEART  CONTRADICT  HEAD?  159 

du  devoir)!^  It  practically  denied  the  existence  of 
any  universal  principle  which  could  connect  the 
different  parts  of  knowledge  with  each  other,  of 
any  general  aim  which  could  give  unity  to  the 
life  of  man.  Its  analytic  spirit  was  fatal,  not  only 
to  the  fictions  of  theology,  but  also  to  that  growing 
consciousness  of  the  solidarity  of  men  of  which 
theology  had  been  the  accidental  embodiment.  The 
reluctance  of  religious  men  to  admit  the  claims  of 
what  appeared  to  be,  and,  indeed,  to  a  certain  extent 
was  light,  was  thus  due  to  a  more  or  less  distinct 
perception  that  their  own  creed,  amid  all  its  partial 
errors,  contained  a  central  truth  more  important  than 
all  the  partial  truths  of  science.  In  clinging  to  the 
past  they  were  preserving  the  germ  of  the  future ; 
and  the  final  victory  of  science  could  not  come 
until  this  germ  had  been  disengaged  from  the  husk 
of  superstition  under  which  it  was  hidden.  Till 
that  was  done,  the  logic  of  the  heart  in  clinging 
to  its  superstitions  was  better  than  the  logic  of 
the  head  in  rebelling  against  them.  In  other  words, 
the  implicit  reason  of  faith  was  wiser  than  the 
explicit  reason  of  science. 

But  this  is  not  all  that  Comte  means.     For  him  Koeiing 

apart  frmu 

the   appeal    to   the   heart   is  not   merely   the    appeal  intciugence 
to   feelings   and    intuitions,   which   are   the   result   of  t^'JI^" '^°"' 
the    past    development    of    human    intelligence,    and 
*Pol.  Pos.  iii.  499;  Trail  a.  419. 


160      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

especially  of  the  long  discipline  by  which  the 
Christian  Church  has  moulded  the  modern  spirit ;  it 
is  an  appeal  to  the  altruistic  affections,  as  original 
or  "  innate "  tendencies  in  man  which  are  altogether 
independent  of  his  intelligence.  It  is  not  that  the 
reason  of  man  often  speaks  through  his  feelings,  but 
that  feeling  and  reason  have  in  themselves  different, 
and  even  it  may  be  opposite,  voices.  In  this  sense, 
the  attempt  has  often  been  made  in  modern  times 
to  stop  the  invasions  of  critical  reflection  by  setting 
up  the  heart  as  an  independent  authority.  From 
the  Lutheran  theologian  who  said,  "  Pectus  theologum 
facit,"  down  to  the  poet  of  In  Memoriam,  appeals 
have  constantly  been  made  to  the  feelings  to  resist 
the  intrusion  of  doubt : — 

"  If  e'er  when  faith  had  fall'n  asleep, 

I  heard  a  voice,  '  believe  no  more '  .  .  . 

A  warmth  within  the  breast  would  melt 
The  freezing  reason's  colder  part, 
And  like  a  man  in  wrath,  the  heart 

Stood  up  and  answered,  '  I  have  felt '  : " 

Such  appeals,  however,  cannot  be  regarded  as  other- 
wise than  provisional  and  self-defensive.  "  The  heart 
knoweth  its  own  bitterness,  and  a  stranger  doth  not 
intermeddle  with  its  joy  " ;  but  just  for  that  reason 
it  has  no  general  content  or  independent  authority 
of  its  own.  Whether  the  phrase  "  I  feel  it "  mean 
little    or    much,    depends    upon    the    individual    who 


THE  HEART  BY  ITSELF  SAYS  NOTHING.    101 

utters  it.  It  may  be  the  concentrated  expression 
of  a  long  life  of  culture  and  discipline,  or  it  may 
be  the  loud  but  empty  voice  of  untrained  passion 
and  prejudice.  The  "  unproved  assertions  of  the 
Vv^ise  and  experienced,"  as  Aristotle  tells  us,  have 
great  value,  especially  in  ethical  matters ;  but  it  is 
not  because  they  are  unproved  assertions,  but  because 
we  know  that  the  speakers  are  wise  and  experienced. 
To  appeal  to  the  heart  in  general,  without  saying 
"  wliosc  heart,"  either  means  nothing,  or  it  means 
an  appeal  to  the  natural  man,  i.e.,  to  man  as  he  is 
before  he  has  been  sophisticated  by  culture  and 
experience.  But  of  the  natural  man,  in  this  sense, 
nothing  can  be  said.  The  farther  we  go  back  in 
the  history  of  the  individual  or  the  race  the  more 
imperfect  does  their  utterance  of  themselves  become ; 
and  when  we  reach  the  beginning,  we  find  that 
there  is  no  manifestation  or  utterance  at  all.  The 
natural  man  of  Eousseau  was  simply  an  ideal  crea- 
tion, inspired  with  that  intense  and  even  morbid 
consciousness  of  self  and  that  fixed  resolve  to  submit 
to  no  external  law,  which  were  characteristic  of 
Eousseau  himself,  and  which  in  him  were  the  last 
product  and  quintessence  of  the  individualism  of  the 
eighteenth  century.  The  simplicity  of  this  ideal 
figure  is  not  the  first  simplicity  of  nature,  but  the 
simplicity  of  a  spirit  which  has  returned  upon  itself 
and    asserted    itself    against    the    world ;    a    kind    of 

L 


162      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

simplicity  which  never  existed,  at  least  in  the  same 
form,  before  the  great  Protestant  revolt.  The  unhis- 
torical  character  of  this  idea  becomes  doubly  evident 
when  we  find  that,  as  time  goes  on  and  the  spirit 
of  the  age  alters,  the  qualities  of  the  natural  man 
also  are  changed.  To  St.  Simon  and  Fourier,  as  to 
Eousseau,  man  is  good  by  nature,  and  it  is  bad 
institutions  or  bad  external  influences  which  are 
the  source  of  all  the  ills  that  flesh  is  heir  to.  But 
while  to  the  latter  the  natural  man  is  a  solitary, 
whose  chief  good  lies  in  the  preservation  of  his 
independence ;  to  the  former  he  is  essentially  social, 
and  what  is  wanted  for  his  perfection  and  happi- 
ness is  only  to  contrive  an  outward  organization  in 
which  his  social  sympathies  shall  have  free  play. 
Comte,  as  we  might  expect,  rises  above  these  imper- 
fect theories,  in  so  far  as  he  refuses  to  attribute 
all  the  evils  of  humanity  to  its  external  circum- 
stances ;  but  he  does  not  free  himself  from  the 
essential  error  which  was  common  to  them  all,  the 
error  of  seeking  for  the  explanation  of  the  higher 
life  of  humanity  in  the  feelings  of  the  natural  man 
— feelings  which  are  prior  to,  and  independent  of, 
the  exercise  of  his  reason,  and  which  supply  all 
the  possible  motives  for  that  exercise.  There  are, 
in  his  view,  two  sets  of  "  innate  "  feelings  or  desires, 
between  which  man's  life  is  divided — the  egoistic 
and  the  altruistic  tendencies,  each  separate  from  the 


THE  NA  TURAL  MAN.  \  03 

others  as  well  as  from  the  iiitellifjeiice,  and  havinsr 
its  "  organ "  in  a  separate  part  of  the  brain.  The 
egoistic  feelings  at  first  exist  in  man  in  far  greater 
strength  than  the  altruistic ;  l)ut  by  the  reaction 
of  circumstances,  and  the  influence  of  men  upon 
each  other,  the  latter  have  in  the  past  gradually 
attained  to  greater  power ;  and  it  is  the  ideal  of  the 
future  to  make  their  victory  complete.  Meanwhile, 
the  intelligence  is  necessarily  the  instrument  of  desire, 
and  its  highest  good  is  to  be  the  instrument  of 
altruistic  as  opposed  to  egoistic  desire.  For  it  has 
at  best  only  a  choice  of  masters,  and  the  emanci- 
pation of  the  intelligence  from  the  heart  could  mean 
only  its  becoming  a  slave  of  personal  vanity.* 
Comte's  appeal,  therefore,  is  still  to  the  natural  man, 
or  rather  to  one  element  in  him,  which,  however, 
as  he  acknowledges,  is  never  so  weak  as  it  is  in 
man's  earliest  or  most  natural  state. 

The  psychology  implied  in  this  theory  is  substan-  Hume's 

view  of  the 

tially    that    which    found    its    fullest    expression     in  relation  of 

•^  '^  reason  and 

Hume's  "  Treatise  on  Human  Nature."  Hume,  with  p^^"°°- 
that  tendency  to  bring  things  to  a  distinct  issue 
which  is  his  best  characteristic,  declares  boldly  that 
"  reason  is  and  ought  to  be  the  slave  of  the  passions, 
and  can  never  pretend  to  any  other  office  than  to 
serve  and  obey  them."  The  passions  or  desires  are 
tendencies  of  a  definite  character  which  exist  in  man 
*Pol.  Pos.  i.  421. 


164      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

from  the  first ;  and  the  awaking  intelligence  cannot  add 
to  their  number,  or  essentially  change  their  nature. 
It  can  only  take  account  of  what  they  are,  and 
calculate  how  best  to  satisfy  them.  "  We  speak 
not  strictly  and  philosophically  when  we  talk  of 
the  combat  of  reason  and  passion,"  for  while  reason 
determines  what  is  true  and  what  is  false,  it  sets 
nothing  before  us  as  an  end  to  be  pursued  and 
avoided.  It  does  not  constitute,  and  it  cannot  trans- 
form, the  desires,  which  are  given  altogether  apart 
from  it :  nor  is  the  will  anything  but  the  strongest 
desire.  When  we  say  that  reason  controls  the  pas- 
sions, what  we  mean  is  simply  that  a  strong  but 
calm  tendency  of  our  nature,  which  has  reference 
to  some  remote  object,  overcomes  a  violent  impulse 
towards  a  present  delight ;  but  for  intelligence  to 
contend  with  passion  is,  strictly  sj)eaking,  an  impos- 
sibility, 
modmifation       The  modifications  which  Comte  makes  in  this  view 

of  Hume's         /•  ,•  •       i  •  m  •  tt         i 

view.  01   motive   are   comparatively  trmmg.     He  does   not, 

indeed,  like  Hume,  call  reason  the  slave  of  the 
passions ;  rather  he  says  that  "  Vcsprit  doit  etre  le 
ministre  du  cceur,  mais  jamais  son  esclavc  " ;  but  this 
change  of  language  does  not  involve  any  important 
modification  of  Hume's  theory.  The  intelligence 
may  give  the  heart  much  information  about  the 
means  whereby  it  may  attain  its  ends,  but  the  ends 
have   to   be    determined   solely    by    the    heart    itself. 


Comte's 


THE  SUBORDINA  TION  OF  REASON.         \  (J5 

In  Comte's  language  the  intellect  is  a  "  slave,"  when 
theology  makes  it  acknowledge  the  existence  of  ficti- 
tious supernatural  beings  whose  natures  are  in  accord- 
ance with  our  desires,  our  hopes,  or  our  fears ;  it 
is  a  "master,"  when  it  pursues  its  inquiries  into 
the  phenomena  of  the  objective  world,  at  the  bidding 
of  an  errant  curiosity,  without  reference  to  the 
well-being  of  man ;  it  is  in  its  true  place  as  a 
"  servant "  when  it  studies  the  objective  world  freely, 
but  only  with  reference  to  the  end  fixed  for  it  by 
the  affections.  "  L'univers  doit  etrc  dtudii  non  pour 
liii-meme,  mais  pour  Vhomme,  on  pluiot  pour  Vhuman- 
iU" ;  and  this,  Comte  thinks,  will  not  be  done  if  the 
intelligence  be  left  to  itself,  but  only  if  it  be  made 
subordinate  to  the  heart.  To  say,  therefore,  that 
the  intelligence  is  not  to  be  a  slave  but  a  servant, 
implies  merely  that  it  is  to  be  left  free  to  collect 
information  about  the  means  of  satisfying  the  desires, 
without  having  its  judgment  anticipated  by  the 
imagination  or  the  heart ;  l)ut  that,  on  the  other 
hand,  it  must  be  kept  strictly  to  its  position  as  an 
instrument  to  an  end  out  of  itself.  For  if  it  once 
emancipates  itself  from  the  yoke  of  feeling,  it  soon 
becomes  altogether  lawless,  and  disperses  its  efforts 
in  every  direction  in  the  satisfaction  of  an  idle  curi- 
osity. The  intelligence,  as  the  scholastic  theologians 
said,  is  in  itself,  or  when  left  to  itself,  a  source 
of   anarchy   and   confusion ;   it   must   be,   not   indeed 


IGG      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 


1 


the  serva,  Ijut  the  ancilla  field,  otherwise  it  will 
defeat  its  own  ends.  The  intellectual  life,  as  such, 
is  an  unsocial,  even  a  selfish  existence ;  for,  as 
reason  is  guided  by  no  definite  objective  aim  derived 
from  itself,  it  must  find  its  real  motive  in  the  satis- 
faction of  personal  vanity  and  self-conceit,  whenever 
it  is  not  subjected  to  the  yoke  of  the  altruistic 
affections. 
Ave  the  ten-       This    theory    (which,    as    we    shall    see,    underlies 

dencies  of  ./       v  - 

purely  dis°*  Comtc's  wholc  conccption  of  history)  suggests  two 
persive.  questions.  It  leads  us  to  ask,  in  the  first  place, 
whether  the  tendenciv^s  of  the  intellectual  life  are 
thus  dispersive  and  opposed  to  the  social  tendencies : 
and,  secondly,  whether  the  social  tendencies  in  the 
form  which  they  take  with  man,  are  not  necessarily 
determined  to  be  what  they  are  by  his  intelligence. 
The  former  question  really  resolves  itself  into  another : 
Is  the  intelligence  of  man  a  mere  formal  power  of 
apprehending  what  is  presented  to  it  from  without, 
so  that,  when  it  is  left  to  itself,  it  can  only  lose 
its  way  amid  the  infinite  multiplicity  of  individual 
objects  in  the  external  world  ?  or  does  it  carry  within 
it  any  synthetic  principle,  any  idea  of  the  whole, 
by  which  it  can  reduce  to  unity  and  order  the  differ- 
ence and  confusion  of  phenomena  ?  Against  Comte's 
assertion  that  the  natural  tendency  of  the  intelligence 
is  to  lose  itself  in  difference  without  end,  we  might 
quote    the    well-kuown    saying    of    Bacon,    that    the 


TENDENCIES  OF  THE  INTELLECT.         1G7 

tendency  of  the  "  intcllcctus  sibi  pcrmissus  "  is  rather 
towards  a  premature  synthesis.  "  Intdlcdus  humamis 
ex  proprietate  sua  facile  sup2wnit  majorcm  ordincm  ct 
cequalitatcm  in  rebus  qnam  invcnit."  Surely,  if  we 
may  speak  of  tendencies  of  the  intellectual  life  as 
separated  from  the  life  of  feeling,  the  tendency  to 
unity  and  the  universal  belongs  to  it  quite  as  much 
as  the  tendency  to  difference  and  the  particular ; 
just  as,  in  the  life  of  feeling,  the  tendency  to  isolation 
and  self-assertion  against  others  is  combined  with  the 
tendency  to  society  and  union  with  others.  From 
the  first  moment  of  intellectual  life  the  world  is  to 
us  a  unity ;  subjectively  a  unity,  as  all  its  varied 
phenomena  are  gathered  up  in  the  consciousness  of 
one  self,  and  objectively  a  unity,  as  every  object  and 
event  is  conceived  as  definitely  placed  in  relation 
to  the  other  objects  and  events  in  one  space  and 
one  time.  The  development  of  knowledge  is,  no 
doubt,  the  continual  detection  of  new  differences  and 
distinctions  in  things,  but  the  phenomena  which  are 
distinguished  from  other  phenomena  are  at  tlie  same 
time  put  in  relation  to  them.  Nor  can  the  intelli- 
gence find  complete  satisfaction  until  this  relation 
is  discovered  to  be  necessary,  and  thus  difference 
passes  into  unity  again.  Individual  minds,  indeed, 
may  be  more  of  the  Aristotelian,  or  more  of  the 
Platonist,  order,  may  tend  more  to  divide  what  at 
first  is  presented  as  unity,  or  to  unite  what  at  first 


1G8      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

is  presented  as  difference.  But  it  is  absurd  to  talk 
of  either  tendency  as  belonging,  more  than  the  other, 
to  the  intelligence  in  itself:  seeing  that  it  is  as 
much  beyond  the  powers  of  thought  to  conceive  of 
an  undifferentiated  unity,  as  to  conceive  of  a  chaos 
of  differences  without  some  kind  of  relation.  In  this 
regard,  indeed,  we  may  bring  Comte  as  a  witness 
against  himself;  for,  while  he  declares  that  the 
sciences  which  deal  with  the  inorganic  world  are 
mainly  analytic  in  their  tendencies,  he  at  the  same 
time  maintains  that  the  sciences  of  Biology,  and,  still 
more,  of  Sociology  ard  Morals,  are  synthetic,  since 
they  deal  with  objects  in  which  the  whole  is  not 
a  mere  aggregation  or  resultant  of  the  parts,  but 
in  which  rather  the  parts  can  be  understood  only 
in  and  through  the  whole.  Hence  it  would  seem 
that  the  dispersive  tendencies  of  science  are  confined 
to  the  lower  steps  of  the  scientific  scale ;  and  that 
the  final  science  admits  and  necessitates  a  synthesis, 
which  is  not  merely  subjective  but  also  objective. 
For  Comte  does  not  hold  that  we  are  to  regard 
other  men  merely  as  means,  or  to  seek  to  understand 
them  only  so  far  as  is  necessary  for  the  gratification 
of  some  desire  in  ourselves  as  individuals.  We  are, 
on  the  contrary,  to  seek  to  know  man  in  and  for 
himself;  and  when  we  do  so  know  him,  we  find 
that  he  is  essentially  social,  and  that  the  individual, 
as   such,  is   a   mere  "  fiction  of  the  metaphysicians." 


IS  ALTRUISM  INNATE.  169 

Here  again,  therefore,  wo  find  that  Conite's  system 
ends  in  a  compromise  between  opposite  tendencies 
of  thought.  As  his  subjective  syntlicsis  after  all 
was  found  to  be  objective,  at  least  so  far  as  man- 
kind were  concerned,  so  in  like  manner  liis  oppo- 
sition of  the  intellect  to  the  heart  turns  out  to  be 
only  partial ; '  for  when  the  intelligence  is  directed 
to  psychology  and  sociology,  it  gives  us  an  idea  of 
humanity,  according  to  which  all  men  are  "  members 
one  of  another."  The  warfare  of  the  heart  and  tlic 
intelligence  thus  resolves  itself  into  another  expres- 
sion of  that  dualism  between  the  world  and  man, 
which  we  have  already  considered. 

The  second  question — whether  tlie  altruistic  a  flee- Arc  not  the 

•'■  social  iinec- 

tions  of  man  do  not  imply,  or  are  not  necessarily  mhlcd'^v"^ 
connected  with,  the  development  of  his  reason  or 
self-consciousness — is  even  more  important.  Comte, 
like  Hume,  took  all  the  desires,  higher  and  lower, 
as  tendencies  given  apart  from  the  reason,  whicli 
can  only  devise  the  means  of  satisfying  them,  and 
is,  therefore,  necessarily  their  servant.  lieason  itself 
on  this  view  does  not  essentially  affect  the  character 
of  those  tendencies  which  it  obeys.  "  Cupiditas  est 
appetitus  cicm  ejusdem  conscientia,"  says  Spinoza,  and 
immediately  he  goes  on  to  speak  as  if  the  "conscientia" 
made  no  change  in  the  character  of  the  "  appetitiis." 
But  if  we  think  of  appetites  or  desires — some  of 
them   tending   to   the   good  of  the  individual,  others 


170      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

to  the  good  of  the  species — as  existing  in  an  animal 
which  is  not  conscious  of  a  self,  these  appetites  will 
neither  be  selfish  nor  unselfish  in  the  sense  in  which 
we  apply  these  terms  to  man.  Where  there  is  no 
c(jo  there  can  be  no  alter  ego,  and  therefore  neither 
egoism  nor  altruism.  The  consciousness  of  the  self 
as  a  permanent  unity  to  which  all  the  different 
tendencies  are  referred,  and  the  consequent  rise  of 
a  new  desire  for  the  good  or  happiness,  as  distinct 
from  the  desires  of  particular  objects,  are  essential 
to  egoism.  The  consciousness  of  an  alter  ego,  i.e.,  of 
a  community  with  others  which  .makes  their  interests 
our  own,  and  hence  the  consequent  rise  of  a  love 
for  them, — which  is  not  disinterested  merely  as  the 
animal  appetites  are  disinterested,  because  they  tend 
directly  to  their  objects  without  any  thought  of  self, 
but  disinterested  in  the  sense  that  the  thought  of 
self  is  conquered  or  transcended, — is  essential  to 
altruism.  Each  of  these  tendencies  may  coincide  in 
its  matter,  or  rather  in  its  first  matter,  with  the 
appetites ;  viewed  from  the  outside,  they  may  seem 
to  be  nothing  higher  than  hunger  or  thirst,  and 
sexual  or  parental  impulse ;  but  their  form  is 
different.  In  becoming  combined  with  self-conscious- 
ness, they  are  changed  as  by  a  chemical  solvent, 
which  dissolves  and  renews  them ;  nay,  as  by  a 
new  principle  of  life,  whose  first  transformation  of 
them   is   nothing    but    the    beginning   of   a   series   of 


REASON  AS  A  SOCIAL  PRINCIPLE.  17 1 

transformations  both  of  tlieir  matter  and  tlieir  form; 
so  that,  in  the  end,  tlie  simpK'  direct  tendency  to 
an  object — the  uneasiness  wliicli  sought  its  cure 
without  reflection  either  upon  itself  or  upon  anything 
else — is  transmuted,  on  the  one  side,  into  a  gigantic 
ambition  and  greed,  which  would  make  the  whole 
world  tributary  to  the  lust  of  the  individual,  and, 
on  the  other  side,  into  a  love  of  humanity  in  whicli 
self-love  is  altogether  transcended  or  absorbed. 
Neither  of  these,  however,  nor  any  lower  form  of 
either,  is  in  such  wise  external  to  reason,  that  we 
can  talk  of  them  as  determining  it  to  an  end 
which  is  not  its  own.  Both  are  simply  the  expres- 
sion in  feeling  of  that  essential  opposition  of  the 
self  to  the  not-self,  and  at  the  same  time  that 
essential  unity  of  the  self  with  the  not-self,  which 
are  the  two  opposite^_j3ut  complementary,  aspects  of 
the  life  of  reason.  I  And  the  progressive  triumph 
of  altruism  over  egoism,  which  constitutes  the  moral 
significance  of  history,  is  only  the  result  of  the  fact 
that  an  individual,  who  is  also  a  conscious  self, 
cannot  find  his  happiness  in  his  own  individual  life, 
but  only  in  the  life  of  the  whole  to  which  he 
belongs.  A  selfish  life  is  for  such  a  being  a  con- 
tradiction. It  is  a  life  in  which  he  is  at  war  with 
himself  as  well  as  with  others ;  for  it  is  the  life  of 
a  being  who,  though  essentially  social,  tries  to  find 
satisfaction    in   a   personal   or   individual    good.      His 


172       THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 


Bearing  of 
this  oppo- 
sition ou 
Comte's 
view  of 
history. 


"  intelligence  "  and  his  "  heart  "  equally  condemn  such 
a  life  ;   it  is  for  him  not  only  a  crime  but  a  blunder. 
For  a  spiritual  being,  as  such,  is  one  who  can  save 
his  life   only  by  losing  it  in  a  wider   life,  one   who 
must  die  to  himself  in  order  that  he  may  live.      In 
the   progress   of    man's  spirit,   therefore,   there   is   no 
necessary  or  possible  schism    between  the  two   parts 
of  his  being;  but,  on  the  contrary,  the  development 
of   the   one   implies    the    development  of    the    otlier. 
It   is   the  more   comprehensive   idea,  as   well  as   the 
higher   social   purpose,  which  always   triumphs ;    and 
if  what  is  called  intellectual  culture  sometimes  seems 
to   have   the   worse   in   the   struggle  for  existence,  it 
is  because  it  is  a  superficial  or  formal  culture,  which 
[does  not  really  represent  the  most  comprehensive  idea^\ 
This    leads    us    to   observe  that  the   opposition  of 
the  heart   to   the  intelligence  is  Comte's  key  to  the 
whole  history   of  the   past,   especially   in   relation    to 
religion.      Theology  is   to  him  a  system  growing  out 
of  a   natural,  though   partially   erroneous,  hypothesis, 
an  hypothesis  which  in  its  first  appearance  was  well 
suited  to  excite   the   nascent  intelligence  and  satisfy 
the    primary    affections    of   man,    but    which,    in    its 
further    development,     tended    to    secure    moral    and 
social    ends    at    the    expense    of   truth,    and    became 
more   and  more    irrational    as    it  became    more    and 
more    useful.      Fetichism,   the   first   religion,  was  the 
spontaneous  result    of   man's    primitive    tendency    to 


-v/ 


t2- 


/ 


/' 


FALSE  SYNTHESIS  OF  THEOLOGY.         173 

exaggerate  the  likeness  of  all  tliin,i,'.s  to  himself.  It 
is  "less  distant  from  Positivity  "  than  any  other  sort 
of  theology,*  for  its  only  error  is  that  it  supposes 
the  existence  of  life  wherever  it  finds  activity,  an 
error  which  can  "  easily  be  brought  to  the  test  of 
verification "  and  corrected.  "  We  can  show  it  to 
be  an  error,  and  so  get  rid  of  it."  But  Polytheism, 
seeking  for  greater  generality,  refers  phenomena,  not 
directly  to  beings  who  are  identified  with  them, 
but  indirectly  to  "  wills  belonging  to  beings  purely 
imaginary,"  whose  "  existence  can  no  more  be  de- 
cisively disproved  than  it  can  be  demonstrated." 
Further,  Polytheism  extends  to  the  order  of  man's 
life  that  kind  of  explanation  which  Fetichism  neces- 
sarily confined  to  nature,  because  the  latter  sought 
to  explain  everything  by  man,  and  never  thought 
of  man  himself  as  requiring  explanation.  But  this, 
while  it  has  the  advantage  of  bringing  human  life 
within  the  domain  of  speculation,  at  the  same  time 
reduces  theology  into  a  palpable  instance  of  reasoning 
in  a  circle.  For  "  Humanity  cannot  legitimately  be 
included  in  the  synthesis  of  causes,  from  the  very 
fact  that  its  type  is  found  in  man."t  Last  of  all 
comes  Monotheism,  concentrating  slill  I'urther  the 
theological  explanation  of  the  universe,  but  rendering 
it  still  more  incoherent  and  irrational,  for  "  the  con- 

*Pol.  Pos.  iii.  p.  85:  Trans,  p.  71. 
tPol.  Po9.  iii.  p.  261:  Trans,  p.  218. 


174-      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

ception  of  a  single  God  involves  a  type  of  absolute 
perfection  complete  in  each  of  the  three  aspects  of 
human  nature,  affection,  thought,  and  action.  Now, 
such  a  conception  unavoidably  contradicts  itself;  for 
either  this  all-powerful  Being  must  be  inferior  to 
ourselves,  morally  or  intellectually ;  or  else  the  world 
which  He  created  must  be  free  from  those  radical 
imperfections  which,  in  spite  of  Monotheistic  sophis- 
try, have  been  always  but  too  evident.  And  even 
were  this  second  alternative  admissible,  there  would 
remain  a  yet  deeper  inconsistency.  Man's  moral 
and  mental  faculties  have  for  their  object  to  sub- 
serve practical  necessities,  but  an  omnipotent  Being 
can  have  no  occasion  either  for  wisdom  or  for  good- 
ness."* 
Monotheism       What  reconcilcs  mankind,  and  especially  the  '  men 

the  great 

instrument  of  light  and  leading,'  to  these  intellectually  unsatis- 

ot  social  "  "^  '' 

"°^*^'  factory  conceptions  of  God,  is  their  practical  value 
in  extending  and  strengthening  the  social  bond. 
Polytheism  was  superior  to  Fetichism,  because  it 
lent  itself  to  the  formation  of  that  wider  community, 
which  we  call  the  State,  whereas  Fetichism  tended 
rather  to  confine  the  sympathies  of  men  to  the 
narrower  limits  of  the  family.  And  Monotheism 
was  the  necessary  basis  of  that  still  wider  society 
which  binds  men  to  each  other  simply  as  men, 
and  apart  from  any  special  ties  of  blood  or  language. 
*Ibid.  iii.  p.  431:  Trans,  p.  365. 


SOCIAL  USES  OF  THEOLOGY.  \-^:^ 

This  at  least  was  the  ease  so  Ioiil;  as  the  truth  (»!' 
the  unity  of  humanity  had  not  yet  assumed  a  scien- 
tific form,  and  therefore  still  needed  an  external 
support.  But  when  the  sciences  of  sociology  and 
morals  arise,  this  external  scafiblding  ceases  to  be 
necessary,  and  must  even  become  injurious,  as,  in- 
deed, Theology  at  the  best  is  ill-adapted  to  the 
social  end  it  has  been  made  to  subserve. 

This   last    point    deserves    special    attention.      Ac-  Though,  in 

'^  ^  itself,  it  i» 

cording  to  Comte,  Theology,  and  above  all,  Mono-  un'ioc.illj; 
theistic  Theology,  is  a  system  the  direct  influence 
of  which  is  altogether  unfavourable  to  the  social 
tendencies,  although  indirectly — by  the  course  of 
history,  and  through  the  wise  modifications  to  which 
it  has  been  subjected  by  the  leaders  and  teachers  of 
mankind — it  has  become  the  main  instrument  in 
developing  altruism.  The  increasing  generality  of 
theological  belief,  indeed,  was  a  necessary  condition 
of  the  establishment  of  social  unity ;  but,  by  directing 
the  eyes  of  men  not  to  themselves  but  to  super- 
natural beings,  by  making  the  issues  of  life  turn 
on  the  favour  or  disfavour  of  such  beings  rather 
than  on  the  social  action  and  reaction  of  men  upon 
each  other,  and  by  reducing  this  world  into  a 
secondary  position,  and  subordinating  its  concerns 
to  those  of  another  world.  Theology  tended  to  dis- 
solve rather  than  to  knit  closer  the  bonds  of  society. 
The   relation  of  the   individual  to   God   isolated  him 


176      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

from  his  fellows.  Especially  was  this  the  case  with 
the  Christian  form  of  Monotheism,  with  its  tremen- 
dous future  rewards  and  penalties,  and  the  direct 
relation  which  it  established  between  the  soul  of 
the  individual  and  the  Infinite  Being.  "  The  im- 
mediate effect  of  putting  personal  salvation  in  the 
foremost  place  was  to  create  an  unparalleled  selfish- 
ness, a  selfishness  rendering  all  social  influences 
nugatory,  and  thus  tending  to  dissolve  public  life."'" 
"  The  Christian  type  of  life  was  never  fully  realized 
except  by  the  hermits  of  the  Thebaid,"  who,  "by 
narrowing  their  wants  to  the  lowest  standard,  were 
able  to  concentrate  their  thoughts  without  remorse 
or  distraction  on  the  attainment  of  salvation. "t  What 
else,  indeed,  but  egoism  could  be  awakened  by  the 
worship  of  a  God  who  is  himself  the  supreme  type 
of  egoism  ?  For  "  the  desires  of  an  omnipotent 
Being,  being  gratified  as  soon  as  formed,  can  consist 
in  nothing  but  pure  caprices.  For  Him  there  can  be 
no  appreciable  motive  either  from  within  or  from 
without.  And  above  all,  these  pure  caprices  must  of 
necessity  be  purely  personal ;  so  that  the  meta- 
physical fornmla,  To  live  in  self  for  self,  would  be 
alike  applicable  to  the  two  extreme  grades  of  the 
vital  scale.  This  type  of  divinity  approximates 
to   the  lowest  stage  of  animality,  the  only  shape  in 

*Pol.  Pos.  iii.  p.  411  :  Trans,  p.  348. 
t  Ibid.  iii.  p.  454  :  Trans,  p.  383. 


THEOLOG  V  SUBDUED  TO  A L  TR UJSM.       177 

which  life  is  purely  individual,  because  it  is  reduced 
to  the  one  function  of  nutrition."*  The  natural 
result  of  such  a  religion  was,  therefore,  to  discourage 
the  altruistic  affections :  as,  indeed.  Monotheism  has 
systematically  denied  that  such  affections  form  part 
of  the  nature   of  man. 

The  alchemy  which,  according  to  Comte,  turned  H"wit8 
this  poison  into  wholesome  food,  was  found  in  the  °!!"J"^e^t. 
altruistic  affections  of  the  teachers  of  mankind,  which 
led  them  to  limit  and  modify  the  doctrine  they 
taught,  so  as  to  subserve  man's  moral  improvement. 
This,  however,  would  not  have  been  sufficient,  if 
these  teachers  had  not  at  an  early  period  ceased 
to  be  a  theocracy,  or,  in  other  words,  if  the  practical 
government  of  mankind  had  not  been  wrested  from 
their  hand  by  the  military  classes.  By  this  change, 
which  contained  in  itself  the  germ  of  the  separation 
of  the  Church  from  the  State,  of  theory  from  practice, 
of  counsel  from  command,  the  priests,  prophets,  or 
philosophers,  who  were  the  intellectual  leaders  of 
men,  were  reduced  to  that  position  of  subordination 
in  which  alone  they  can  concentrate  their  attention 
upon  their  proper  work.  For  the  influences  of  the 
intellect,  like  those  of  the  affections,  must  be  indirect 
if  they  are  to  be  pure.  "No  power,  especially  if  it 
be  theological,  cares  to  modify  the  will,  unless  it 
finds    itself    unable    to    control    action."     But    when 

*  Ibid.  iii.  p.  446  :  Trans,  p.  376. 
M 


178      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

the  theoretic  class  were  subordinated  to  the  practical 
class,  they  became  the  natural  allies  of  the  womne, 
and,  like  them,  had  to  substitute  counsel  for  com- 
mand. At  tirst,  indeed,  their  subjection  was  too 
absolute,  for  the  military  aristocracies  of  Greece  and 
Eome  did  not  leave  to  tlie  priesthood  sufficient  in- 
dependence, or  at  least  sufficient  authority,  to  permit 
even  of  counsel.  But  with  the  rise  of  Catholic 
Monotheism,  supported  as  it  was  by  a  new  revelation 
based  upon  the  idea  of  an  incarnation  of  God,  the 
separation  of  Church  and  State  was  definitely  estab- 
lished, and  the  Intellectual  life  was  put  in  its  proper 
relation  to  the  life  of  action. 
Howciuis-        Xhe  consequence  is  that  the  theolocrical  priesthood 

tian  Mono-  •'•  or 

hunmiiled.  havc  Continually  sought  to  counteract  the  natural 
influences  of  their  doctrine  by  making  additions 
which  were  inconsistent  with  its  "  absolute  "  principle, 
but  which  rendered  it  better  fitted  for  the  purpose 
of  binding  men  together.  This  was  especially  the 
case  under  Monotheism,  where,  as  we  have  seen, 
such  counteraction  was  most  necessary.  From  this 
source  arose  a  series  of  supplementary  doctrines, 
generally  tending  to  connect  God  with  man,  and 
men  with  each  other,  i  St.  Paul,  "  the  real  founder 
of  Catholicism,"  took  the  first  step  in  reducing  Mono- 
^  theism  into  a  shape  in  which  it  could  act  as  an 
"  organic "  doctrine ;  and  his  successors  followed 
steadily    in   the   same    path.      If  the  omnipotence  of 


NATURE  AND  GRACE.  179 

God  raised  Him  above  all  human  sympathy,  ami 
tended  to  destroy  human  sympathy  in  his  worship- 
pers, the  doctrines  of  the  Trinity  and  the  Incarnation 
again  brought  God  near  to  men,  and  taught  them 
to  reverence  in  themselves  a  humanity  which  was 
raised  into  unity  with  God.  In  the  Feast  of  the 
Eucharist  all  men  celebrated  and  enjoyed  their  unity 
with  this  exalted  and  deified  humanity.  The  same 
influence,  in  its  further  development,  led  to  the 
adoration  of  the  saints,  and  al)Ove  all  of  the  Virgin 
Mother,  in  whom  Christian  devotion  really  worshipped 
Humanity,  in  its  simplest  and  tenderest  affections. 
Finally,  if  benevolent  sympathies  were  denied  to 
nature,  St.  Paul  found  a  place  for  them  by  attributing 
them  to  grace,  "  which  Thomas  a  Kempis  admirably 
defines  as  the  equivalent  of  love — gratia  sive  dilectio 
— divine  inspiration  being  substituted  for  human 
impulse."*  And  the  struggle  between  egoism  and 
altruism  was  expressed  in  the  doctrines  of  the  Fall 
and  Redemption  of  mankind.t  Thus  the  social  pas- 
sion which,  according  to  the  theory,  could  not  be 
derived  from  human  nature,  was  conceived  to  flow 
from  a  divine  influence,  and  became  ennobled,  at 
least  as  a  means  of  salvation,  in  the  eyes  of  those  /*• 
who  would  otherwise  have  suppressed  it.  At  the 
same  time,  as   Gomte   also   contends,   these   additions 

*  Pol.  Pos.  iii.  p.  447  :  Trans,  p.  378. 
+  Ibid.  iii.  p.  409  :  Trans.  346. 


180      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

or  corrections  of  the  original  doctrine  were  incon- 
sistent or  imperfect  in  themselves,  and  inadequate  to 
the  social  purpose  for  which  they  were  destined ; 
and  they  naturally  disappeared  whenever,  by  the 
emancipation  of  the  intelligence,  the  immense  egoism, 
which  Monotheism  consecrated  in  God  and  favoured 
in  man,  was  let  loose  from  the  bonds  in  which  the 
Church  had  confined  it.  Protestantism  was  the  first 
•  indication  of  this  change  ;  for  Protestantism  is  but 
an  organized  anarchy,  and  the  only  elements  of  order 
in  it  are  derived  from  an  instinctive  conservatism, 
clinging  to  the  fragments  of  a  past  doctrinal  system 
which,  in  principle,  has  been  abandoned.  It  contains 
no  organic  elements  of  its  own,  and  it  has  made 
no  positive  contribution  to  the  progressive  life  of 
humanity ;  it  is  simply  the  first  result  of  that 
metaphysical  individualism  which,  in  its  ultimate 
form,  freed  from  all  the  limits  of  the  Catholic 
system,  expressed  itself  theoretically  in  Eousseau 
and  Voltaire,  and  practically  in  the  Prench  Ee vo- 
lution, rriie  hope  of  mankind,  however,  lies  in 
ithe  new  synthesis  of  Positivism,  which  alone  can 
give  due  value  to  the  innate  altruistic  sympathies 
of  man ;  for  it  alone  can  place  on  a  permanent 
scientific  basis  that  social  order,  which  the  medi- 
aeval church  attempted  in  vain  to  found  on  the 
essentially  egoistic  and  anarchic  doctrine  of  Mono- 
theism. 


z 


TWO  ELEMENTS  IN  CHRISTIAXITY.        181 
The  fundamental  conception,  tlien,  which  underlies  <»i>i><"'Hio.. 

i  '  '  111  (.-loiucnti 

Comte's  view  of  progress  is,  that  every  past  religion,  |."„Vm  ouiic 
with  the  partial  exception  of  Fetichisni,  has  heen ''"" 
an  amalgam  of  two  radically  inconsistent  elements, 
of  which  only  one  was  due  to  the  theological  prin- 
ciple itself;  while  the  other  was  due,  ])artly  to  the 
practical  instinct  of  its  priests,  which  led  them  to 
modify  the  logical  results  of  that  principle  in  con- 
formity with  the  social  wants  of  man ;  and  partly 
also  to  their  subordinate  position,  which  obliged 
them  to  use  the  spiritual  means  of  conviction  and 
persuasion  instead  of  the  ruder  weapons  of  material 
force.  To  criticize  this  theory  fully  would  be  to 
re-write  Comte's  history  of  religion.  It  will  be  suffi- 
cient here  to  point  out  that  his  view  of  modern 
history  begins  in  a  false  interpretation  of  Christianity, 
and  ends  in  an  equally  false  interpretation  of  the 
Protestant  Reformation. 

Christianity    from    its  origin    has    two    aspects   or  Did  tins  di»- 

<>  ^  ^  cord  exist  ill 

elements ;  and  if  we  compare  it  with  earlier  religions,  ci'nstian- 
we  may  call  these  its  Pantheistic  and  its  Monothe- 
istic elements.  But  these  elements  are  not,  as  Comte 
asserts,  joined  together  by  a  mere  external  necessity. 
They  are  necessarily  connected  in  the  inner  logic  of 
the  system ;  nor  can  we  regard  one  of  them  as 
more  or  less  essential  than  the  other.  In  the 
simplest  words  of  the  Gospels  we  find  already  ex- 
pressed   a    sense    of    reconciliation     with     Clod,    and 


182      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

therefore  with  tlie  worhl  and  self,  which  is  alien 
to  pure  Monotheism,  though  there  is  some  faint 
anticipation  of  it  in  the  later  books  of  the  Old 
Testament.  For  a  spiritual  Monotheism,  while  it 
awakens  a  consciousness  of  the  holiness  of  God,  and 
the  sinfulness  of  the  creature,  tends  to  make  fear 
prevail  over  love,  and  the  sense  of  separation  over 
the  sense  of  union.  The  idea  of  the  unity  of  the 
Divine  and  the  Human — an  original  unity  which 
yet  has  to  be  realized  by  self-sacrifice — and  the 
corresponding  idea  that  the  individual  or  natural  life 
must  be  lost  in  order  to  save  it,  were  presented  for 
the  first  time,  as  in  one  great  living  picture,  in 
the  life  and  death  of  Jesus.  And  what  was  thus 
directly  presented  to  the  heart  and  the  imagination 
in  an  individual,  was  universalized  in  the  writings 
of  St.  Paul  and  St.  John;  in  other  words,  it  was 
there  liberated  from  its  peculiar  national  setting,  and 
used  as  a  key  to  the  general  moral  history  of  man. 
The  Messiah  of  the  Jews  was  exalted  into  the  Divine 
Logos,  and  the  Cross  became  the  symbol  of  an 
atonement  and  reconciliation  between  God  and  man, 
which  has  been  made  "  before  the  foundation  of  the 
\vorld,"  yet  which  has  to  be  made  again  in  every 
human  life.  The  work  of  the  first  three  centuries 
was  to  give  to  this  idea  such  logical  expression  as 
was  then  possible,  in  the  doctrines  of  the  Incarnation 
and    the    Trinity.      It    is    true    that    this    idea    of   the 


SEPARATION  OF  CHURCH  AA'I)  ST  AT  J-.     1.S3 

unity  of  man  with  (Jod  was  not  iniinediatcly  carried 
out  to  any  of  the  consequences  wliich  might  seem 
to  be  contained  in  it.  It  remained  for  a  time  a 
religion,  and  a  religion  only  ;  it  did  not  show  itself 
to  be  the  principle  of  a  new  social  or  political 
order  of  life.  Rather  it  accepted  tlie  old  order 
represented  by  the  Roman  Empire,  and  even  conse- 
crated it  as  "ordained  of  God,"  only  demanding  for 
itself  that  it  should  be  allowed  to  purify  the  innei- 
life  of  men.  Such  a  separation  of  the  things  of 
Cjesar  and  the  things  of  God  was  then  inevitable ; 
for  it  is  impossible  that  a  new  principle  can  ever 
be  received,  simply  and  without  alloy,  into  minds 
which  are  at  tlie  same  time  occupying  themselves 
with  its  utmost  practical  or  even  its  utmost  theo- 
retical consequences.  In  this  sense  there  is  much 
truth  in  what  Comte  says  about  the  value  of  the 
separation  of  the  spiritual  from  tlie  temporal  autho- 
rity. The  power  of  directly  realizing  a  new  religious 
principle,  just  because  it  draws  away  attention  from 
the  principle  itself  to  the  details  of  its  practical 
application,  is  likely  to  prevent  that  application  being 
either  a  complete  or  even  a  true  expression  of  the 
principle.  Practical  inferences  from  such  a  principle 
cannot  safely  be  drawn  by  mere  logical  deduction ; 
they  will  be  drawn  with  certainty  and  effect  only 
by  those  whose  whole  spiritual  life  the  principle  has 
remoulded.      The  decided  withdrawal  of  tlie  Christian 


the  middle 
ages, 


184      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

Church  from  the  sphere  of  "  practical  politics "  was, 
therefore,  not  merely  a  necessity  forced  upon  it  from 
without ;  it  was  a  condition  which  its  best  members 
gladly  accepted,  because  without  it  the  inner  trans- 
formation of  man's  life  by  the  new  doctrine  would 
have  been  impossible.  If  Christianity  had  raised  a 
servile  insurrection,  it  never  could  have  put  an  end 
to  slavery. 
duaiTsm^n  ^^^  whilc  this  withdrawal  was  necessary,  it  con- 
tained a  great  danger ;  for  the  inner  life  cannot  be 
separated  from  the  outer  life  without  becoming 
narrowed  and  distorted.  Confined  to  the  sphere  of 
religion  and  private  morality,  the  doctrine  of  unity 
and  reconciliation  necessarily  became  itself  the  source 
of  a  new  dualism.  What  had  been  at  first  merely 
neglect  of  the  world  was  gradually  changed  into 
hostility  to  worldly  interests ;  and  the  germs  of  a 
positive  morality,  reconciling  the  flesh  and  the  spirit, 
which  appear  in  the  New  Testament,  were  neglected 
and  overshadowed  in  the  growth  of  asceticism. 
Christianity,  even  in  its  first  expression,  had  a 
negative  side  towards  the  natural  life  of  man  ;  while 
it  lifted  man  to  God,  it  yet  taught  that  humanity 
"  cannot  be  quickened  except  it  die."  But  the 
mediaeval  Church,  while  it  constantly  taught  that 
humanity  must  die  to  all  its  natural  impulses,  had 
almost  forgotten  to  hope  that  it  could  be  quickened. 
Its  highest  morality — the  morality  of  the  three  vows 


MEDIAEVAL  ASCETICISM.  185 

— was  the  negatiou  of  all  social  olilij^ations ;  its 
science  was  the  interpretation  of  a  tixod  dogma 
received  on  authority ;  its  religion  tended  to  become 
an  external  service,  an  opus  opcratum,  a  preparation 
for  another  world,  rather  than  a  principle  of  action 
in  this.  Its  highest  act  of  worsliij),  iJie  Eucharist, 
in  which  it  celebrated  the  revealed  unity  of  men 
with  each  other  and  with  God,  was  reserved  in  its 
fulness  for  the  clergy  ;  and  even  with  them  it  was 
reduced  to  an  external  act  by  the  doctrine  of  tran- 
substantiation,  in  which  poetry  "  became  logic,"  and 
in  becoming  logic,  ceased  to  be  trutli. 

Now,  Comte  seeing  the   working   of   this   nefiative  uuityofti.. 

°  °  °  twocle- 

tendency  in  mediaeval  Catholicism,  and  regarding  it  "j"|gtiin 
as  the  natural  work  of  j\Ionotheism,  is  obliged  to  '*^' 
treat  all  the  positive  side  of  Christianity  as  an 
external  addition  suggested  by  the  practical  wisdom 
of  the  clergy.  St.  l*aul  is  supposed  l>y  him  to  have 
invented  (and  Comte's  language  would  even  suggest 
that  he  consciously  invented*)  the  doctrine  of  grace, 
in  order  to  reconsecrate  those  social  afl'ections  which 
Monotheism,  in  its  condemnation  of  nature,  had  either 
denied  to  exist,  or,  what  is  nearer  the  truth,  had 
treated  as  having  no  moral  value,  liut  this  only 
shows  how  imperfectly  Comte  had  grasped  the  Pauline 
conception  of  the  moral  change  which  religion  pro- 
duces.  fThe   idea   that   the   immediate   untamed   and~ 


*Pol.  Pos.  iii.  p.  409:    Trans,  p.  346. 


Y 


I] 


186      T//E  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

undisciplined  will  of  the  natural  man  is  not  a 
principle  of  morality,  and  that  therefore  man  must 
die  to  live,  must  rise  above  himself  to  be  himself, 
is  one  which  has  in  it  nothing  discordant  with  the 
claims  of  social  feeling.  It  is  the  commonplace  of 
every  powerful  writer  on  practical  ethics,  from  the 
Gospels  to  Thomas  a  Kempis,  and  from  Luther  to 
Goethe. 

"  Und  so  lang  du  das  iiicht  hast, 
Dieses  :    Stirb  and  Werde, 
Bist  du  nur  eiii  triiber  Gast 
Auf  der  dunkelu  Erde." 

St.  Paul  adds  that  this  death  to  self  is  possible 
only  to  him  in  whom  another  than  his  own  natural 
will  lives ;  "  so  then  it  is  not  I  that  live,  but 
Christ  that  liveth  in  me."  Comte  would  accept  the 
words  of  St.  Paul  with  the  substitution  of  Humanity 
for  Christ.  But  either  substitution  involves  the 
negation  of  the  natural  tendencies,  whether  individ- 
ual or  social,  in  their  immediate  natural  form ;  and 
Comte  himself,  when  he  placed  not  only  the  sexual 
but  even  the  maternal  impulse  among  those  that 
are  merely  "  personal  or  egoistic,"  virtually  acknow- 
ledged that  the  natural  or  instructive  basis  of  the 
altruistic  affections  is  not  in  itself  moral.""  But 
because  he  begins  with  a  psychology  which  treats 
the  egoistic  and  altruistic  desires,  and  again  the 
*Ibid.  i.  p.   726:    Trans,  p.  562. 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  CHRISTIANITY.         1  S7 

intellect  and  the  heart,  as  distinct  and  independent 
entities,  he  is  nnable  to  do  justice  to  an  account 
of  moral  experience  whicli  involves  that  they  are 
essentially  related  elements  in  one  whole,  or  neces- 
sarily connected  stages  of  its  development. 

In  the  form  in  which   it  was  first   presented,  the  ''!''"-•''■  "pp"- 

*■  '  KitlOU  111  ith 

teaching  of  Christianity  was  undoubtedly  ambiguous ;  lll'Jut"'' 
as,  indeed,  every  doctrine  in  its  first  and  simplest 
form  must  be.  In  that  form  we  cannot,  without 
limitations,  call  it  either  social  or  anti-social ;  it  is 
anti-social  and  ascetic,  because  of  its  negative  re- 
lations  to  the  previous  forms  of  life  and  culture ; 
it  is  social  and  positive,  in  so  far  as  in  its  primary 
doctrine  of  the  unity  of  the  divine  and  human — of 
divinity  manifested  in  man  and  humanity  made 
perfect  through  suffering — it  contains  the  promise 
and  the  necessity  of  a  development  by  which  nature 
and  spirit  shall  be  reconciled.  The  progressive  tend- 
ency of  Christendom  was  based  on  the  fact  that 
from  the  earliest  times  the  followers  of  Christ  were 
placed  in  the  dilennna,  either  of  denying  their  primary 
doctrine  of  reconciliation  between  (Jod  and  man  and 
going  back  to  pure  Monotheism,  or  of  advancing  to 
the  reconciliation  of  all  those  other  antagonisms  of 
spirit  and  nature,  the  world  and  the  Church,  which 
arose  out  of  the  circumstances  of  its  first  publication. 
And  modern  history  is  more  than  anything  else  the 
history    of    the    long    process    whereby    this    logical 


188       THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

necessity  manifested  itself  in  fact.  The  negative 
spirit  of  the  ]\Iiddle  Age,  its  asceticism,  its  dualism, 
its  formalism,  its  tendency  to  transform  the  moral 
opposition  of  natural  and  spiritual  into  an  external 
opposition  between  two  separate  worlds,  present  and 
future,  and  thus  to  suljstitute  "  other-wordliness  "  for 
worldliness,  instead  of  substituting  unworldliness  for 
both — all  these  characteristics  were  the  natural 
results  of  the  fact  that  the  idea  of  Christianity,  in 
its  first  abstract  form,  could  not  include,  and  there- 
fore necessarily  became  opposed  to,  the  forms  of 
social  life  and  organization  with  which  it  came  into 
contact.  But  while  the  early  Christians  looked  for 
the  realization  of  the  kingdom  of  Heaven  in  some 
immediate  earthly  future,  and  the  Middle  Age  post- 
poned it  to  another  life,  Jesus  had  already  taught  the 
truth,  which  alone  can  turn  either  of  these  hopes  into 
something  more  than  the  expression  of  an  egoistic 
desire — the  truth  that  "  the  kingdom  of  God  is  in  the 
midst  of  us."  The  reaction  of  the  social  necessities 
of  mediaeval  society  on  the  doctrine — which  Comte 
quite  correctly  describes  as  leading  to  the  gradual 
elevation  of  humanity  and  of  human  interests — found 
its  main  support  in  the  principles  of  the  doctrine 
itself,  so  soon  as  its  lessons  had  been  absorbed  into 
the  mind  of  the  people.  And  the  irresistible  force 
of  the  movement,  whereby  at  a  later  period  the 
intelligence    was    emancipated    from    authority,    and 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  CHRISTIANITY.         lyQ 

the  claims  of  tlie  Family  and  llio  State  were  asserted 
against  the  Church,  lay  above  all  in  this,  that  Chris- 
tianity itself  was  felt  to  involve  tlic  consecration  of 
human  life  in  all  its  interests  and  relations.  Luther's 
appeal  to  the  New  Testament  and  to  the  earliest 
ages  of  Cliristianity  was  in  some  ways  nnhistorical, 
but  it  expressed  a  truth.  Protestantism  was  not 
a  return  to  the  Christianity  of  the  first  century ; 
it  was  an  assertion  of  the  relation  of  the  individual 
to  God,  which  was  itself  made  possible  only  by  the 
long  work  of  Latin  Catholicism.  But  the  develop- 
ment of  a  doctrine,  if  it  has  in  it  any  germ  of 
truth  which  is  capable  of  development,  involves  a 
continual  recurrence  to  its  first,  and  therefore  its 
most  general,  expression.  The  elements  successively 
developed  in  the  Catholic  and  the  Protestant,  the 
Latin  and  the  Germanic  forms  of  Christianity,  were 
both  present  in  the  original  germ,  and  the  exagger- 
ated prominence  given  in  the  former  to  the  ncrjative 
side  of  Christianity  could  not  but  lead,  in  the 
development  of  thought,  to  a  similarly  exaggerated 
manifestation  of  its  j^ositive  side.  But  it  is  nearly 
as  absurd  to  say,  as  Comte  does,  that  the  true 
logical  outcome  of  Christianity  is  to  be  found  in  the 
"  life  of  the  hermits  of  the  Thebaid,"  as  it  would 
be  to  say  that  its  true  logical  outcome  is  to  be 
found  in  those  vehement  assertions  of  nature — naked 
and  unashamed — as  its  own  sufficient  warrant,  which 


190      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

poured    almost    with    the    force    of   inspiration    from 
the    lips    of    Diderot.     Both    extremes    are    equally 
removed    from   that   special    moral  temper  and    tone 
of   feeling    which    we    call    distinctively   Christian — 
the  former  by  its  want  of  sympathy  and  tenderness, 
no   less   than   the   latter   by  its   want   of  purity  and 
self-command.      Eeassertion    of    nature     through     its 
negation,  or   to  put  it   more   simply,  the   purification 
of  the   natural   desires   by  the   renunciation  of  their 
immediate   gratification,  is  the  idea   that  is    more   or 
less   definitely   present   in   all   phases   of  the   history 
of  Christianity ;   and,  though  swaying  from  one  side 
to  the  other,  the  religious  life  of  modern  times  has 
never   ceased   to   present   both   aspects.      Even   a   St. 
Augustine   recoiled   from   the   Manichreism   by  which 
nature   was   regarded,  not   simply  as   fallen   from   its 
original    idea,    but    as    essentially   impure.     And,   on 
the    other    hand,    even    Kousseau's     Savoyard    vicar, 
who  freed   himself   from  the  negative  or  ascetic  ele- 
ment as  completely  as  is   possible   for   any  one  still 
retaining    any    tincture    of    Christianity    or    even    of 
religion,   and    who    insists    so    strongly   on    the    text 
that   "  the    natural   is   the    moral,"   is   yet    forced    to 
recognize   that   nature   has  two    voices,  and  that   the 
raison  commune  has  to  overcome   and   transform   the 
natural   inclinations   of    the    individual.      In   the   life 
of   its    Founder,    the    Christian    Church    has    always 
had    before   it   an   individual   type   of    that   harmony 


EGOISM  A ND  ALTRUISM.  \ f)  1 

of  the  spiritual  and  natunil  life,  wliicli  it  is  its 
ideal  to  realize  in  all  the  wider  social  relations  of 
man ;  nor,  till  that  ideal  is  reached,  can  it  be  said 
that  the  Christian  idea  is  exhausted,  or  that  the 
place  is  vacant  for  a  new  religion, — great  as  may 
be  the  changes  of  form  and  expression  through  which 
Christianity  must  pass  under  the  chahged  conditions 
of  modern  life. 

That  Conite  was    not    able  to   discern    this,   arose,  i'o«ntc-» 

own 

as    we    have    seen,   from    the    fact    that    he    lield    to  '•""''''"'■ 
a  kind   of    Mauichansm    of    his    own,  ^To    him    the  ( 
egoistic    and    the    altruistic    desires    were    two    kinds 
of  innate    tendencies,  both    of    which    exist   in    man 
from  the  first,  though   with  a  greater  preponderance 
on  the  side  of  egoism.*     Moral  improvement  simply 

*Comte  insists  with  great  force  on  tlie  danger  of  taking 
an  organism  as  the  mere  sum  of  its  parts,  or  its  life  as 
merely  the  resultant  of  their  external  action  and  reaction 
upon  each  other  ;  but  in  his  psychological  analysis,  he  often 
seems  to  forget  this  principle.  If  he  recognizes  that,  as  we 
rise  in  the  scale  of  animal  life,  there  is  a  continually  advanc- 
ing differentiation  of  the  simple  unity  we  find  in  the  lowest 
organisms,  he  does  not  always  remember  that  this  implies 
and  necessitates  a  correspondent  integration.  Hence  in  the 
end  the  unity  which  he  establishes  between  the  different 
elements,  e.g.^  between  the  intellect  and  the  heart,  or  between 
the  egoistic  and  the  social  impulses,  is  external  and  artificial. 
In  his  Psychology  the  fact  that  it  is  /  who  think,  /  who 
feel,  /  who  desire,  finds  no  sufiicient  place,  and,  therefore,  in 
his  Ethics  he  can  I'each  no  ideal  except  that  of  an  external 
harmony    of   the   different   faculties    and    tendencies.      Where 


192      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

consists  in  altering  the  original  proportions  in  favour 
of  altruism,  and  moral  perfection  would  be  the  com- 
plete extinction  of  egoism  (which  with  Comte  would 
naturally  mean  the  extinction  of  all  the  desires 
classified  as  personal).  Hence  there  is  a  somewhat 
ascetic  tendency  in  some  of  the  ideas  of  the  Politique 
Positive — i.e.,  asceticism  sometimes  appears  in  it,  not 
simply  as  a  transitionary  process  through  which 
certain  natural  desires  are  to  be  purified,  but  as 
'  an  attempt,  so  far  as  possible,  to  extinguish  thern^ 
A  deeper  analysis  would  have  shown  that  the  desires 
in  themselves,  as  mere  natural  impulses,  are  neither 
egoistic  nor  altruistic,  neither  bad  nor  good ;  and 
that  if,  as  they  appear  in  the  self-conscious  life  of 
men,  they  are  necessarily  infected  with  egoism,  yet 
that  the  ego  is  not  absolutely  opposed  to  the  alter 
ego,  but  rather  implies  it.  A  spiritual  or  self- 
conscious  being  is  one  who  can  realize  his  own  in- 
dividual good  only  as  he  realizes  the  good  of  others: 
but,  in  seeking  to  realize  such  a  good,  it  is  not 
needful  that  he  should  renounce  any  natural  desire 
as  impure ;  for  there  is  no  natural  desire  which  may 
not   become   an   expression  of  the  better  self,  which 

the  primary  unity  below  the  diflPerence  and  conflict  of  the 
parts  is  not  recognized,  it  becomes  impossible  to  see  beyond 
their  antagonism  to  its  reconciliation  in  a  final  unity. 

See  especially  Comte's  sketch  of  Psychology  in  the  third 
chapter  of  the  Introduction  Fondamentale.  Pol.  Pos.  i.  685, 
seq. 


IS  CHRISTIANITY  OTHER-WORIDUNESS  ?  lOH 

is   ego    and    alter    ego    in    one.      But    Comte,    unable 
from   the    limitations   of  his   psychology   to    see    the 
true  relation  of  tlie   negative   and    the   positive   side 
of    ethics,    is    obliged   to   treat    the    ascetic  tendency 
of  Christianity  as  involving  a  denial  of  the  existence 
in    man    of    innate    social    sympathies ;   and    on    the 
other  hand,   to  regard    the    efforts    of    the    Christian 
Church   to  cultivate  such    sympathies,   as   the   result 
of  an   external   accommodation.     His  idea   of  Chris- 
tianity   practically   coincides    with    the    definition   of 
virtue  given   by  Paley ;   it  is   "  doing   good   to  man, 
in   obedience   to    the   will    of   God,  with    a    view   to 
eternal  happiness."     On  this  view  the  Christian  life 
is  the  pursuit  of  a  selfish    end    by   means   in  tiiem- 
selves    unselfish,    or    it   is    selfishness   turned    to   un- 
selfish action    in    view    of   the    pleasures    and    pains 
of   another    world  ;    and    so    soon    as    doubt    is    cast 
upon    these    supernatural    rewards  and  punishments, 
the   false   show    of   benevolence   must   disappear   and 
leave   bare    selfishness    in    its    place.     Hence    Comte 
is  just  neither  to  Catholicism  nor  to  Protestantism ; 
for,  while  he  maintains   the   former   to   be   only   in- 
directly   social,    he    regards     the    latter    as    the    first 
step   in    a   scepticism   which,   taking   away   the  fears 
and  hopes  of  another  world,  must  at  the  same  time 
take   away  all  restraint  upon  selfishness.     And,  just 
because   he  is  unable  fully  to  understand  either  the 
negative  spirit   of  the   earlier,   or   the   positive  spirit 


194      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

of  the  later,  phase  of  modern  life,  he  has  an  im- 
perfect appreciation  of  that  social  ideal  to  which 
both  are  tending,  and  which  must  combine  in  itself 
the  true  elements  of  both.  Yet  we  cannot  say  that 
he  is  equally  unfair  to  Catholicism  and  to  Protes- 
tantism. It  is  the  temptation  of  writers  on  social 
subjects  to  be  least  just  to  the  tendencies  of  the 
time  which  precedes  their  own,  and  against  the 
errors  of  which  they  have  immediately  to  contend. 
Hence  we  are  not  surprised  to  find  that  Comte 
does  more  justice  to  Catholicism  than  to  Protes- 
tantism, or  to  that  Individualism  which  grew  out 
of  Protestantism.  The  Reformation  and  the  so- 
called  Enlightenment  he  regards  solely  on  their 
destructive  side,  as  successive  stages  in  the  modern 
movement  of  revolt,  while  he  fails  to  appreciate 
the  constructive  elements  involved  in  each  of  them. 
Hence  also,  in  his  attitude  towards  this  great  move- 
ment, he  all  but  identifies  himself  with  Catholic 
writers  like  De  Maistre ;  and  his  own  scheme  of 
the  future  is  essentially  reactionary.  The  restoration 
of  the  spiritual  power  to  its  mediaeval  position  was 
for  Comte  a  natural  proposal,  because  he  could 
see  in  the  Protestant  revolt  nothing  more  than 
an  insurrectionary  movement,  which  might  clear 
the  way  for  a  new  social  construction,  but  which 
in  itself  was  the  negation  of  all  government  what- 
ever. 


TM^O  ASPECTS  OF  PROTESTANTISM.        l!)") 

But  what  was  Protestantism?  '\\^  llie  Protestant  T}io'ie/ocu 
it  seemed  to  be  simply  a  return  to  the  original  ^""'""■ 
purity  of  the  Christian  iaith ;  to  the  Catholic,  it 
seemed  to  be  a  fatal  revolt  against  the  only  organiz- 
ation by  which  Christianity  could  be  realized.  Ifeally 
it  partook  of  both  characters.  It  involved  a  danger- 
ous misconception  of  the  social  conditions,  under 
which  alone  the  religious  life  can  be  realized  and 
developed ;  but  it  involved  also  a  deeper  and  truer 
apprehension  of  that  religion,  which  first  recognized 
the  latent  divinity,  or  universal  capacity,  of  every 
spiritual  being  as  such,  and  which,  therefore,  seemed 
to  impose  upon  every  individual  man  the  right,  or 
rather  the  duty,  of  living  by  the  witness  of  his  own 
spirit.  Comte  saw  only  the  former  of  these  two 
aspects  of  it.  Hence  he  regarded  the  Frencli  Re- 
volution as  a  practical  refutation  of  the  individualism 
which  grew  out  of  the  Protestant  movement,  and 
not,  as  it  was  in  truth,  a  critical  event,  which  forced 
men  to  distinguish  and  separate  its  true  from  its 
false  elements.  He  drew  from  it,  indeed,  a  true 
lesson — the  lesson  that  the  individual  as  such  has 
no  moral  or  religious  life  of  his  own,  and  that  it 
is  only  in  proportion  as  he  transcends  his  own  in- 
dividuality and  lives  in  the  life  of  humanity,  that 
his  spiritual  life  can  have  any  depth  or  riches  in 
it.'  "We  are  afraid  to  put  men  to  live  and  trade 
each   on   his   own    private    stock    of    reason,    because 


19G      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

we  suspect  that  the  stock  in  each  man  is  small, 
and  that  the  individuals  would  do  better  to  avail 
themselves  of  the  general  bank  and  capital  of  nations 
and  of  ages."  The  truth  expressed  in  these  words 
was  seen  as  clearly  by  Comte  as  by  Burke.  And 
because  he  saw  it,  Comte  regarded  the  Protestant 
Individualism  which  throws  individuals  back  upon 
themselves,  as  tending  merely  to  empty  their  minds 
of  all  real  interests,  and  to  deliver  them  over  to 
their  own  caprices.  ■  Private  judgment  and  popular 
^  government  were  to  him  only  pretentious  names  for 
intellectual  and  political  anarchy ;  and  his  remedy 
for  the  moral  diseases  of  modern  times  was  the 
restoration  of  that  division  of  the  spiritual  and 
temporal  authorities,  which  existed  in  the  Middle 
I  Ages,  - 
The  good  There  is,  however,  another   aspect   of  the   Protes- 

side  of  Pro- 
testantism,  tantism    and    of   the    apparently    anarchical   doctrines 

derived  from  it,  to  which  Comte  pays  no  attention. 
Catholicism,  as  we  have  seen,  had  developed  one 
aspect  of  Christianity,  until,  by  its  exclusive  pro- 
minence, the  principle  of  Christianity  itself  was  on 
the  point  of  being  lost.  It  had  changed  the  division 
between  laity  and  clergy,  world  and  Church,  from  a 
relative  to  an  absolute  division ;  it  had  presented 
Christian  doctrine,  not  as  something  which  the  spirit 
of  the  individual  may  ultimately  verify  for  itself, 
but  as  something  which   it  must  submissively  accejDt 


CATHOLICISM  IMPERFECT  CHRISTIANITY.    I!l7 

without  any  VL'ritication.  k  had  made  Christian 
worship  into  an  oyus  operatum,  a  work  done  by 
the  priest  for  the  people,  instead  of  a  means  through 
which  the  feelings  of  the  people  could  be  at  once 
drawn  out  and  expressed.  Now,  it  is  as  opposed 
to  these  tendencies  that  the  I'rotestant  movi'mcnt 
had  its  highest  value.  Each  of  the  so-called  anarchic 
doctrines,  against  which  Comte  protests,  has  a  good 
as  well  as  a  bad  meaning.  If,  c.fj.,  it  is  nothing 
less  than  intellectual  anarchy  for  every  individual 
to  claim  to  judge  for  himself,  on  subjects  for  which 
he  has  not  the  requisite  training  or  discipline,  it 
is  a  slavery  scarcely  less  corrupting  in  its  elfect 
than  anarchy,  when  he  is  made  to  regard  the  differ- 
ence between  himself  and  his  teachers  as  a  permanent 
and  absolute  one.  In  the  former  case,  he  has  no 
sufhcient  feeling  of  his  want  to  make  him  duly 
submissive  to  teaching ;  in  the  latter,  he  has  no 
sufficient  consciousness  of  his  capacity  to  be  taught, 
to  permit  a  due  reaction  of  his  thought  upon  the 
matter  received  from  his  teachers.  Again,  the 
doctrine  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  people  is  the 
negation  of  all  government  and  social  order,  if  it 
be  taken  to  mean  that  the  uninstructed  many  sliould 
govern  themselves  by  their  own  insight,  and  tliat 
the  instructed  few  should  simply  be  their  servants 
and  their  instruments.  But  where  the  people  are 
not    recognized     as    the    ultimate    source    of    power. 


198      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

where  their  consent  is  not  in  any  regular  way  made 
necessary  to  the  proceedings  of  their  governors,  they 
are  by  that  very  fact  kept  in  a  perpetual  tutelage, 
and  cannot  possibly  feel  that  the  life  of  the  state 
is  their  own  life.  Now,  the  most  important  effect 
of  the  Protestant  movement  was  just  this,  that  it 
awakened  in  the  individual  the  consciousness  of  his 
universal  nature,  or,  in  other  words,  the  conscious- 
ness that  there  is  no  external  power  or  sovereignty, 
divine  or  human,  to  which  he  has  absolutely  and 
permanently  to  submit,  but  that  every  outward  claim 
of  authority  must  ultimately  be  justified  by  the 
inner  witness  of  his  own  spirit.  The  freedom  of 
man  consists  in  this,  that  his  obedience  to  the 
State,  to  the  Church,  even  to  God,  is  the  obedience 
of  his  natural  to  his  spiritual  self.  The  essential 
truth  of  the  lieformation  lay  in  its  republication 
of  the  doctrine  that  the  voice  of  God  speaks  not 
only  without  but  also  within  us,  and  indeed  that 
"  it  is  only  by  the  God  within  that  we  can  com- 
prehend the  God  without."  And  the  nations,  which 
had  learned  that  lesson  in  religion,  soon  hastened 
to  apply  it  to  the  social  and  political  order  of  life. 
It  is  undoubtedly  a  lesson  which  is  liable  to  mis- 
apprehension ;  as  may  be  seen,  not  only  from  the 
tendency  of  many  Protestant  sects  to  put  the  inner 
life  in  opposition  to  the  outer,  and  so  to  deprive 
the   former  of  all  wider  contents  and  interests  ;  but 


THE  TRUTH  IN  PROTESTANTISM.  iQf) 

also  from  the  ultimate  substitution,  by  Kousseau 
and  others,  of  the  assertion  of  the  natural,  fur  the 
assertion  of  the  spiritual,  man.  By  such  writers 
the  mere  capacity  of  man  for  a  higher  life  is  treated 
as  if  it  were  the  higher  life  itself:  and  it  is  for- 
gotten that  the  capacity  is  notliing  unless  it  be 
realized,  and  that  its  realization  requires  the  sur- 
render of  individual  liberty  and  private  judgment 
to  the  guidance  and  teaching  of  those,  in  whom 
that  realization  has  already  taken  place.  But  it 
is  not  the  less  true  that  the  consciousness  of  the 
capacity,  and  consequently  of  the  duty,  of  becoming 
not  merely  a  slave  or  instrument,  but  an  organ, 
of  the  intellectual  and  moral  life  of  mankind,  is 
the  essential  basis  of  modern  life.  "  Henceforth,  I 
call  ye  not  servants,  for  the  servant  knoweth  not 
what  his  lord  doeth ;  but  I  have  called  you  friends," 
is  a  word  of  Christ  which  scarcely  began  to  be 
verified  till  the  Eeformation.  And  while  its  veri- 
fication cannot  mean  the  negation  of  that  division 
of  labour  upon  which  society  rests, — cannot  mean 
that  each  one  should  know  and  judge,  any  more 
than  that  each  one  should  do,  everything  for  him- 
self,— it  at  least  means  that  every  power  and  autho- 
rity should  henceforth  be,  in  the  true  sense  of  the 
word,  a  spiritual  power,  and  should,  therefore,  rest 
for  its  main  support  upon  the  opinion  of  those  who 
obey  it.     It  is  because  he  has   not   appreciated  this 


•200      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

truth  that  Comte  so  decidedly  breaks  with  the  demo- 
cratic spirit  of  modern  times,  and  seeks  to  set  up 
an  aristocracy  in  the  State  and  a  monarchy  in  the 
Church.  Yet  the  spirit  of  the  age  is,  after  all,  too 
strong  for  him,  and  while  he  refuses  to  the  governed 
any  regular  and  legitimate  way  of  reacting  upon 
the  powers  that  govern  them,  he  recognizes  that 
the  ultima  ratio,  the  final  remedy  for  misgovern- 
ment,  lies  in  their  irregular  and  illegitimate  action. 
As  regards  the  State,  he  declares  that  "  the  right 
of  insurrection  is  the  ultimate  resource  with  which 
no  society  should  allow  itself  to  dispense."  *  And 
as  regards  the  Church  he  says  that  if  "  the  High 
Priest  of  Humanity,  supported  by  the  body  of  the 
clergy,  should  go  wrong,  then  the  only  remedy  left 
would  be  the  refusal  of  co-operation,  a  remedy  which 
can  never  fail,  as  the  priesthood  rests  solely  on 
conscience  and  opinion,  and  succumbs,  therefore,  to 
their  adverse  sentence."  The  civil  government,  in 
fact,  can  bring  the  spiritual  power  to  a  dead- lock, 
by  "  suspending  its  stipend,  for  in  cases  of  serious 
error  popular  subscriptions  would  not  replace  it, 
unless  on  the  supposition  of  a  fanaticism  scarcely 
compatible  with  the  Positive  faith,  where  there  is 
enthusiasm  for  the  doctrines,  rather  than  for  the 
teachers."*!*     Comte  also  desiderates  a  strong  reactive 

*Cf.  Pol.  Pos.  i.  128  se^. 
tPol.  Pos.  iv.  337  :  Trans.  294. 


CHURCH  A  ND  ST  A  TE.  •_>( )  1 

influence  of  public  opinion  from  llie  proletariate,  Ijy 
which  the  officers,  both  of  Church  ami  Slate,  may 
be  kept  faithful  to  their  work.  lUit  if  thi«  is 
desirable,  why  should  the  proletariate  have  no  re<,'ular 
means  of  making  their  will  felt  ?  An  "  organic " 
theory  of  the  constitution  of  society  nuist  surely 
provide  every  real  force  with  a  legitimate  form  of 
expression ;  if  a  social  theory  embodies  in  itself  the 
idea  of  revolution,  it  is  self-condemned. 

Comte's   social   ideal    is   in   many  respects  a  close  cmte's  imr- 

■^  ^  tiul  rovlvul 

reproduction  of  the  mediaival  system,  with  its  renimc  °^  *'l"  , 
dispcrsif  of  feudalism  in  the  world,  and  its  Papal  ^•"■*^™- 
concentration  of  authority  in  the  Church.  For  him, 
the  establishment  of  the  national  State  is  as  great 
an  error  in  secular  politics,  as  is  the  increasing 
division  of  labour  in  the  spiritual  kingdom  of  science. 
Still  more  strongly,  if  possible,  does  he  reprobate 
that  mingling  of  the  functions  of  Church  and  State, 
that  interference  of  the  secular  authority  with  spir- 
itual matters,  such  as  the  education  of  the  people 
and  its  religious  life,  which  has  been  the  natural 
consequence  of  the  failure  of  the  niedi;eval  Church 
to  maintain  its  old  authority.  Notwithstanding  his 
worship  of  Humanity,  the  idea  of  a  "  parliament  of 
man,  a  federation  of  the  world,"  by  which  all  the 
powers  of  mankind  should  be  united  for  the  attain- 
ment of  the  highest  material  and  spiritual  good,  has 
no   attraction   for   him.      To  reduce  the  State  to  the 


202      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

dimensions  of  a  commune,  and   to   confine  it  to  the 
care  of  purely  material  interests,  is  his  first  political 
proposal.     France,  England,  and  Spain  (and  we  may 
now    add    Germany    and    Italy)    are,    in    his    view, 
'  factitious  aggregates  without  solid  justification,"  and 
they  will  only  become  "  free  and  durable  States,"  when 
they  are  broken  up  into  fragments,  each  with  a  popu- 
lation of  two  or  three   millions,  and  a  territory  not 
exceeding  that  of  Belgium  or  Tuscany,     The  "West" 
will  thus  be  divided  into  seventy  republics,  and   the 
earth  into  five  hundred ;  and  the  main  work  of  the 
patriciate  will  be  to  diroct  and  regulate  the  industrial 
life  of  the  community ;  each  member  of  the  banker  tri- 
umvirate, who  are  to  be  at   the   head    of  the    State, 
having  one  of  the  great  industrial  departments  under 
his  special  superintendence.      On  the  other  hand,  the 
unity   of   humanity   is    to    be   represented    solely   by 
the   spiritual   power,   in    whose    hands   is   to   be   left 
the    whole   work   of  advancing   science,   teaching   the 
people,   and    exercising   a   moral    censorship   over   all 
Governments  and  individuals.      And  while  this  spir- 
itual  power  is,  for  practical   purposes,  to  be   strictly 
organized    on    the    model    of   the    mediaeval    Church, 
it  is  also,  like  that  Church,  to  remain,  for  scientific 
purposes,  inorganic.      In  other   words,  it  is  to  admit 
no  division   of    labour  in    science,    but    every   scien- 
tific  man,   like   a  mediteval  doctor,  is    to    profess  all 
science,    adding    to    this    the    priestly    office,    which, 


CHURCH  A  ND  S TA  TE.  20:} 

with  Comte,  includes  both  the  cure  of  souls  and  of 
bodies. 

To  criticize   the   details   of  this   scheme   seems   to  sepumtion 

of  N)ilritual 

be  unnecessary  after  what  has  been  already  said.  "^'^J,?^'""''"'" 
It  is  not  to  be  denied  that  the  division  of  Church 
.  and  State  in  the  Middle  Ages  was  a  most  important 
and  even  a  necessary  condition  of  proj^ress.  Chris- 
tianity could  never  have  been  impressed  upon  the 
minds  of  men,  if  the  concrete  application  of  its 
principles  had  been  too  rapid.  The  essential  con- 
dition of  such  application  was  that  men  should  not 
concern  themselves  too  prematurely  with  it.  For 
the  consequences  of  a  moral  and  religious  principle 
cannot  be  reached  by  direct  logical  deduction ;  it 
is  like  a  living  germ,  in  which,  by  no  analysis  or 
dissection,  you  can  discover  the  lineaments  of  the 
future  plant.  To  find  out  what  it  really  is,  or 
involves,  you  must  plant  it  in  the  minds  of  men, 
and  let  it  grow.  Hence  the  mediaeval  Church  was 
strong  in  its  weakness,  and  it  was  its  very  victories 
over  the  temporal  power  that  were  its  greatest  danger. 
It  became  corrupt  and  lost  its  hold  upon  the  minds 
of  men,  just  when  it  seemed  to  have  established 
its  right  to  an  absolute  supremacy.  Comte,  following 
De  Maistre,  attaches  great  importance  to  the  posi- 
tion of  the  Popes  as  arbiters  between  the  sovereigns 
and  nations  of  mediaeval  Europe.  But  he  forgets 
that   in   claiming  and   maintaining  this   position,  the 


204     THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

Popes  were  distinctly  ceasing  to  be  a  spiritual  power, 
if  it  be  the  function  of  a  spiritual  power  to  inculcate 
principles  rather  than  to  use  them  to  solve  practical 
difficulties.  A  power  interfering  in  this  way  with 
the  immediate  struggle  of  interests  could  not  but 
be  invaded  by  the  passions  they  excite ;  and  it  was 
the  more  certain  to  be  corrupted  by  these  passions, 
because  it  conceived  them  to  be  evil,  and  pretended 
altogether  to  renounce  them.  The  authority  acquired 
by  the  Church  in  the  Middle  Ages  might  have  its 
value,  as  an  anticipation  of  the  peaceful  federation 
of  the  nations  under  one  supreme  Government,  but 
it  was  undoubtedly  the  first  step  towards  the  erasing 
of  the  distinction  between  the  temporal  and  the 
spiritual  power. 
Their  neces-       ^hc    truth    sccms    to    be    that    the    distinction    of 

sary  con- 
flict, when  1  1  •    -i.       1  J.      •         J.T. 

separated,  sccular  and  Spiritual  powers,  except  m  the  sense 
already  indicated,  is  essentially  irrational,  and  that 
the  attempt  to  realize  it  in  practice  must  involve, 
as  it  did  involve  in  the  Middle  Ages,  a  continual 
internecine  struggle.  To  set  up  two  regularly  con- 
stituted powers  face  to  face  with  each  other,  one 
claiming  man's  allegiance  in  the  name  of  his  spiritual, 
and  the  other  in  the  name  of  his  temporal,  interests, 
is  to  organize  anarchy.  So  long  as  man's  body  and 
soul  are  inseparable,  it  will  be  impossible  to  divide 
the  world  between  Ctesar  and  God ;  for  in  one  point 
of  view  all   is  Ctesar's,  and  in  another   all   is  God's. 


THE  SECULAR  AND  SPIRITUAL  POWERS.    205 

Tn  the  Middle  Ages  the  conflict  of  two  despotisms 
was  necessary  to  the  growth  of  freedom  ;  hut,  when 
government  ceases  to  be  despotic,  the  need  for  such 
division  of  power  passes  away.  The  relative  separa- 
tion between  the  speculative  and  the  practical 
classes — between  the  scientific  and  moral  teachers  of 
mankind,  who  have  to  discover  and  inculcate  prin- 
ciples, and  the  statesmen  or  administrators,  who  have 
to  determine  what  improvements  it  is  possible  at 
a  definite  time  to  make  in  the  organization  of  man's 
social  and  political  life — is  a  division  of  labour  which 
can  surely  be  secured  without  breaking  up  the  unity 
of  the  social  body.  It  is  not  desirable  that  the 
philosopher,  or  priest,  or  man  of  science,  should  be 
king  (and  we  may  even  acknowledge  that,  if  in- 
were  a  king,  he  would  probably  be  a  very  bad  one) :  \ 
on  the  other  hand,  it  is  desirable  that  he  should 
have  his  due  influence,  as  the  teacher  of  those 
general  truths  out  of  which  all  practical  improvement  \ 
must  ultimately  spring.  But  the  natural  difference 
of  the  tastes  and  capacities  of  men  should,  in  a 
well-organized  State,  be  sufficient  to  secure  due  in- 
fluence to  those  who  are  the  natural  representatives 
of  man's  spiritual  interests  (whether  they  be  relig- 
ious, philosophic,  or  scientific),  without  tempting 
them  from  their  proper  task  of  discovering  and 
teaching  the  truth,  to  the  less  appropriate  work  of 
determining    how    much    of    it    comes    within    "  the 


206       THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

sphere  of  practical  politics."  Comte,  indeed,  by 
organizing  them  as  an  independent  power  apart 
from,  and  outside  of,  the  State,  would  make  such 
a  perversion  extremely  probable.  A  hierarchy  of 
priests  under  a  despotic  Pope  would  soon  cease  to 
be,  in  any  sense,  a  spiritual  jDower ;  it  would  de- 
generate just  as  the  Papacy  degenerated  in  the 
fourteenth  century ;  and  this  would  be  only  the 
more  certain  if,  by  the  Comtist  denunciation  of 
specialism,  the  priests  were  prohibited,  in  their  own 
peculiar  sphere  of  scientific  research,  from  any  divi- 
sion of  labour  according  to  capacity.  For  by  this 
prohibition  their  attention  would  be  diverted  from 
inquiries  about  the  truth  of  their  doctrines  to  their 
immediate  practical  application;  not  to  mention  that, 
in  the  case  of  all  but  a  few  comprehensive  minds,  the 
natural  result  would  be  an  omniscient  superficiality, 
which  would  be  the  enemy  of  all  real  culture. 
Deprived  of  its  natural  object  as  a  scientific  order, 
the  Comtist  Priesthood  would  inevitably  throw  itself, 
with  all  its  energy,  into  the  task  of  directly  influenc- 
ing the  practical  life  of  men ;  and,  if  Comte's  polit- 
ical ideas  were  carried  out,  it  would  find  itself  in  the 
presence  of  a  number  of  communal  States,  none  of 
them  large  enough  to  offer  any  effective  resistance. 
Positivism  must  indeed  alter  human  nature,  if  such 
a  priesthood  would  not  seek  to  make  itself  despotic, 
especially  if  it  could  wield  such  a  formidable  weapon 


THE  CHURCH  AGAINST  THE  STATE.       207 

as    the    Positivist    excommunication    is    sui)pused    to 
be.* 

The  truth  is  that  Comte  commits  the  same  error  comto-s 

Hocial  ideal 

which  misled  Montesquieu  when  he  supposed  that  "r^^^'^jj."^ 
the  great  security  of  a  free  State  lay  in  the  separation 
of  the  legislative,  executive,  and  judicial  ])owers, — 
i.e.,  in  treating  the  dillerent  organs  thrctugli  wliich 
the  common  life  expresses  itself  as  if  they  were 
independent  organisms.  He  forgot  that  if  such  a 
balance  of  power  was  realized,  the  effect  must  either 
be  an  equilibrium  in  which  all  movement  would  cease, 
or  a  struggle  in  which  the  unity  of  the  State  would 
be  in  danger  of  being  lost.  The  true  security 
against  the  dangers  involved,  on  the  one  hand,  in 
the  direct  application  of  theory  to  practice,  and,  on 
the  other  hand,  in  the  too  great  separation  of  practice 
from  theory,  must  lie,  not  in  giving  them  independent 
positions  as  spiritual  and  temporal  powers,  but  in 
subordinating  them  to  the  organic  unity  of  the  whole 
society,  whether  it  be  communal,  national,  or  universal. 
And  organic  unity,  though  it  does  not  mean  any 
special  form  of  government,  means  at  least  two  things: 
in  the  first  place,  that  each  great  class  or  interest 
should  have  for  itself  a  definite  organ,  and  sliould 
therefore  be  able  to  act  on  the  whole  body  in  a 
regular  and  constitutional  manner,  so  as  to  use 
all  its  force  without  revolutionary  violence ;  and, 
*  Pol.  Pos.  iv.  p.  292. 


208      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

in  the  second  place,  that  no  class  or  interest  should 
have  suc]i  an  independent  position,  as  to  exclude 
every  legal  or  constitutional  method  of  bringing  it 
into  due  subordination  to  the  common  good.  But 
Corate,  losing  his  balance  in  his  jealousy  of  the 
individualistic  and  democratic  movement  of  modern 
society,  has  built  up  a  social  ideal,  which  fails  in 
both  these  points  of  view,  and  which,  indeed,  is  a 
revival  of  the  inorganic  structure  of  mediaeval  society, 
comte's  j^  would   not   be   fair  to  conclude  these  chapters, 

position  as  a  ■•■ 

philosopher,  ^i-jjyj-^  have  necessarily  been  devoted  in  great  part 
to  criticism  and  controversy,  without  expressing  a 
sense  of  the  power  and  insight  which  are  shown  in 
the  works  of  Comte,  especially  in  the  Folitiqtce 
Positive.  Controversy  itself,  it  must  be  remembered, 
is  a  kind  of  homage ;  for,  as  Hegel  says,  "  It  is 
only  a  great  man  that  condemns  us  to  the  task 
of  explaining  him."  But  if  we  can  sometimes  look 
down  upon  such  men,  it  becomes  us  to  remember 
that  we  stand  upon  their  shoulders.  Comte  seems 
to  me  to  occupy,  as  a  writer,  a  position  in  some 
degree  analogous  to  that  of  Kant.  He  stands,  or 
rather  moves,  between  the  old  world  and  the  new, 
and  is  broken  into  inconsistency  by  the  effort  of 
transition.  Like  Kant,  he  is  embarrassed  to  the 
end  by  the  ideas  with  which  he  started,  and  of 
which  he  can  never  free  himself  so  as  to  make 
a  new  beginning.      Comte,  indeed,  had  only  a  small 


COMTE  AND  AV/A'7.  :^0L> 

portion  of  that  power  ol'  speculative  analysis  whith 
characterized  his  great  predecessor,  but  he  luul  much 
of  his  tenacity  of  thought,  his  power  of  continuous 
construction ;  he  had  the  same  conviction  of  the  all- 
importance  of  morals,  and  the  same  determination 
to  make  all  theoretic  studies  subordinate  to  the 
solution  of  the  moral  problem.  Also,  partly  because 
he  lived  at  a  later  time  and  in  the  midst  of  a 
society  which  was  in  the  throes  of  a  social  revolu- 
tion, and  partly  because  of  the  keenness  and  strength 
of  his  own  social  sympathies,  he  gives  us  a  kind  of 
insight  into  the  diseases  and  wants  ol'  modern  society, 
which  we  could  not  expect  from  Kant,  and  which 
throws  new  light  upon  the  ethical  speculations  oi' 
Kant's  idealistic  successors.  To  believe  that  his 
system,  as  a  whole,  is  inconsistent  with  itself,  that 
his  theory  of  historical  progress  is  insufficient,  and 
that  his  social  ideal  is  imperfect,  need  not  prevent 
us  from  recognizing  that  there  are  many  valuable 
elements  in  his  historical  and  social  theories,  and 
that  no  one  who  would  study  such  subjects  can 
afiford  to  neglect  them.  A  mind  of  such  power 
cannot  treat  any  subject  without  throwing  upon  it 
much  light,  which  is  independent  of  his  special 
system  of  thought;  and,  above  all,  without  doing 
much  to  show  what  are  the  really  imi)onant  diffi- 
culties in  it  which  need  to  be  solved.  And,  espec- 
ially in  such  subjects,  to  discover  the  right  question 


210      THE  SOCIAL  PHILOSOPHY  OF  COMTE. 

is  to  be  half-way  to  the  answer.  Further,  as 
Comte  himself  somewhere  says,  it  is  an  immense 
advantage  in  studying  any  complex  subject  to  have 
before  us  a  distinct  and  systematic  attempt  to  explain 
it ;  for  it  is  only  by  criticism  upon  criticism  that 
we  can  expect  to  reach  the  truth,  in  which  its 
different  sides  and  aspects  are  brought  to  a  unity. 


THE  END 


GLASGOW;    FRIMEU    41'   THt;    IXIVEKSITV    FliESS   iiV    RUBEIU    MACLEHOSE. 


WORKS  BY   THE  SAME   AUTHOR. 


The   Critical   Philosophy   of  Immanuel  Kant. 

2  VOLS.     DEMY  8vo.     32s. 

"It  is  quite  the  most  comprehensive  and  maturely  considered  tonln- 
bution  that  has  yet  been  made  by  an  English  writer  to  the  underslandinj; 
of  Kant's  whole  philosophical  achievements." — Mind. 

"  At  last  we  have  in  English  a  critical  exposition  of  '  'I'lie  Critica 
Philosophy  of  Kant,' which,  for  thoroughness  and  ability,  can  hold  up  its 
head  before  any  similar  attempt  in  other  languages." — 7'/ie  Acadtmy. 

Essays  in  Literature  and  Philosophy. 

2  VOLS.     CROWN  8vo.     8s.  6d.   Nktt. 

Vol.  1. — Dante  in  his  Relation  to  the  Theology  and  Ethics 
of  the  Middle  Ages  ;  Goethe  and  Philosophy  ;  Rousseau  ; 
Wordsworth  ;  The  Problem  of  Philosophy  at  the  Present 
Time  ;  the  Genius  of  Carlyle. 

Vol.  II. — Cartesianism  ;  Metaphysics. 

Either  volume  may  be  had  separately,  price  55.  iiett. 

"  Mr.  Caird's  literary  appreciations  are  suggestive,  sympathetic,  and 
penetrating,  while  his  speculative  discussions  exhibit  a  profound  grasp 
of  metaphysic." — The  Times. 

The  Evolution  of  Religion. 

The   Gifford   Lectures   delivered   be/ore   the    University  of  St. 
Andrews  in  1890-92. 

2  VOLS.     EX.   POST  8vo.     14s.  Nf;TT. 

"  Professor  Edward  Caird's  two  learned  and  thoughtful  volumes  on  the 
Evolution  of  Religion  are  a  very  important  and  very  striking  contribution 
to  the  philosophy  of  religious  thought.  The  conception  which  tiiey  embody 
of  the  religious  history  of  mankind  as  a  continuous  evolution  still  in  many 
respects  incomplete,  will  of  course  be  repudiated  by  some  schools  of 
religious  thought,  but  it  will  be  welcomed  by  others  as  a  fruitful  source 
of  spiritual  comfort  and.enlightenment,  and  even  the  most  orthodo.x  might 
welcome,  as  they  cannoj^j^happreciate,  Professor  Caird's  empiiatic  presenta- 
tion of  ideal  Christian it\ras  the  final  term  of  the  evolution." — The  Times, 
Feb.  2,  1893.  W 


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